2014.04.19 美国如何失去弗拉基米尔-普京

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How America Lost Vladimir Putin
A rupture between Russia and the West, 14 years in the making

By David Rohde and Arshad Mohammed

A portrait of Russian President Vladimir Putin, painted by former U.S. President George W. Bush, at the Bush Presidential Library and Museum in Dallas. (Brandon Wade/Reuters)
APRIL 19, 2014
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In September 2001, as the U.S. reeled from the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, Vladimir Putin supported Washington's imminent invasion of Afghanistan in ways that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War. He agreed that U.S. planes carrying humanitarian aid could fly through Russian air space. He said the U.S. military could use airbases in former Soviet republics in Central Asia. And he ordered his generals to brief their U.S. counterparts on their own ill-fated 1980s occupation of Afghanistan.

During Putin's visit to President George W. Bush's Texas ranch two months later, the U.S. leader, speaking at a local high school, declared his Russian counterpart "a new style of leader, a reformer … a man who's going to make a huge difference in making the world more peaceful, by working closely with the United States."

Putin promotes a conservative, ultra-nationalist form of state capitalism as an alternative to Western democracy.
For a moment, it seemed, the distrust and antipathy of the Cold War were fading. Then, just weeks later, Bush announced that the United States was withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, so that it could build a system in Eastern Europe to protect NATO allies and U.S. bases from Iranian missile attack. In a nationally televised address, Putin warned that the move would undermine arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

"This step has not come as a surprise to us," Putin said. "But we believe this decision to be mistaken." The sequence of events early in Washington's relationship with Putin reflects a dynamic that has persisted through the ensuing 14 years and the current crisis in Ukraine: U.S. actions, some intentional and some not, sparking an overreaction from an aggrieved Putin.

As Russia masses tens of thousands of troops along the Russian-Ukrainian border, Putin is thwarting what the Kremlin says is an American plot to surround Russia with hostile neighbors. Experts said he is also promoting "Putinism"—a conservative, ultra-nationalist form of state capitalism—as a global alternative to Western democracy.

It's also a dynamic that some current and former U.S. officials said reflects an American failure to recognize that while the Soviet Union is gone as an ideological enemy, Russia has remained a major power that demands the same level of foreign-policy attention as China and other large nations—a relationship that should not just be a means to other ends, but an end in itself.

"I just don't think we were really paying attention," said James F. Collins, who served as the U.S. ambassador to Moscow in the late 1990s. The bilateral relationship "was seen as not a big deal."

Since 2000, Putin has made restoring Russia's traditional sphere of influence his central goal.
Putin was never going to be an easy partner. He is a Russian nationalist with authoritarian tendencies who, like his Russian predecessors for centuries, harbors a deep distrust of the West, according to senior U.S. officials. Much of his worldview was formed as a KGB officer in the twilight years of the Cold War and as a government official in the chaotic post-Soviet Russia of the 1990s, which Putin and many other Russians view as a period when the United States repeatedly took advantage of Russian weakness.

Since becoming Russia's president in 2000, Putin has made restoring Russia's strength—and its traditional sphere of influence—his central goal. He has also cemented his hold on power, systematically quashed dissent, and used Russia's energy supplies as an economic billy club against its neighbors. Aided by high oil prices and Russia's United Nations Security Council veto, Putin has perfected the art of needling American presidents, at times obstructing U.S. policies.

Officials from the administrations of Presidents Bush and Barack Obama said American officials initially overestimated their potential areas of cooperation with Putin. Then, through a combination of overconfidence, inattention, and occasional clumsiness, Washington contributed to a deep spiral in relations with Moscow.


A sign made by local school children welcoming Putin to Texas hangs from a cattle fence outside Crawford, Texas, in November 2001. Putin and Bush met to discuss nuclear-arms-stockpile reductions. (Reuters)
Bush and Putin's post-2001 camaraderie foundered on a core dispute: Russia's relationship with its neighbors. In November 2002, Bush backed NATO's invitation to seven nations—including former Soviet republics Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—to begin talks to join the Western alliance. In 2004, with Bush as a driving force, the seven Eastern European nations joined NATO.

