2022.02.28 西方决不能对潜在的侵略者重新陷入自满情绪

shiyi18

By Invitation | Russia and Ukraine
John Bolton on the lessons to be drawn from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
The West must not lapse back into complacency about potential aggressors, says a former US national security adviser

Feb 28th 2022


JUST DAYS into what might be a protracted Russia-Ukraine war, politicians and pundits are already drawing sweeping conclusions. For some, Russia’s failure to gain a swift, decisive, low-casualty victory renders Vladimir Putin’s downfall inevitable, and imminent. For others, a Russian victory, however bloody, directly threatens Ukraine’s neighbours and would mean sustained tensions in Europe. Which is correct, I can’t tell. Edmund Burke’s advice is, as usual, apt: “Please God, I will walk with caution, whenever I am not able clearly to see my way before me.” A few prudential lessons, however, are clear.

First, pay attention to what adversaries say. In 2005 Mr Putin said that the Soviet Union’s disintegration was the 20th century’s greatest geopolitical catastrophe. Slowly but systematically since then, he has sought to reverse the collapse, most visibly through invasions, annexations and creating independent states—in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014). Mr Putin has also used less kinetic means to bring states like Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan into closer Russian orbits.


While this unfolded, the West remained largely insouciant: not spending adequate amounts on defence; growing increasingly reliant on Russian oil and gas supplies; and mirror-imaging Russia’s leadership as Europeans-in-waiting (ie, just like us except not as refined). Those days may be over, but Winston Churchill’s insight as to “the confirmed unteachability of mankind” remains profound. Been reading speeches by Xi Jinping, Ayatollah Khamenei and Kim Jong Un recently?

Second, the aggressive use of military force is back in style. The “rules-based international order” just took a direct hit, not that it was ever as sturdy as imagined in elite salons and academic cloisters. Although the steps taken to prevent Russia’s invasion and aid Ukraine in advance were obviously inadequate, the strength of the international reaction once the shooting actually started is impressive. It helps immeasurably that, so far, Ukraine’s resistance has been stiff. But let’s not be naive. Reports that Russian forces got lost, ran out of fuel, surrendered readily or even refused to cross into Ukraine all bespeak a Russian military not nearly so prepared, in morale or resources as Mr Putin believed.

The real unknown remains whether the widespread spontaneous outrage is sustainable, or whether the West lapses back into complacency regarding Russia and other potential international aggressors. World peace is not at hand. Rhetoric and virtue-signalling are no substitute for new strategic thinking and higher defence budgets. Germany’s commitment on February 27th to meet a commitment it had already made in 2014 to spend 2% of its GDP on defence merits applause. More will be merited when we see the colour of its money.


There has rightly been growing attention to the enormous threat China poses to Taiwan’s independence. So grave is it that Abe Shinzo, a former Japanese prime minister, and others have advised Washington to abandon “strategic ambiguity” over whether it will defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack. The Japanese now fully understand that an attack on Taiwan is an attack on Japan.

North Korea’s threat to South Korea is neither trivial nor a cold-war relic, especially in light of Pyongyang’s increasingly successful nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programmes. For Beijing, the prison-state North is an asset with which to threaten the western Pacific and beyond. South Korea’s impending presidential election will reveal much about the impact of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, and its implications for smaller countries abutting large, former-Communist, land empires.

In the Middle East, Iran proves that extremist, expansionist theology is still alive and well. Tehran’s hostile activities parallel Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile threats, and extend to providing drones and missiles to Yemen’s Houthi rebels to attack civilian targets in nearby countries; aiding terrorist outfits like Hamas and Hizbullah; and using conventional forces and terrorist tactics in Iraq and Syria to advance Iran’s interests.

Third, the new Russia-China entente is rolling along. Breast-beating about isolating Russia refers primarily to isolating it from Europe (which has, entirely through its own fault over several decades, become over-dependent on Russia for energy supplies). It remains to be seen whether the rest of the world will concur in the long run. Merely as one example, when Russia vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the Ukraine invasion, India, China and the United Arab Emirates all abstained. China may well be providing Russia with a tacit insurance policy through a willingness to buy any oil and gas Europe decides to embargo (not that Europe has acted yet; it’s cold in Berlin).

More important is the strategic positioning of the Russia-China entente. Although not yet a full-scale alliance, the Beijing-Moscow relationship is something the West feared during cold-war days. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were determined to “play the China card” to widen the gap between Beijing and Moscow that had been opening since Nikita Khrushchev launched de-Stalinisation. There is no doubt the entente has legs, after years in which the two countries’ interests have been converging. With both empires now showing their fangs, playing a new strategy “card” to split them will be difficult. The entente is likely to be a threatening reality for decades.

In sum, international threats are back with a vengeance. The critical unanswered question is whether the United States and the West generally can shake off their lassitude. ■

John Bolton was America’s national security adviser in 2018-19 for President Donald Trump. He was ambassador to the United Nations in 2005-06 and served in the administrations of presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush.



