2017.04.01 俄罗斯革命如何成为禁忌

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Putin Likes to Pretend 1917 Never Happened
How the Russian Revolution became taboo

By Mikhail Zygar
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on July 27, 2016.
Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, on July 27, 2016. (Maxim Shemetov / Reuters)
APRIL 1, 2017
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Just over 100 years ago, Russian Emperor Nicholas II abdicated his throne and his vast empire ceased to exist, setting off decades of world-shaking change. Yet this year, not a single Russian television station marked the anniversary. The decision to ignore the centennial arose from a meeting at the Kremlin last year, in which Russian President Vladimir Putin told his advisors that it would be unnecessary to commemorate it. Instead, the occasion should be discussed “only by experts,” he reportedly said. That is, let the experts, the historians, discuss the Revolution; the rest of Russia shouldn’t concern itself with such matters.

This order was then conveyed by Sergei Kirienko, the Kremlin’s new political strategist, to the directors of Russia’s state media companies. Russia doesn’t need revolutions—it needs stability, he said, according to those who attended these meetings. The collapse of empire had become taboo for Russian media, and apparently a negligible historical footnote for Putin.

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Putin, however, is no Soviet Union groupie, notwithstanding his 2006 declaration that “the collapse of the U.S.S.R. [was] the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century.” Leftist ideologies are alien to him. Since becoming president in 2000, he has stocked the government with neoliberal adherents and ardent free marketeers, not with neo-communists and command economy admirers. What Putin pines for, above all else, are the days of Russia’s expansive greatness.

The idea of Russian empire, then, comes naturally to Putin. But his version of empire isn’t an exact replica of Nicholas II’s. Instead, it is an imagined, virtual empire, encompassing the traits of the Soviet Union, Russian Orthodox Christianity, sovereignty, populism, Joseph Stalin, victory in World War II, Yuri Gagarin’s trip into space, and the palaces of Catherine the Great. Putin’s ideology is built on a feeling of Russia’s inherent greatness, the idea that it is a country to be feared and respected. A world in which CNN airs a documentary about Putin called “The Most Powerful Man in the World” is his best world.

The conventional wisdom is that, during Putin’s first term, the people of Russia traded their political freedom for a sense of security and prosperity. In the 2000s, thanks to high oil prices, many Russians were better off than ever before. But that’s changed since then. Russians are now willing to forego a part of their prosperity in exchange for a sense of national pride, willing to suffer the sting of sanctions or economic crisis as long as Crimea is part of Russia. Most Russians haven’t felt pride in their country since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Because of the economic turbulence that followed, many of them felt humiliated.


Now, for many, Putin has restored a sense of pride. It’s like what you feel when your favorite football team wins. Nothing actually changes: You don’t become smarter, healthier, or richer; your personal life doesn’t improve. You simply, irrationally, feel happier, proud of an accomplishment in which you played no role. To millions of Russians, Putin is that football team. And all he does is win.

Russia’s glories of yesteryear are far more important than some new, unprecedented victory, providing fuel for the Russian propaganda machine. As oil prices tumbled to historic lows, Russian history has replaced the bounty of the boom years as the eternal spring of Putin’s popularity.

Viewed through this lens, 1917 is the most uncomfortable year possible for Russian propaganda. In the story of the fall of the Russian empire, there is no character for Putin to equate himself with. Not Stalin, the man who led his countrymen to victory in the war (he has never compared himself with Stalin personally), and not Nicholas II, that loser who surrendered an empire. Nor can he equate himself with Vladimir Lenin, the revolutionary who wrecked an empire. (Putin doesn’t hide his antipathy for Lenin, referring to him as the man who put a ticking atomic bomb under Russia.)

And Putin certainly cannot compare himself to the democratic revolutionaries who governed the country from the February and October 1917. Thanks to their efforts, Russia became, for a short time, the most progressive country in the world, the first nation in Europe to abolish the death penalty, and one of the first to introduce universal suffrage, including for women.


For those months, Russia’s strong, free civil society tried to take the country’s fate into its own hands, inspired by artists like Wassily Kandinsky, composer Igor Stravinsky, director Constantin Stanislavski, Ballet Russe founder Serge Diaghiliev, and writers and poets like Mikhail Bulgakov and Anna Akhmatova. Indeed, the first democratic prime minister of Russia, Georgy Lvov, was a friend and follower of Leo Tolstoy, and tried to implement a utopian ideal to create a non-violent state. He resigned in July 1917 after the first attempt by the Bolsheviks at a violent coup, saying he could not bring himself to use weapons to put down an uprising. His replacement, Alexander Kerensky, was a charismatic leader of the February Revolution, perhaps capable of becoming a soft dictator or a Russian Ataturk. But he, too, wanted to follow a Western, democratic path. And in the end he was ousted by Lenin, a far more brutal dictator.