Putin and other Russian officials asked why NATO continued to grow when the enemy it was created to fight, the Soviet Union, had ceased to exist. And they asked what NATO expansion would do to counter new dangers, such as terrorism and proliferation. "This purely mechanical expansion does not let us face the current threats," Putin said, "and cannot allow us to prevent such things as the terrorist attacks in Madrid or restore stability in Afghanistan."

"We never tested Putin."
Thomas E. Graham, who served as Bush's senior director for Russia on the National Security Council, said a larger effort should have been made to create a new post-Soviet, European security structure that replaced NATO and included Russia. "What we should have been aiming for—and what we should be aiming for at this point," Graham said, "is a security structure that's based on three pillars: the United States, a more or less unified Europe, and Russia."

Graham said small, incremental attempts to test Russian intentions in the early 2000s in Afghanistan, for example, would have been low-risk ways to gauge Putin's sincerity. "We never tested Putin," Graham said. "Our policy never tested Putin to see whether he was really committed to a different type of relationship."

But Vice President Dick Cheney, Senator John McCain, and other conservatives, as well as hawkish Democrats, remained suspicious of Russia and eager to expand NATO. They argued that Moscow should not be given veto power over which nations could join the alliance, and that no American president should rebuff demands from Eastern European nations to escape Russian dominance.


Putin meets German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and French President Jacques Chirac in St. Petersburg, in April 2003. The three leaders opposed the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. (Reuters)
Another core dispute between Bush and Putin related to democracy. What Bush and other American officials saw as democracy spreading across the former Soviet bloc, Putin saw as pro-American regime change. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, without UN authorization and over the objections of France, Germany, and Russia, was a turning point for Putin. He said the war made a mockery of American claims of promoting democracy abroad and upholding international law.

Putin was also deeply skeptical of U.S. efforts to nurture democracy in the former Soviet bloc, where the State Department and American nonprofit groups provided training and funds to local civil-society groups. In public speeches, he accused the United States of meddling.

Bush said that the U.S. was promoting freedom in Iraq. Putin openly mocked him.
In late 2003, street protests in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, known as the Rose Revolution, led to the election of a pro-Western leader. Four months later, street protests in Ukraine that became known as the Orange Revolution resulted in a pro-Western president taking office there. Putin saw both developments as American-backed plots and slaps in the face, so soon after his assistance in Afghanistan, according to senior U.S. officials.

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In 2006, Bush and Putin's sparring over democracy intensified. In a press conference at the first G-8 summit hosted by Russia, the two presidents had a testy exchange. Bush said that the United States was promoting freedom in Iraq, which was engulfed in violence. Putin openly mocked him.

"We certainly would not want to have the same kind of democracy as they have in Iraq," Putin said, smiling as the audience erupted into laughter, "I will tell you quite honestly." Bush tried to laugh off the remark. "Just wait," he replied, referring to Iraq.

Graham said the Bush administration telegraphed in small but telling ways that other foreign countries, particularly Iraq, took precedence over the bilateral relationship with Moscow. In 2006, for example, the White House asked the Kremlin for permission for Bush to make a refueling stop in Moscow on his way to an Asia-Pacific summit meeting. But it made clear that Bush was not looking to meet with Putin, whom he would see on the sidelines of the summit.

After Russian diplomats complained, Graham was sent to Moscow to determine if Putin really wanted a meeting and to make clear that if there was one, it would be substance-free. In the end, the two presidents met and agreed to ask their underlings to work on a nonproliferation package. "When the Russian team came to Washington in December 2006, in a fairly high-level ... group, we didn't have anything to offer," Graham said. "We hadn't had any time to think about it. We were still focused on Iraq."

Graham said that the Bush administration's approach slighted Moscow. "We missed some opportunities in the Bush administration's initial years to put this on a different track," Graham said. "And then later on, some of our actions, intentional or not, sent a clear message to Moscow that we didn't care."

Bush's relationship with Putin unraveled in 2008. In February, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia with the support of the United States—a step that Russia, a longtime supporter of Serbia, had been trying to block diplomatically for more than a decade. In April, Bush won support at a NATO summit in Bucharest for the construction of a missile-defense system in Eastern Europe.

The pattern is clear: U.S. actions, some intentional and some not, sparking an overreaction from an aggrieved Putin.
Bush called on NATO to give Ukraine and Georgia a so-called Membership Action Plan, a formal process that would put each on a path toward eventually joining the alliance. France and Germany blocked him and warned that further NATO expansion would spur an aggressive Russian stance when Moscow regained power. In the end, the alliance simply issued a statement saying the two countries "will become members of NATO." That compromise risked the worst of both worlds—antagonizing Moscow without giving Kiev and Tbilisi a roadmap to join NATO.

