2022.02.23克里姆林宫为什么要在乌克兰寻求政权更迭

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By Invitation | Russia and Ukraine
Michael Kofman, an expert on Russia’s armed forces, explains why the Kremlin will seek regime change in Ukraine
Scenarios involving only limited fighting make little sense militarily

Feb 23rd 2022


AFTER A LENGTHY and ominous speech, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin chose to recognise the breakaway Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, in eastern Ukraine, on February 21st. Shortly afterwards, Russian troops marched in openly. Yet this decision marks the start of a new phase, rather than the end of the current standoff.

Mr Putin’s decision does nothing to satisfy the numerous grievances Russia’s leader has levied against Kyiv or his demands for security guarantees from NATO in recent months. Russian troops have already been in Ukraine’s Donbas region for eight years. In fact, by formally recognising the two republics he has given up his main leverage in Ukraine: the prospect of using the separatists to entrench Russian influence over its politics. Russian recognition is therefore part of a larger ploy to retain a say over Ukraine’s strategic orientation and domestic policies.


The evolution of this crisis, Mr Putin’s grievances and the current disposition of Russian forces suggest the start of a more significant play for Ukraine, with grand aims. The Kremlin’s recent claims of continuing escalation, and that Ukrainian soldiers crossed into Russian territory, appear to be part of a false-flag operation, building the case for a larger war. The recognition of Luhansk and Donetsk, and the subsequent approval of the Federation Council, the upper house of Russia’s legislature, authorises Moscow to use force abroad. This formally establishes the legal and political basis for military action in Ukraine, and Moscow can use force more broadly now if it accuses Ukraine of aggression against the newly independent statelets.


A new war would prove quite different from past Russian offensives during the summer of 2014 and winter 2015. Those battles resulted in the Minsk I and II ceasefires, imposed on Ukraine at gunpoint, but the deals are widely acknowledged in Moscow to have been failures that did not achieve Russia’s political aims. Repeating such operations—limited wars to coerce Ukraine into a deal—would come at great economic cost in exchange for no tangible benefit. Ukraine’s armed forces have improved and expanded considerably since 2014. A smaller war confined to the Donbas would incur higher casualties today, without good prospects for achieving any political objectives. If Russia seeks a quick and decisive victory, it will therefore have to dramatically expand the scope of the conflict—and the types of forces employed.

Russia has positioned more than 150,000 troops to surround Ukraine from Belarus in the north to Crimea in the south. Together with Russian-led forces in the Donbas, and auxiliaries including Rosgvardia, Russia’s national guard, this figure may exceed 190,000. These ground forces are supported by hundreds of tactical aircraft, forward-deployed attack helicopters and the Russian navy. This is not a force for a limited campaign, but one designed to pursue maximalist political aims. Russia will seek to surround and isolate Ukrainian forces in pockets of territory, forcing them to surrender, and attempt to impose regime change in Kyiv.

The Russian disposition of forces suggests that its general staff intends to conduct two major pincer movements into Ukraine. The lesser of the two will advance from the north on the capital, Kyiv. The larger attack will seek to encircle Ukrainian forces near Donbas. Russian-led units there may serve as a pinning force, while the main Russian grouping would advance from the north-east by Kharkiv and from Crimea in the south. In this scenario, Moscow would try to prevent Ukrainian forces from being able to conduct an organised retreat to more defensible terrain west of the Dnieper river.

This war would begin with air strikes, missile strikes and use of electronic warfare and cyber-attacks. Their goal would be to degrade, fragment and paralyse the Ukrainian armed forces along with its political leadership. This air campaign would be brief, followed by a combined arms ground offensive. Russia’s ground force is an artillery army with tanks and mechanised infantry. It emphasises decisive use of firepower. These formations would be backed by attack helicopters, tactical bombers and missile brigades. Those supporting elements would dramatically increase the effectiveness of Russian ground formations in combat.


Although Ukraine’s armed forces have improved since the fighting of 2014-2015, so have Russia’s. The units surrounding Ukraine are largely staffed by contract soldiers—professional servicemen, rather than conscripts—with high levels of readiness, modernised equipment and officers bloodied in several conflicts, such as the war in Syria. Ukraine’s military is understaffed, poorly supplied, and inexperienced in manoeuvre warfare. Russian forces therefore have considerable quantitative and qualitative superiority.

Much is contingent in war, but Ukraine’s odds are grim in a conventional fight, even with Western-supplied weapons. Its forces might convert into partisan warfare, or take to the cities. The latter would prove a difficult decision as urban warfare is immensely destructive. Moscow probably hopes to organise local security forces, or to co-opt political elites, to avoid being dragged into urban combat. The current Russian force may be enough to occupy Ukraine’s eastern regions and the capital, but if Russian leaders believe they can control large parts of the country, they are likely to be walking into a sustained insurgency.

Although Moscow has the military advantage, Russian pronouncements on Ukraine suggest that the Kremlin suffers from a high degree of war optimism—a common mistake made by aggressors throughout history. These conflicts tend to drag on well beyond the initial campaign, or escalate into regional wars. America’s experience in Iraq was hardly an aberration. Using force is always a gamble. If Mr Putin goes through with it, it will be the biggest he has made thus far. ■

Michael Kofman is the Director of the Russia Studies Program at CNA, an American defence research organisation. The views expressed here are his own.



