标题: 1966.09 中东军备竞赛 [打印本页] 作者: shiyi18 时间: 2022-6-21 04:34 标题: 1966.09 中东军备竞赛 Middle East Arms Race
SEPTEMBER 1966 ISSUE
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A POTENTIAL Middle East balance of terror haunts the capitals of long-contending states. Security is no longer measured in numbers of divisions and exact distributions of military hardware. Possible future atomic capability, or an equivalent command of atomic guarantee, is becoming the criterion of strength and power. The most optimistic view is that the Arabs and Israelis are using atomic language in a new version of psychological warfare. Can Israel produce bombs at Dimona? Did German scientists really put Egypt on the track of the same possibility? Each side hopes that the other believes it. Each says it will not be the first to introduce such weapons into the area. Each needs to bolster prestige by keeping up the sinister guessing game.
The Middle East contenders appear today to be approaching the nuclear world with somewhat different strategies. Egypt and Israel both signed the test-ban treaty of 1963. But since that time Egypt has made no secret of its need for international reassurance. Last May’s joint appeal by Presidents Tito and Nasser for a general disarmament conference was only the last of a series of such moves. At Geneva disarmament sessions, Egyptian delegates play an active role, suggesting means of detecting underground tests and ways of control. Along with other atomic have-nots at Stockholm last spring, Egyptians explored ways of differentiating between underground explosions and earthquakes.
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Pending general disarmament developments, Egypt has sought a guarantee of atomic protection from the U.S.S.R. Part of the psychological pressure in the area depends on the unknown response to this appeal. Soviet Premier Kosygin took the occasion of his last visit to Cairo to warn of the dangers of nuclear proliferation. He stressed the need for a treaty to prevent it “as soon as possible.”
Denuclearization of the Mediterranean is, of course, an important Soviet objective. The Russians have offered an agreement there conditioned on the removal of American bases and of the Polaris elements of the Sixth Fleet.
Given the lack of progress toward general agreement on nonproliferation, it is not surprising that such countries as Israel and Egypt (and India) should weigh the possibility of joining the atomic club. President Nasser has said that Egypt is thinking about developing nuclear weapons because Israel “is working in this field.” It is clear from the tone of his various statements to this effect that considerations of prestige weigh as heavily as does actual security. At this stage Egypt is not believed to possess the potential for making bombs. Yet it must seem to be in the race while it is seeking actual security through guarantees.
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Israel’s atomic reactor
Israel, on the other hand, appears to have a real choice. While urging the major powers to draw the line against “impermissible” arms in the area, and promising that Israel will not introduce atomic weapons itself, Premier Eshkol has made it plain that Israel will make its own policy. In this field Israel leads from a certain amount of strength. Its research reactor in the Negev is capable of producing plutonium for weapons. Built with French help, and reportedly with the help of other European scientists, this reactor has a capacity of 24,000 thermal watts. It is of the heavy-water-moderated type using natural uranium. Thus each time there is mention in the world press of an Israeli deal with some South American country for uranium, the question again arises whether Dimona is being diverted to military purposes.
Israel today rejects the idea of international inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Until such inspection is the rule and not the exception, it sees no reason to reveal its secrets. It contends that the IAEA is staffed with many representatives of Arab countries. If Dimona came under such scrutiny, Israel would lose its freedom to decide whether or when to make bombs. Thus even the psychological deterrent of uncertainty would be lost, as well as the final choice about a real deterrent. Visits of American scientists have been permitted with a view to reassuring Washington about Israel’s intentions. This arrangement is informal and appears to have assured the visitors that Dimona is not producing weapons.
The race for tanks and planes
Meanwhile, the balance of conventional threats to peace is precarious. A higher proportion of resources is spent for military purposes in the Middle East than anywhere else in the developing world. Military equipment has become a symbol of power and influence. It is no longer enough to have steel plants, national air lines, computers, and food freezers. The latest tanks and planes are essential status symbols.
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In the arms race, figures are obsolete on publication. An order of magnitude is indicated by estimated troop strengths ranging from Israel’s 250,000 on immediate call, Egypt’s 180,000, Iraq’s 82,000, Syria’s 61,000, Jordan’s 36,000, and Saudi Arabia’s 20,000.
Tank strength is estimated at 1200 for Egypt, from the U.S.S.R.; 600 for Israel, including British Centurions and American Pattons; 320 for Iraq, mostly from the U.S.S.R.; and 200 for Jordan, including 150 Pattons acquired in 1965-1966.