The senior U.S. official said these steps amounted to "three train wrecks" from Putin's point of view, exacerbating the Russian leader's sense of victimization. "Doing all three of those things in kind of close proximity—Kosovo independence, missile defense and the NATO expansion decisions—sort of fed his sense of people trying to take advantage of Russia," he said.

In August 2008, Putin struck back. After Georgia launched an offensive to regain control of the breakaway, pro-Russian region of South Ossetia, Putin launched a military operation that expanded Russian control of South Ossetia and a second breakaway area, Abkhazia. The Bush administration, tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, publicly protested but declined to intervene militarily in Georgia. Putin emerged as the clear winner and achieved his goal of standing up to the West.


Matryoshka dolls decorated with images of U.S. President Barack Obama, his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev, and Russia's then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin at a Moscow market in July 2009. (Denis Sinyakov/Reuters)
After his 2008 election victory, Barack Obama carried out a sweeping review of Russia policy. Its primary architect was Michael McFaul, a Stanford University professor and vocal proponent of greater democracy in Russia who took the National Security Council position previously held by Thomas Graham.

In a recent interview, McFaul said that when Obama's new national security team surveyed the administration's primary foreign-policy objectives, they found that few involved Russia. Only one directly related to bilateral relations with Moscow: a new nuclear-arms-reduction treaty. The result, McFaul said, was that relations with Moscow were seen as important in terms of achieving other foreign-policy goals, and not as important in terms of Russia itself. "So that was our approach," he said. Obama's new Russia strategy was called "the reset." In July 2009, he traveled to Moscow to start implementing it.

In Moscow, Obama spent five hours meeting Medvedev and only an hour with Putin.
In an interview with the Associated Press a few days before leaving Washington, Obama chided Putin, who had become Russia's prime minister in 2008 after reaching his two-term constitutional limit as president. Obama said the United States was developing a "very good relationship" with the man Putin had anointed as his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, and accused Putin of using "Cold War approaches" to relations with Washington.

"I think Putin has one foot in the old ways of doing business and one foot in the new," Obama said. In Moscow, Obama spent five hours meeting with Medvedev and only one hour meeting with Putin, who was still widely seen as the country's real power. After their meeting, Putin said U.S.-Russian relations had gone through various stages. "There were periods when our relations flourished quite a bit and there were also periods of, shall we say, grayish mood between our two countries and of stagnation," he said, as Obama sat a few feet away.

At first, the reset fared well. During Obama's visit, Moscow agreed to greatly expand Washington's ability to ship military supplies to Afghanistan via Russia. In April 2010, the United States and Russia signed a new START treaty, further reducing the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals. Later that year, Russia supported sweeping new UN economic sanctions on Iran and blocked the sale of sophisticated, Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems to Tehran.

Experts said the two-year honeymoon was the result of the Obama administration's engaging Russia on issues where the two countries shared interests, such as reducing nuclear arms, countering terrorism, and nonproliferation. The same core issues that sparked tensions during the Bush administration—democracy and Russia's neighbors—largely went unaddressed.


U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton talks to Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov after she gave him a device with a red knob that said "RESET" during a meeting in Geneva, in March 2009. (Fabrice Coffini/Reuters)
In 2011, Putin accused Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of secretly organizing street demonstrations after disputed Russian parliamentary elections. Putin said Clinton had encouraged "mercenary" Kremlin foes. And he claimed that foreign governments had provided "hundreds of millions" of dollars to Russian opposition groups.


"She set the tone for some opposition activists, gave them a signal, they heard this signal and started active work," Putin said. McFaul called that a gross exaggeration. He said the U.S. government and American nonprofit groups in total have provided tens of millions of dollars in support to civil-society groups in Russia and former Soviet bloc countries since 1989.

In 2012, Putin was elected to a third term as president and launched a sweeping crackdown on dissent and re-centralization of power. McFaul, then the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, publicly criticized the moves in speeches and Twitter posts.

