标题: 2022.08.03习近平可能会攻击台湾 [打印本页] 作者: shiyi18 时间: 2022-8-5 03:15 标题: 2022.08.03习近平可能会攻击台湾 By Invitation | Taiwan
Xi Jinping may attack Taiwan to secure his legacy, warn Admiral Lee Hsi-min and Eric Lee
The pair believe a paradigm shift in Taiwan’s military strategy is now critical
Aug 3rd 2022
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THE RUSSIAN invasion of Ukraine has been a wake-up call for Taiwan. Every day images of destruction flash across Taiwanese television screens. They bring to mind Taiwan’s own potential future. Late-night talk-show hosts in Taipei, the capital, have shifted from discussing political gossip to analysing military tactics and ruminating on how the war in Ukraine will unfold, and what it all means. That faraway conflict has drawn attention to the existential threat facing Taiwan.
Under General Secretary Xi Jinping’s command, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has systematically strengthened its armed forces and prepared for an attack on Taiwan. The island’s government, its armed forces and its citizens must also prepare. After this year’s 20th CCP Congress in Beijing, expected to be held in November, there is a very real possibility of a sharp uptick in aggression towards Taiwan.
Mr Xi’s legacy is one reason why. He has promulgated grandiose goals for the CCP and has fundamentally altered the way in which China engages with the world. But he has yet to secure an achievement on a scale that would fix his legacy alongside those of supreme leaders such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Mr Xi could attempt a feat that no other party leader has ever managed: conquering Taiwan.
Beijing is increasingly powerful, aggressive and ideologically hostile, and it is no secret that Mr Xi and the CCP elite seek to annex Taiwan. The questions are when and how. Military force remains an option. Mr Xi initiated massive reforms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which will enable China’s soldiers to better execute joint operations—those involving the army, air force and navy acting together—against Taiwan.
Mr Xi has directed China’s defence industry to churn out weapons specifically designed to prevent American forces from intervening to help Taiwan or other allies in the region. Such weapons include increasingly accurate and lethal ballistic and cruise missiles, integrated air-defence systems and anti-satellite weapons—all backed by a rapidly growing stockpile of nuclear weapons. As the PLA evolves, the CCP’s intentions seem increasingly clear. Even if Mr Xi is prioritising other options today, such as intimidating and isolating Taiwan, once the PLA is ready for an invasion Mr Xi’s decision to launch one could come with little warning.
The build-up of China’s armed forces is not the only problem that Taiwan faces. Taiwan has struggled to advance national-security objectives for a range of domestic reasons. These have included issues with military strategy and defence guidance, threat perception, military training and recruitment, and civilian-military relations—to name but a few.
Now is the time to rethink Taiwan’s national defence in its totality. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has altered traditional thinking about the effectiveness of conventional military strategies. It has made plain the shortcomings and vulnerabilities of large weapons platforms. It has also revealed the advantages of mobile, precise weapons on the battlefield. Events have proven that asymmetric warfare, in which a combatant attempts to thwart the strengths of a more powerful opponent, can defend against invasion. Taiwan should fully implement a truly asymmetric defence strategy.
There are those who say instead that Taiwan should have more conventional weapons, such as fighter jets, to stop China gaining control of the airspace. But given the enormous qualitative and quantitative disparity in combat power across the Strait, Taiwan will fail if it continues to focus solely on acquiring weapons that are not well suited to countering an invasion. Minor adjustments to weapons procurement will make no difference unless accompanied by fundamental changes in strategy, however. That is because an asymmetric strategy will dictate how weapons are actually used. Taiwan must innovate with its relatively limited resources. The country should prioritise deterring and, if necessary, defeating an invasion as its ultimate objective.
Taiwan plans on the assumption that China’s threat will probably manifest in two ways: through coercion and/or invasion. Coercion includes conventional and unconventional state-sponsored aggression below the threshold of all-out war. It includes escalating military intimidation in Taiwan’s skies and seas, through incursions and live-fire exercises around its territorial waters and airspace, for example. Such intimidation is happening already on a daily basis. In an invasion, the PLA would seek to destroy the government and occupy Taiwan’s territory in its totality. It is critical that Taiwan acknowledges the existence of both threats and develops commensurate countermeasures. But arguably the country is less prepared for invasion than it is coercion.
At the start of an all-out war across the Taiwan Strait, the PLA would launch waves of devastating missile strikes. The aim would be to destroy important political and military targets so as to weaken the public’s will and the armed forces’ ability to fight. An amphibious invasion would follow. Taiwan should narrowly aim to prevent such a landing, rather than seeking the more ambitious goals of sea control and air superiority. The military imbalance between the two sides means that China’s forces would overwhelm Taiwan’s with sheer numbers anyway, and also devastate ports and air bases, paralysing Taiwan’s navy and airforce.
Above all, Taiwan’s troops and weapons need to survive to counter an invasion. That means the armed forces must be mobile, resilient, lethal and dispersed. They must focus on the PLA’s vulnerabilities. Primarily, this would entail striking critical military nodes as well as exposed units crossing the Strait. Taiwan’s defensive advantage would be greatest when enemy forces are in the waters nearing Taiwan. When in transit, the PLA would be vulnerable and limited in its fighting capabilities. But Taiwan would be able to summon firepower from air, sea and ground assets while receiving cover from land-based air defences and protection from sea mines.
Military training should be overhauled and the armed forces organised to operate under decentralised command, as communications could fail. The government should train civilians and establish a voluntary territorial defence force (TDF) as any air blockade or quarantine would leave no opportunity for citizens to flee. A TDF would educate the public and strengthen its will to fight. The initiative would not be a death sentence for the Taiwanese people, sending all into war. Rather, by signalling that Taiwan would not raise the white flag even if enemy forces succeeded in landing on Taiwanese territory, the force would function as a deterrent. The PLA would know that it could complicate war plans.
Much attention has been focused on the specific weapons Taiwan needs to defend itself. But the country stands no chance without an effective strategy, tough training and the will to fight. In order to continue the freedom and prosperity it enjoys, Taiwan needs a paradigm shift to fundamentally change its approach to defence. ■
Admiral Lee Hsi-min served in Taiwan’s navy for over 40 years and was chief of the general staff of the country’s armed forces between 2017 and 2019. He is now a senior fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, a think-tank in Washington, DC, where he works with Eric Lee. Mr Lee is the institute’s associate director of programmes.