Aircraft strengths have rapidly increased in the last two years. Israel apparently leads here with about 470 planes, among them French Mirages, Mystères, and Super Mystères as well as Skvhawk bombers now promised from the United States. Egypt is estimated to have a force of about 450 planes, of which Soviet MIG-21D’s are the most important component. Iraq accounts for about 250, including MIG-17’s and -19’s; Syria about 150; and Jordan about 36 Starfighters plus a small number of British aircraft.
Missiles on each side remain a secret to non professionals. Egypt periodically announces production of long-range missiles. Soviet-made SAM-2’s, of the type used in North Vietnam, protect Cairo, Aswan, and the Suez Canal. Israel’s theoretical possession of French missiles with 500-mile-range is denied in Tel Aviv. Its possession of French Matra air-to-air missiles is public knowledge, however, as is its acquisition of U.S. Hawks.
Defense budgets last year ran at $400 million for Egypt, $271 million for Israel, $142 million for Iraq, $108 million for Saudi Arabia. With stepped-up purchases on order in 1966, all must be rising, particularly that of Saudi Arabia. Its $400 million package for arms, fighters, rockets, and a complete air defense system, to become operable in two years, will make Saudi Arabia the potential defender of the entire Arabian peninsula. This appears to be the purpose behind the AngloAmerican agreement with King Faisal this summer.
United States policy shifts
United States policy in the Middle East in the sixties has been based on two ideas. One is the encouragement of peaceful internal development. The second has been disengagement from local quarrels. Aid programs have been tailored to encourage local initiative. The Jordan Development Board, for example, began under British and American tutelage and has evolved to independent status. Between 1959 and 1964 Jordan’s income rose 65 percent. Its growth rate is 5 percent a year. The government aims to be self-sustaining in the next decade.
In Egypt the same principles have guided American policy in a much more hectic atmosphere. Since 1955, aid in the amount of $1.2 billion has gone to the revolutionary government for its internal programs. Much of this has been for food. But much has also gone into useful work in water development, education, and management training. Private American funds have gone into oil exploration, and private American foundation grants have helped establish small industries and advanced Egypt’s birth control program. The United States has maintained a diplomatic exchange and sustained the basic food program while remaining disengaged from Egyptian political gyrations.
The U.S.S.R. is estimated to have spent a billion dollars on military aid to Egypt in rubles or in exchange for cotton. Large amounts have also gone to Syria; and 85 percent of Iraq’s matériel has come from the Eastern bloc. By contrast, during the eight years prior to 1965, American military aid to Jordan amounted to only $36 million.
Two factors have combined to pressure Washington into assuming a more direct role in Middle East defense supply. One is the increasingly sophisticated character of modern arms. These new weapons, and the ancillary matériel which goes with them, involve elaborate scientific training for those using them. Thus the question arises whether it is more advantageous to supply and train some of those who turn to Washington for support rather than to let them all turn to the East.
The failure of Arab unity
The second factor which has had to be weighed is the political polarization which has taken place with the failure of attempts at Arab unity. The effort toward unity began late in 1963 under Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was the architect and leader of what came to be called Arab summitry. It was he who then headed off a violent confrontation with Israel over diversion of Jordan River headwaters. Such a confrontation could not succeed, he said, until the Arabs were united. There must not be another 1948. The struggle against Israel must be postponed until a Unified Arab Command, drawing on pooled Arab funds, developed a united strategy.
To appease the activists, particularly in Syria, a Palestine Liberation Organization was set up. Palestinians eager to prepare for action were steered into a force called the Palestine Liberation Army.
Priorities set up by the Unified Command soon put heavy pressure on King Hussein. Jordan’s pivotal geographic position, and the fact that two thirds of its citizens are former Palestinians, made this inevitable. Hussein was assigned a given number of arms to be obtained for the cause. Funds would come from the United Command treasury in Cairo, to which the oil states were heavy contributors. It was suggested at command headquarters that Russian arms were available in the needed quantities, and that a unified command could best deploy unified armament.
At this point Hussein turned to Washington. The much debated shift in American arms policy followed, after a more than usually agonizing reappraisal. Allocations of arms to help Jordan modernize its forces (and maintain its independence among the Arab states) were announced in April, 1965. There was no outcry in Tel Aviv, where Hussein has long been regarded as a stabilizing if unfriendly figure in the Arab world. In Cairo, of course, the move was recognized as a check to Nasserite ambitions.
In this fashion the American government was persuaded to face the shifting realities of power and weakness in the Middle East and to devise a case-by-case approach to appeals for defense assistance.