Clashes with Obama over democracy ended any hopes of U.S.-Russian rapprochement.
In the interview, McFaul blamed Putin for the collapse in relations. He said the Russian leader rebuffed repeated invitations to visit Washington when he was prime minister and declined to attend a G-8 meeting in Washington after he again became president. Echoing Bush-era officials, McFaul said it was politically impossible for an American president to trade Russian cooperation on Iran, for example, for U.S. silence on democracy in Russia and Moscow's pressuring of its neighbors.


"We're not going to do it if it means trading partnerships or interests with our partners or allies in the region," McFaul said. "And we're not going to do it if it means trading our speaking about democracy and human rights." Andrew Weiss, a Russia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that clashes over democracy ended any hopes of U.S.-Russian rapprochement, as they had in the Bush administration. "That fight basically vaporizes the relationship," said Weiss.

In 2013, U.S.-Russian relations plummeted. In June, Putin granted asylum to National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden. Obama, in turn, canceled a planned summit meeting with Putin in Moscow that fall. It was the first time a U.S. summit with the Kremlin had been canceled in 50 years.


Obama meets with Putin during the 2013 G-8 summit in Scotland. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)
Last fall, demonstrators in Kiev began demanding that Ukraine move closer to the European Union. At the time, the Obama White House was deeply skeptical of Putin and paying little attention to the former Soviet bloc, according to Weiss. White House officials had come to see Russia as a foreign-policy dead end, not a source of potential successes.


Deferring to European officials, the Obama administration backed a plan that would have moved Ukraine closer to the EU and away from a pro-Russian economic bloc created by Putin. Critics said it was a mistake to make Ukraine choose sides. Jack F. Matlock, who served as U.S. ambassador to Moscow from 1987 to 1991, said that years of escalating protests by Putin made it clear he believed the West was surrounding him with hostile neighbors. And for centuries, Russian leaders have viewed a friendly Ukraine as vital to Moscow's defense.

"This weird notion that Putin will go away and there will suddenly be a pliant Russia is false."
"The real red line has always been Ukraine," Matlock said. "When you begin to poke them in the most sensitive area, unnecessarily, about their security, you are going to get a reaction that makes them a lot less cooperative." American experts said it was vital for the U.S. to establish a new long-term strategy toward Russia that does not blame the current crisis solely on Putin. Matthew Rojansky, a Russia expert at the Wilson Center, argued that demonizing Putin reflected the continued failure of American officials to recognize Russia's power, interest, and importance.


"Putin is a reflection of Russia," Rojansky said. "This weird notion that Putin will go away and there will suddenly be a pliant Russia is false." A senior U.S. official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, called for a long-term strategy that exploits the multiple advantages the U.S. and Europe enjoy over Putin's Russia.

"I would much rather be playing our hand than his over the longer term," the official said. "Because he has a number of, I think, pretty serious strategic disadvantages—a one-dimensional economy, a political system and a political elite that's pretty rotten through corruption."

Matlock, the former U.S. ambassador, said it was vital for Washington and Moscow to end a destructive pattern of careless American action followed by Russian overreaction. "So many of the problems in our relationship really relate, I would say, to what I'd call inconsiderate American actions," Matlock said. "Many of them were not meant to be damaging to Russia.… But the Russian interpretation often exaggerated the degree of hostility and overreacted."

This post originally appeared on Reuters.com, an Atlantic partner site.



美国如何失去弗拉基米尔-普京
俄罗斯和西方之间的断裂，14年的酝酿。

大卫-罗德和阿尔沙德-穆罕默德报道

在达拉斯的布什总统图书馆和博物馆，美国前总统乔治-W-布什绘制的俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔-普京的画像。(Brandon Wade/Reuters)
2014年4月19日

2001年9月，当美国从对世贸中心和五角大楼的恐怖袭击中恢复过来时，弗拉基米尔-普京以冷战时期难以想象的方式支持华盛顿即将入侵阿富汗。他同意运送人道主义援助的美国飞机可以飞过俄罗斯领空。他说美国军队可以使用中亚前苏联共和国的空军基地。他还命令他的将军们向美国同行介绍他们自己在1980年代对阿富汗的不幸占领。

两个月后，普京访问乔治-W-布什总统的德克萨斯农场时，这位美国领导人在当地一所高中发表讲话，宣布他的俄罗斯同行是 "一个新式的领导人，一个改革者......一个将通过与美国密切合作，在使世界更加和平方面发挥巨大作用的人。"