应邀参加｜俄罗斯和乌克兰
约翰-博尔顿谈从俄罗斯入侵乌克兰中吸取的教训
美国前国家安全顾问表示，西方决不能对潜在的侵略者重新陷入自满情绪。

2022年2月28日



在可能成为一场旷日持久的俄乌战争的短短几天里，政治家和学者们已经在得出全面的结论。对一些人来说，俄罗斯未能取得迅速、决定性、低伤亡的胜利，这使得弗拉基米尔-普京的下台不可避免，而且迫在眉睫。对其他人来说，俄罗斯的胜利，无论多么血腥，都直接威胁到乌克兰的邻国，并将意味着欧洲的持续紧张局势。哪个是正确的，我说不上来。埃德蒙-伯克的建议一如既往地恰如其分。"请上帝保佑，每当我不能清楚地看到我面前的路时，我就会小心翼翼地走路。" 然而，有几个谨慎的教训是很清楚的。

首先，要注意对手的言论。2005年，普京先生说，苏联的解体是20世纪最大的地缘政治灾难。从那时起，他缓慢但有系统地寻求扭转解体局面，最明显的方式是入侵、吞并和建立独立国家--格鲁吉亚（2008年）和乌克兰（2014年）。普京先生还使用了不太激烈的手段，将白俄罗斯、亚美尼亚和哈萨克斯坦等国纳入俄罗斯的轨道。


在这一过程中，西方在很大程度上保持着无知：没有在国防上花费足够的资金；越来越依赖俄罗斯的石油和天然气供应；并将俄罗斯的领导层想象成等待中的欧洲人（即，就像我们一样，只是没有那么精致）。那些日子可能已经过去了，但温斯顿-丘吉尔关于 "人类证实不可教 "的洞察力仍然很深刻。最近读过习近平、哈梅内伊和金正恩的演讲吗？

第二，积极使用军事力量的做法又开始流行了。基于规则的国际秩序 "刚刚受到了直接打击，并不是说它曾经像精英沙龙和学术回廊中想象的那样坚固。尽管事先为防止俄罗斯入侵和援助乌克兰所采取的措施显然是不够的，但一旦枪战真正开始，国际反应的力度令人印象深刻。到目前为止，乌克兰的抵抗一直很顽强，这对它的帮助是不可估量的。但是，我们不要太天真了。关于俄罗斯军队迷路、燃料耗尽、轻易投降或甚至拒绝进入乌克兰的报道，都表明俄罗斯军队在士气或资源方面的准备并不像普京先生所认为的那样。

真正的未知数是，广泛的自发愤怒是否持续，或者西方是否对俄罗斯和其他潜在的国际侵略者重新陷入自满。世界和平并不在眼前。花言巧语和美德标语不能替代新的战略思维和更高的国防预算。德国在2月27日承诺履行其在2014年已经做出的将国内生产总值的2%用于国防的承诺，这值得鼓掌欢迎。当我们看到其资金的颜色时，会有更多的掌声。


人们理所当然地越来越关注中国对台湾独立构成的巨大威胁。这种威胁如此严重，以至于日本前首相安倍晋三和其他人建议华盛顿放弃在是否保卫台湾免受中国攻击方面的 "战略模糊"。日本人现在完全明白，对台湾的攻击就是对日本的攻击。

朝鲜对韩国的威胁既不是小事，也不是冷战遗留问题，特别是考虑到平壤日益成功的核武器和弹道导弹计划。对北京来说，监狱式的朝鲜是威胁西太平洋及其他地区的资产。韩国即将举行的总统选举将揭示俄罗斯攻击乌克兰的影响，以及它对毗邻大型前共产主义土地帝国的小国的影响。

在中东，伊朗证明了极端主义、扩张主义的神学仍然存在。德黑兰的敌对活动与平壤的核威胁和导弹威胁并行，并延伸到向也门胡塞叛军提供无人机和导弹，以攻击附近国家的平民目标；援助哈马斯和真主党等恐怖组织；并在伊拉克和叙利亚利用常规部队和恐怖战术来推进伊朗的利益。

第三，新的俄中协约正在进行中。关于孤立俄罗斯的言论主要是指将其与欧洲隔离开来（几十年来，欧洲在能源供应方面过度依赖俄罗斯，这完全是其自身的错误）。从长远来看，世界其他地区是否会同意，还有待观察。仅举一例，当俄罗斯否决联合国安理会谴责乌克兰入侵的决议时，印度、中国和阿拉伯联合酋长国都投了弃权票。中国很可能通过愿意购买欧洲决定禁运的任何石油和天然气，为俄罗斯提供一个默许的保险单（并不是说欧洲还没有采取行动；柏林的天气很冷）。

更重要的是俄中协约的战略定位。虽然还不是一个全面的联盟，但北京-莫斯科的关系是西方在冷战时期所担心的。理查德-尼克松和亨利-基辛格决心 "打中国牌"，以扩大北京和莫斯科之间的差距，这种差距自尼基塔-赫鲁晓夫启动去斯大林化以来一直在扩大。毋庸置疑，在两国利益趋同的数年后，这一协约是有脚的。由于两个帝国现在都露出了獠牙，打出一张新的战略 "牌 "来分裂它们将是困难的。该协约可能会在几十年内成为一个有威胁的现实。

总而言之，国际威胁又回来了，而且是报复性的。关键的未解之谜是美国和西方国家是否能普遍摆脱倦怠的状态。■

约翰-博尔顿是美国总统唐纳德-特朗普2018-19年的国家安全顾问。他曾在2005-06年担任驻联合国大使，并在罗纳德-里根、乔治-H-W-布什和乔治-W-布什总统的政府中任职。