The second case was that of Saudi Arabia. The decision by London and Washington to provide a modern defense system in the Arabian peninsula is related to Red Sea and Arabian Gulf politics. Britain’s decision this year to relinquish its position in Aden by 1968 means that another power vacuum will be created. Its location is particularly vital, for Britain cannot relinquish its dependence on Middle East oil. Sixty-four percent of Britain’s oil imports come from the Middle East. About a quarter of its seaborne trade transits the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. London must therefore be concerned about what happens at Aden.
King Faisal’s role
Chaos in Yemen, and the failure of any federated state to evolve in response to British prodding in Aden and adjacent protectorates, causes London to look hopefully toward the one stable figure in the Gulf region, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. In a more utopian era an alternative source of security might be a UN police force. A UN role in the political evolution of South Arabia is now being sought. But neither London nor Washington can contemplate without concern the prospect of a Yemeni-style struggle over a “liberated” Aden Federation.
Lacking constructive alternatives in the face of one more British evacuation from the Middle East, Western hopes therefore focus on King Faisal, a gradualist leader to whom the mini-states in the region can look for support. But since gradualism is anathema to the hotheads in South Arabia and Aden, the King is being supplied with an air and communications system adequate for an eventual regional defense.
The stakes in this region are high. Even before the Yemeni revolution in 1962 the Chinese had appeared, offering technical aid. In its turn the U.S.S.R. invested $28 million in military aid to the former Imam’s regime. The only conceivable point to both these ventures was to gain toeholds in the Red Sea region. Thus today’s contest was clearly foreseen in Peking and Moscow. Soviet air bases remain at Sanaa and Hodeida. Lately, some electronically equipped Soviet trawlers, operating from Egypt’s Red Sea coast, have appeared to be fishing in more than one sense. Across the Red Sea, Soviet arms have for some time been going to Somalia, causing great anxiety in Addis Ababa.
It seems significant, therefore, that King Faisal has been making friendly overtures to Emperor Haile Selassie, and that he has visited Khartoum as well as Washington. Nearer home he is sponsoring and paying for a “Friendship Road,” which connects the small states on the Arabian Gulf coast with each other and with Saudi Arabia. He has settled local border disputes with Kuwait and Qatar. Another recent agreement with Jordan has set the border between them so as to enable Jordan to expand its port of Aqaba.
Israel’s position
With the obvious breakup of attempts at Arab unity and the present polarization of factions, Israel should feel more secure than in the immediate past. No one today expects an Arab drive against Israel. The violent talk about Israel seems almost in inverse relationship to potential threats. Syria is most vocal — and weakest internally. Half of Egypt’s army is still bogged down in Yemen. King Hussein is fully occupied keeping a step ahead of subversive local Nasserites, and parrying efforts by Shukairy to divide the Palestinians who make up the backbone of Jordan’s electorate. The river question is a chronic issue, but Israel does not object to the dam being constructed by Jordan on the Yarmuk.
Even so, Israel has continued insistently to argue for American defense commitments. Earlier, the plea was for a unilateral guarantee of Israel’s frontiers. When the United States determined that such a move would not be in Israel’s interest, or in its own, the argument moved to different ground. Israel wanted its independent means of defense. It wanted not to rely indefinitely on the presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
Israelis believe that an important turning point in relations with Washington has been reached with the agreement for eventual delivery of A-4 Skyhawk bombers. Skyhawks can operate from short runways, such as those in Israel. They have a combat range of 1000 miles and can carry 5000 pounds of bombs or missiles. The significance of this deal is that for the first time Washington has been persuaded of Israel’s need of an offensive American plane.
There are in this case, as in those with Arab countries, restrictions on procurement from other sources and on total amounts spent on arms. Yet press reports from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem reveal that Israel regards the Skyhawk agreement as a great diplomatic victory. To Tel Aviv it means that Washington accepts the idea of independent deterrent power. It is also suggested in this period of euphoria that with this deterrent promised, the decision about atomic weapons development in Israel can be postponed.
Israel may have reaped another temporary bonus in defense this last summer. U.S. pilots in July in Vietnam demonstrated a way to evade the Soviet SAM missiles in North Vietnam. The possibility that the SAM’s may therefore become obsolete is a potential blow to Cairo. The search for a new means of protection could only lead to further escalation in the region.
The lesson here is that any socalled balance of forces is transitory. And the preservation of the long Middle East truce remains as difficult as ever.