普京提倡一种保守的、极端民族主义形式的国家资本主义，以替代西方民主。
有那么一刻，似乎冷战时期的不信任和反感正在消退。然后，仅仅几周后，布什宣布美国退出《反弹道导弹条约》，以便在东欧建立一个系统，保护北约盟国和美国基地免受伊朗导弹攻击。在一次全国性的电视讲话中，普京警告说，此举将破坏军备控制和不扩散努力。

"这一步骤对我们来说并不意外，"普京说。"但我们认为这个决定是错误的。" 华盛顿与普京关系早期发生的一系列事件反映了一种动态，这种动态在随后的14年和当前的乌克兰危机中一直存在。美国的行动，有些是故意的，有些不是，引发了受委屈的普京的过度反应。

当俄罗斯在俄乌边境集结数万名军队时，普京正在挫败克里姆林宫所说的美国用敌对的邻国包围俄罗斯的阴谋。专家说，他还在推广 "普京主义"--一种保守的、极端民族主义形式的国家资本主义--作为西方民主的全球替代方案。

一些现任和前任美国官员说，这也是一种动态，反映出美国没有认识到，虽然苏联作为意识形态上的敌人已经消失，但俄罗斯仍然是一个大国，需要与中国和其他大国一样的外交政策关注--这种关系不应该只是达到其他目的的手段，而应该是目的本身。

"曾在20世纪90年代末担任美国驻莫斯科大使的詹姆斯-F-柯林斯（James F. Collins）说："我只是认为我们没有真正注意到这一点。双边关系 "被视为不是什么大事"。

自2000年以来，普京将恢复俄罗斯的传统势力范围作为其核心目标。
普京从来不会是一个容易的合作伙伴。据美国高级官员称，他是一个具有独裁倾向的俄罗斯民族主义者，与他几个世纪以来的俄罗斯前辈一样，对西方怀有深深的不信任。他的世界观大部分是在冷战晚期担任克格勃官员时形成的，并在20世纪90年代混乱的后苏联时期担任政府官员，普京和许多其他俄罗斯人认为那是美国一再利用俄罗斯弱点的时期。

自2000年成为俄罗斯总统以来，普京将恢复俄罗斯的实力及其传统势力范围作为他的中心目标。他还巩固了自己的权力，系统性地平息了异议，并利用俄罗斯的能源供应作为对付邻国的经济棍棒。在高油价和俄罗斯在联合国安理会的否决权的帮助下，普京已经完善了与美国总统针锋相对的艺术，有时还阻挠美国的政策。

布什总统和奥巴马总统的政府官员说，美国官员最初高估了他们与普京合作的潜在领域。然后，通过过度自信、不注意和偶尔的笨拙，华盛顿促成了与莫斯科关系的深度螺旋。


2001年11月，德克萨斯州克劳福德市外的牛栏上挂着一个由当地学童制作的欢迎普京到德克萨斯州的标语。普京和布什会面，讨论削减核武库存。(路透社)
布什和普京在2001年后的友好关系建立在一个核心争端上。俄罗斯与邻国的关系。2002年11月，布什支持北约邀请七个国家--包括前苏联的爱沙尼亚、拉脱维亚和立陶宛--开始谈判，加入西方联盟。2004年，在布什的推动下，这七个东欧国家加入了北约组织。

普京和其他俄罗斯官员问道，既然北约的敌人--苏联已经不存在了，为什么还要继续发展。他们还问道，北约的扩张将如何应对新的危险，如恐怖主义和扩散。"这种纯粹的机械式扩张不能让我们面对当前的威胁，"普京说，"不能让我们防止诸如马德里的恐怖袭击或恢复阿富汗的稳定。"

"我们从来没有测试过普京。"
曾担任布什国家安全委员会俄罗斯事务高级主管的托马斯-E-格雷厄姆说，本应作出更大的努力，建立一个新的后苏联、欧洲安全结构，以取代北约并包括俄罗斯。"格雷厄姆说："我们本应追求的，也是我们目前应该追求的，是一个基于三个支柱的安全结构：美国、一个或多或少统一的欧洲和俄罗斯。"

