标题: 2022.03.03 德国已经进入一个新时代 [打印本页] 作者: shiyi18 时间: 2022-3-4 06:17 标题: 2022.03.03 德国已经进入一个新时代 By Invitation | Russia and Ukraine
Wolfgang Ischinger argues that Germany has entered a new era
The country’s most experienced diplomat explains its astonishing foreign-policy U-turn
Mar 3rd 2022
SOMETHING DRAMATIC, even historic, happened in the Reichstag building in Berlin on February 27th. Olaf Scholz, Germany’s chancellor, announced a plan to spend an additional €100bn ($111bn) on defence; to support imposing sanctions on Russia (including ones related to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and SWIFT); to commit to two LNG terminals; to export weapons to Ukraine and to consider acquiring the American-made F-35 as the next generation of nuclear-capable German aircraft. This was a massive and almost complete policy turnaround, with a number of German foreign policy’s sacred cows slaughtered. Having prided themselves on continuity as a central element of German foreign policy for decades, German political elites were stunned. It became apparent that Mr Scholz was not only enjoying the support of his Ampelkoalition, traffic-light coalition, but also that of Germany’s new opposition leader, Friedrich Merz.
Throughout the past decade, maintaining the status quo was the bottom line of German foreign policy, often defined as Politik der Zurückhaltung, policy of restraint. To understand why, consider our recent history. After reunification in 1990, Germany developed a lasting love affair with stability. Germans endured huge changes after their catastrophic military and moral defeat in the second world war: the partition of Germany into East and West; membership of NATO and the European Union for West Germany; membership of the Warsaw Pact for East Germany. Then came the Berlin Wall in the 1960s, and later its fall and the reunification of Germany in 1989-90. For many Germans, this was more than enough change. They felt relief that four decades on the front line of the cold war were now ending, and they applauded when German leaders declared that “we are now only surrounded by friends”.
Angela Merkel understood all this extremely well. She managed to get herself re-elected three times by telling the Germans that she would not rock the boat. Partnership with Russia, as well as partnership with China, remained German aspirations even after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and in the face of China’s increasingly repressive domestic policies. Soberingly Mrs Merkel declared in 2017, having just met Donald Trump, that Europe could no longer rely on always being protected by America. But she did not follow up her remarks with action. Nuclear strategy and NATO’s goal of ensuring that its members spend 2% of GDP on defence were never among her priorities. Instead, she deserves praise for keeping the EU from falling apart during the Greek and euro crises, and Germany’s generous humanitarian position during the migration crisis. But Mrs Merkel failed to take advantage of the various crises and challenges confronting Europe to push Germany into a new role, and into a new era.
Enter Mr Scholz at the end of 2021. He did not really win the election last year; Mrs Merkel’s party lost it. Few expected him to lead his coalition effectively and he remained rather unimpressive in his first international appearances. Foreign-policy experts declared that the world around us was changing ever more quickly; we at the Munich Security Conference even published a report entitled “Zeitenwende”, or “Watershed,” at the end of 2020. But only after Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine last month did Mr Scholz explain that the German infatuation with the status quo was going up in flames. A new era—one far more dangerous than the three decades since reunification—had begun.
Mr Scholz is emerging as a “crisis chancellor”. If Angela Merkel had attempted to raise defence expenditure by €100bn, opposition parties would have organised street protests. But he has managed it. Has Mr Scholz risen to the challenge Mr Putin poses? The answers to these questions will depend on how well Mr Scholz is able to hold his traffic-light coalition together. Pacifist elements within it, including the Green party and the left wing of Mr Scholz’s own Social Democratic Party, may not stay quiet for long. The state of the war will determine their response.
The central task for Germany now is to strengthen the EU and to ensure that it is more respected as a strategic actor. Co-operation between France and Germany is critical, and Mr Scholz barely mentioned it in his speech on Sunday. If President Joe Biden, or another committed transatlanticist, were not in the White House at present, the EU would seriously struggle in the face of Mr Putin’s war. Mr Scholz’s coalition has promised to put German power at the service of the EU. That reminds me of words spoken by the author Thomas Mann some seven decades ago: “Our goal should not be a German Europe but a European Germany.” ■
Wolfgang Ischinger is the president of the Foundation Council of the Munich Security Conference (MSC) Foundation. He was chairman of the MSC, which organises an annual gathering of political and military leaders, from 2008 to 2022. Before that he was the German ambassador to America and to Britain.
在过去十年中，维持现状是德国外交政策的底线，通常被定义为Politik der Zurückhaltung，即克制政策。要了解原因，请考虑我们最近的历史。1990年统一后，德国对稳定产生了持久的爱慕之情。德国人在第二次世界大战中遭受灾难性的军事和道德失败后，经历了巨大的变化：德国被分割成东西两部分；西德加入了北约和欧盟；东德加入了华沙条约国。然后是20世纪60年代的柏林墙，以及后来的柏林墙倒塌和1989-90年的德国统一。对许多德国人来说，这已经是足够多的变化了。他们感到欣慰的是，在冷战前线的四十年现在已经结束了，当德国领导人宣布 "我们现在只被朋友包围 "时，他们鼓掌叫好。