应邀参加｜俄罗斯和乌克兰
俄罗斯武装力量专家迈克尔-科夫曼解释了克里姆林宫为什么要在乌克兰寻求政权更迭。
只涉及有限战斗的方案在军事上没有意义

2022年2月23日


经过冗长而不祥的讲话，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔-普京在2月21日选择承认乌克兰东部分离出来的卢甘斯克和顿涅茨克人民共和国。此后不久，俄罗斯军队公开进军。然而，这一决定标志着一个新阶段的开始，而不是当前对峙的结束。

普京先生的决定并没有满足俄罗斯领导人对基辅的诸多不满，也没有满足他近几个月对北约安全保障的要求。俄罗斯军队已经在乌克兰的顿巴斯地区驻扎了8年。事实上，通过正式承认这两个共和国，他已经放弃了他在乌克兰的主要筹码：利用分离主义分子巩固俄罗斯对乌克兰政治的影响的前景。因此，俄罗斯的承认是一个更大的策略的一部分，以保持对乌克兰的战略方向和国内政策的发言权。


这场危机的演变、普京先生的不满以及俄罗斯军队目前的部署都表明，乌克兰开始了一场更重要的游戏，而且目标宏大。克里姆林宫最近声称危机继续升级，乌克兰士兵越过了俄罗斯领土，这似乎是假象行动的一部分，为更大规模的战争做准备。对卢甘斯克和顿涅茨克的承认，以及随后联邦委员会（俄罗斯立法机构的上院）的批准，授权莫斯科在国外使用武力。这正式确立了在乌克兰采取军事行动的法律和政治基础，如果莫斯科指责乌克兰对新独立的小国进行侵略，它现在可以更广泛地使用武力。


一场新的战争将证明与过去俄罗斯在2014年夏季和2015年冬季的攻势截然不同。这些战斗的结果是在枪口下强加给乌克兰的明斯克一号和二号停火协议，但莫斯科方面普遍承认这些协议是失败的，没有达到俄罗斯的政治目的。重复这样的行动--通过有限的战争来胁迫乌克兰达成协议--将付出巨大的经济代价，却无法换取实际的利益。自2014年以来，乌克兰的武装力量得到了极大的改善和扩大。今天，一场局限于顿巴斯地区的较小规模的战争将招致更多的伤亡，而且没有实现任何政治目标的良好前景。如果俄罗斯寻求快速和决定性的胜利，它将不得不大幅扩大冲突的范围--以及所使用的部队类型。

俄罗斯已经部署了超过15万的部队，从北部的白俄罗斯到南部的克里米亚包围乌克兰。加上俄罗斯在顿巴斯地区领导的部队，以及包括俄罗斯国民警卫队Rosgvardia在内的辅助部队，这一数字可能超过19万。这些地面部队得到了数百架战术飞机、前沿部署的攻击直升机和俄罗斯海军的支持。这不是一支用于有限战役的部队，而是一支旨在追求最大政治目标的部队。俄罗斯将寻求在小块领土上包围和孤立乌克兰军队，迫使他们投降，并试图在基辅实施政权更迭。

俄罗斯对部队的部署表明，其总参谋部打算对乌克兰进行两次主要的钳形运动。两次中较小的一次将从北部向首都基辅推进。较大的进攻将寻求包围顿巴斯附近的乌克兰部队。俄罗斯领导的部队在那里可以作为夹击力量，而俄罗斯的主要集团将从东北方向的哈尔科夫和南部的克里米亚推进。在这种情况下，莫斯科将试图阻止乌克兰部队能够有组织地撤退到第聂伯河以西更容易防守的地形。

这场战争将以空袭、导弹袭击和使用电子战和网络攻击开始。他们的目标是削弱、瓦解和瘫痪乌克兰武装部队及其政治领导人。这一空袭行动将是短暂的，随后是联合武器的地面攻势。俄罗斯的地面部队是一支拥有坦克和机械化步兵的炮兵部队。它强调果断地使用火力。这些编队将得到攻击直升机、战术轰炸机和导弹旅的支持。这些支持元素将极大地提高俄罗斯地面编队的战斗力。


虽然乌克兰的武装力量自2014-2015年的战斗以来有所改善，但俄罗斯的武装力量也有所改善。乌克兰周边的部队主要由合同兵--专业军人，而不是义务兵--组成，他们拥有高水平的战备、现代化的装备和在若干冲突中浴血奋战的军官，例如在叙利亚的战争。乌克兰的军队人员不足，供应不足，而且没有机动作战的经验。因此，俄罗斯部队在数量和质量上有相当大的优势。

在战争中，很多东西都是偶然的，但乌克兰在常规战斗中的胜算很低，即使使用西方提供的武器。它的部队可能会转入游击战，或者进入城市。后者将被证明是一个困难的决定，因为城市战具有巨大的破坏性。莫斯科可能希望组织当地的安全部队，或者收编政治精英，以避免被拖入城市战斗。目前的俄罗斯部队可能足以占领乌克兰东部地区和首都，但如果俄罗斯领导人认为他们可以控制该国的大部分地区，他们很可能会走进一场持续的叛乱中。

虽然莫斯科拥有军事优势，但俄罗斯在乌克兰问题上的声明表明克里姆林宫患有高度的战争乐观主义--这是历史上侵略者常犯的错误。这些冲突往往会在最初的战役之后拖得很久，或者升级为区域战争。美国在伊拉克的经历几乎没有反常之处。使用武力总是一场赌博。如果普京先生坚持这样做，这将是他迄今为止所做的最大的一次。■

迈克尔-科夫曼是美国国防研究机构CNA的俄罗斯研究项目主任。这里所表达的观点是他自己的。