格雷厄姆说，例如，21世纪初在阿富汗进行的测试俄罗斯意图的小规模、渐进式尝试，将是衡量普京诚意的低风险方式。"我们从未测试过普京，"格雷厄姆说。"我们的政策从来没有测试过普京，看看他是否真的致力于建立不同类型的关系。"

但是，副总统迪克-切尼、参议员约翰-麦凯恩和其他保守派以及鹰派民主党人仍然对俄罗斯心存疑虑，渴望扩大北约。他们认为，莫斯科不应获得对哪些国家可以加入联盟的否决权，任何美国总统都不应该回绝东欧国家摆脱俄罗斯统治的要求。


2003年4月，普京在圣彼得堡会见德国总理施罗德和法国总统希拉克。这三位领导人反对以美国为首的对伊拉克的入侵和占领。(路透社)
布什和普京之间的另一个核心争端与民主有关。布什和其他美国官员认为民主在前苏联集团蔓延，而普京则认为是亲美政权的改变。2003年美国未经联合国授权，不顾法国、德国和俄罗斯的反对入侵伊拉克，是普京的一个转折点。他说，这场战争是对美国宣称的促进海外民主和维护国际法的嘲弄。

普京还对美国在前苏联集团培育民主的努力深表怀疑，美国国务院和美国非营利组织为当地民间社会团体提供培训和资金。在公开演讲中，他指责美国插手干预。

布什说，美国正在促进伊拉克的自由。普京公开嘲讽他。
2003年底，前苏联格鲁吉亚共和国的街头抗议活动，即所谓的玫瑰革命，导致亲西方的领导人当选。四个月后，乌克兰的街头抗议活动被称为 "橙色革命"，导致亲西方的总统在那里就职。据美国高级官员称，普京将这两个事态发展视为美国支持的阴谋和打脸，在他援助阿富汗之后不久。

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阿斯利康（ASTRAZENECA
2006年，布什和普京在民主问题上的争吵愈演愈烈。在俄罗斯主办的首届八国集团峰会的新闻发布会上，两位总统进行了激烈的交流。布什说，美国正在伊拉克促进自由，而伊拉克正被暴力所吞噬。普京公开嘲讽他。

普京说："我们当然不希望拥有与他们在伊拉克一样的民主，"普京笑着说，听众席上爆发出一阵笑声，"我会很诚实地告诉你。" 布什试图对这句话一笑置之。"等着吧，"他回答说，指的是伊拉克。

格雷厄姆说，布什政府以细小但有说服力的方式传递出其他外国，特别是伊拉克，优先于与莫斯科的双边关系。例如，2006年，白宫要求克里姆林宫允许布什在前往亚太峰会的途中在莫斯科加油。但白宫明确表示，布什并不希望与普京会面，他将在峰会的间隙与普京见面。

在俄罗斯外交官提出抱怨后，格雷厄姆被派往莫斯科，以确定普京是否真的想要会面，并明确表示，如果有会面，将是没有内容的。最后，两位总统进行了会晤，并同意要求他们的下属就不扩散方案开展工作。"当俄罗斯团队于2006年12月来到华盛顿，在一个相当高级别的......小组中，我们没有任何东西可以提供，"格雷厄姆说。"我们没有任何时间去考虑这个问题。我们仍然专注于伊拉克。"

格雷厄姆说，布什政府的做法轻视了莫斯科。"在布什政府的最初几年，我们错过了一些机会，没有把这个问题放在不同的轨道上，"格雷厄姆说。"后来，我们的一些行动，不管是有意还是无意，都向莫斯科发出了一个明确的信息，即我们并不关心。"

布什与普京的关系在2008年解体。2月，在美国的支持下，科索沃单方面宣布从塞尔维亚独立--这是俄罗斯作为塞尔维亚的长期支持者，十多年来一直试图在外交上阻挠的步骤。4月，布什在布加勒斯特举行的北约峰会上赢得了对在东欧建造导弹防御系统的支持。

这种模式很明显：美国的行动，有些是故意的，有些不是，引发了受委屈的普京的过度反应。
布什呼吁北约给乌克兰和格鲁吉亚一个所谓的 "成员行动计划"，这是一个正式的过程，将使每个国家走上最终加入联盟的道路。法国和德国阻止了他，并警告说，当莫斯科重新获得权力时，北约的进一步扩张将刺激俄罗斯的侵略性姿态。最后，联盟只是发表了一份声明，说这两个国家 "将成为北约的成员"。这种妥协有可能造成两败俱伤的局面--在不给基辅和第比利斯一个加入北约的路线图的情况下激怒莫斯科。

这位美国高级官员说，从普京的角度来看，这些步骤相当于 "三次火车失事"，加剧了俄罗斯领导人的受害感。"他说："在科索沃独立、导弹防御和北约扩张的决定中，所有这三件事都很接近，这让他感觉到人们试图利用俄罗斯的利益。

2008年8月，普京进行了反击。在格鲁吉亚发动攻势，重新控制分离出来的亲俄罗斯的南奥塞梯地区后，普京发起了一次军事行动，扩大了俄罗斯对南奥塞梯和第二个分离地区阿布哈兹的控制。被伊拉克和阿富汗拖累的布什政府公开抗议，但拒绝对格鲁吉亚进行军事干预。普京成为明显的赢家，实现了他对抗西方的目标。


2009年7月，在莫斯科的一个市场上，装饰有美国总统奥巴马、俄罗斯总统梅德韦杰夫和俄罗斯时任总理普京形象的玛特里奥什卡娃娃。(Denis Sinyakov/Reuters)
奥巴马在2008年大选获胜后，对俄罗斯政策进行了全面的审查。其主要设计师是迈克尔-麦克福尔，他是斯坦福大学的教授，也是俄罗斯更多民主的积极支持者，他担任了托马斯-格雷厄姆之前担任的国家安全委员会职务。

在最近的一次采访中，麦克福尔说，当奥巴马的新国家安全团队调查政府的主要外交政策目标时，他们发现很少涉及俄罗斯。只有一个直接与莫斯科的双边关系有关：一个新的核武器削减条约。麦克福尔说，其结果是，与莫斯科的关系被视为在实现其他外交政策目标方面很重要，而在俄罗斯本身方面则不重要。"他说："所以这就是我们的方法。奥巴马的新俄罗斯战略被称为 "重置"。2009年7月，他前往莫斯科，开始实施这一战略。

在莫斯科，欧巴马花了五个小时与梅德韦杰夫会面，而与普京会面只有一个小时。
在离开华盛顿前几天接受美联社采访时，欧巴马责备普京，他在2008年作为总统达到宪法规定的两届任期上限后成为俄罗斯总理。欧巴马说，美国正在与普京指定为其继任者的德米特里-梅德韦杰夫发展一种 "非常好的关系"，并指责普京使用 "冷战方法 "处理与华盛顿的关系。

"欧巴马说："我认为普京一只脚踏在旧的商业方式上，一只脚踏在新的方式上。在莫斯科，奥巴马花了五个小时与梅德韦杰夫会面，只花了一个小时与普京会面，而普京仍被广泛视为该国的真正力量。在他们会面后，普京说美俄关系经历了不同的阶段。他说："有一些时期，我们的关系相当繁荣，也有一些时期，我们可以说，我们两国之间有灰色的情绪和停滞不前，"他说，奥巴马就坐在几英尺之外。

起初，重启工作进展顺利。在欧巴马访问期间，莫斯科同意大大扩大华盛顿通过俄罗斯向阿富汗运送军事物资的能力。2010年4月，美国和俄罗斯签署了一项新的裁减战略武器条约，进一步削减美国和俄罗斯的核武库。同年晚些时候，俄罗斯支持联合国对伊朗实施全面的新经济制裁，并阻止了向德黑兰出售复杂的俄制S-300防空导弹系统。

专家们说，这两年的蜜月是奥巴马政府在两国共同关心的问题上与俄罗斯接触的结果，如削减核军备、打击恐怖主义和不扩散。在布什政府时期引发紧张局势的同样核心问题--民主和俄罗斯的邻国--基本上没有得到解决。


2009年3月，美国国务卿希拉里-克林顿在日内瓦的一次会议上给了俄罗斯外交部长谢尔盖-拉夫罗夫一个带有红色旋钮的装置，上面写着 "RESET"，然后与他交谈。(Fabrice Coffini/Reuters)
2011年，普京指责美国国务卿希拉里-克林顿在有争议的俄罗斯议会选举后秘密组织街头示威活动。普京说克林顿鼓励 "雇佣兵 "克里姆林宫的敌人。他还声称，外国政府向俄罗斯反对派团体提供了 "数亿美元 "的资金。


"普京说："她为一些反对派活动家定下了基调，给了他们一个信号，他们听到这个信号后开始积极工作。麦克福尔称这是严重的夸大其词。他说，自1989年以来，美国政府和美国非营利性团体总共向俄罗斯和前苏联集团国家的民间社会团体提供了数千万美元的支持。

2012年，普京当选为第三任总统，并发起了对异议人士的全面镇压和权力的重新集中。时任美国驻莫斯科大使的麦克福尔在演讲和推特上公开批评了这些举措。

在民主问题上与奥巴马的冲突结束了美俄和解的任何希望。
在采访中，麦克福尔将关系的崩溃归咎于普京。他说，俄罗斯领导人在担任总理时拒绝了访问华盛顿的多次邀请，并在他再次成为总统后拒绝出席在华盛顿举行的八国集团会议。麦克福尔呼应布什时代的官员，说美国总统在政治上不可能用俄罗斯在伊朗问题上的合作来换取美国对俄罗斯的民主和莫斯科对其邻国的压力的沉默。


"如果这意味着与我们在该地区的伙伴或盟友交换伙伴关系或利益，我们不会这样做，"麦克福尔说。"如果这意味着拿我们对民主和人权的看法做交易，我们也不会这么做。" 卡内基国际和平基金会的俄罗斯问题专家安德鲁-魏斯说，关于民主的冲突结束了美俄和解的任何希望，就像在布什政府时期那样。"韦斯说："那场斗争基本上使关系蒸发了。

2013年，美俄关系一落千丈。6月，普京为国家安全局的告密者爱德华-斯诺登提供庇护。反过来，欧巴马取消了与普京计划于当年秋天在莫斯科举行的峰会。这是50年来美国首次取消与克里姆林宫的峰会。


奥巴马在2013年苏格兰八国集团峰会期间与普京会面。(Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)
去年秋天，基辅的示威者开始要求乌克兰向欧盟靠拢。韦斯说，当时，奥巴马白宫对普京深表怀疑，对这个前苏联集团的关注度不高。白宫官员将俄罗斯视为外交政策的死胡同，而不是潜在成功的来源。


奥巴马政府听从欧洲官员的意见，支持一项计划，该计划将使乌克兰更接近欧盟，远离普京建立的亲俄经济集团。批评者说，让乌克兰选边站是个错误。1987年至1991年担任美国驻莫斯科大使的杰克-马特洛克(Jack F. Matlock)说，普京多年来不断升级的抗议活动清楚地表明，他认为西方正在用敌对的邻居包围他。而几个世纪以来，俄罗斯领导人一直认为一个友好的乌克兰对莫斯科的防御至关重要。

"这种认为普京会消失，会突然出现一个柔顺的俄罗斯的奇怪想法是错误的。"
"真正的红线一直是乌克兰，"马特洛克说。"当你开始不必要地在最敏感的领域戳他们的安全问题时，你将会得到一种反应，使他们的合作性大大降低。" 美国专家说，美国对俄罗斯建立一个新的长期战略至关重要，该战略不会将当前的危机完全归咎于普京。威尔逊中心的俄罗斯专家Matthew Rojansky认为，将普京妖魔化反映了美国官员仍然没有认识到俄罗斯的力量、利益和重要性。


"普京是俄罗斯的一个反映，"罗扬斯基说。"这种认为普京会消失，会突然出现一个柔顺的俄罗斯的奇怪想法是错误的。" 一位不愿透露姓名的美国高级官员呼吁采取长期战略，利用美国和欧洲对普京的俄罗斯享有的多种优势。

"这位官员说："从长远来看，我更愿意打我们的牌而不是他的牌。"因为他有一些，我认为，相当严重的战略劣势--一个单一的经济，一个政治制度和一个因腐败而相当腐烂的政治精英。"

美国前大使马特洛克说，对华盛顿和莫斯科来说，结束美国不小心的行动和俄罗斯过度反应的破坏性模式至关重要。"我们关系中的许多问题，我想说的是，与我所说的美国的不周到的行动有关，"马特洛克说。"他们中的许多人并不打算对俄罗斯造成损害....，但俄罗斯的解释往往夸大了敌意的程度，并且反应过度。"

这篇文章最初出现在路透社网站，一个大西洋的合作伙伴网站。