But for Russia’s contemporary ideology, neither great culture nor a powerful civil society are important. What’s important, instead, is a victorious Russian empire. Anything that doesn’t square with this image can be discarded.

Incidentally, Russia of 100 years ago was awash in these similar conspiracy theories.
There is, however, one aspect of contemporary Russian propaganda that recalls the Revolutions of 1917. According to Russian state television, the Russian opposition is composed of agents of Western NGOs and security services. Any revolution is always the result of a conspiracy or foreign meddling, it seems. The official Russian conspiracy theory—hammered home by Russian TV every day and believed by Putin—tells us that the Ukrainian revolution of 2014 was organized and paid for by the Americans, along with the revolutions of the Arab Spring.


Now, we see the same kinds of theories pop up in state media portrayals of the Revolutions of 1917. The February Revolution, which felled Nicholas II, is now said to have been sponsored by the British (through the efforts of the very active British ambassador to Russia, George Buchanan). The October Revolution, which brought the Bolsheviks to power, was allegedly financed by the Germans, who helped Lenin make his way to Russia and really needed his help to end World War I.

Incidentally, Russia of 100 years ago was awash in similar conspiracy theories. In 1917, the Russian czarist state considered everyone in the opposition to be traitors who had sold their souls to the British, while the liberal opposition believed that the government was crawling with German spies. Today, it is accepted wisdom that there were no conspiracies, neither British nor German, shaping the events of 1917. Lenin was no spy, even though authorities in Berlin did allow him and his Bolsheviks to pass through Germany during the war on their way back to Russia, where they hoped to finish the revolution (and, hopefully, pull Russia out of the war). A massive amount of energy was spent fighting imagined threats instead of real ones from the West. And when the chaos of genuine revolution descended, everything fell apart. There was no one left to defend Nicholas II: Everyone who had been loyal to him before his abdication had vanished.


The Russian government of today doesn’t fear a revolution. Even the recent anti-corruption protests in several Russian cities still do not impress the Kremlin. Those protesters were young hipsters, they are sure, and the vast majority of Russians will remain absolutely loyal. The Kremlin is certain that everything is stable, that the people are proud of their president and that there’s no reason to worry. And they’re right. But in its day, the Russian Empire seemed even more stable. Everyone knew what would happen to the Empire of Nicholas II: It would be ruled by his son, Alexei. Today’s Russian stability is far less predictable.

This article was translated from the Russian by Julia Ioffe.





全球
普京喜欢假装1917年从未发生过
俄罗斯革命如何成为禁忌

米哈伊尔-齐格报道
2016年7月27日，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔-普京在俄罗斯莫斯科的克里姆林宫发表讲话。
2016年7月27日，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔-普京在俄罗斯莫斯科的克里姆林宫发表讲话。(Maxim Shemetov / Reuters)
2017年4月1日

仅仅100多年前，俄罗斯皇帝尼古拉二世退位，他的庞大帝国不复存在，掀起了几十年来震撼世界的变革。然而今年，没有一家俄罗斯电视台纪念这一周年。忽视百年纪念的决定源于去年克里姆林宫的一次会议，在这次会议上，俄罗斯总统弗拉基米尔-普京告诉他的顾问们，没有必要纪念它。据报道，他说，相反，这一事件 "只应由专家讨论"。也就是说，让专家、历史学家来讨论革命；俄罗斯的其他人不应该关心这些事情。

随后，克里姆林宫的新政治战略家谢尔盖-基里延科将这一命令传达给了俄罗斯国有媒体公司的负责人。据参加这些会议的人说，俄罗斯不需要革命--它需要稳定，他说。帝国的崩溃已经成为俄罗斯媒体的禁忌，对普京来说显然是一个可以忽略不计的历史脚注。

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然而，普京并不是苏联的追随者，尽管他在2006年宣称 "美苏解体[是]20世纪最大的地缘政治灾难"。左派意识形态对他来说是陌生的。自2000年成为总统以来，他为政府配备了新自由主义的信徒和热心的自由市场人士，而不是新共产主义者和指令性经济的崇拜者。普京最怀念的是俄罗斯广阔的伟大时代。

因此，俄罗斯帝国的想法对普京来说是自然而然的。但他的帝国版本并不是尼古拉二世的精确复制品。相反，它是一个想象中的、虚拟的帝国，包含了苏联、俄罗斯东正教、主权、民粹主义、约瑟夫-斯大林、二战胜利、尤里-加加林的太空之旅以及凯瑟琳大帝的宫殿的特征。普京的意识形态建立在对俄罗斯固有的伟大的感觉上，认为它是一个值得敬畏和尊重的国家。一个CNN播放关于普京的纪录片《世界上最有权力的人》的世界是他最好的世界。

传统观点认为，在普京的第一个任期内，俄罗斯人民用他们的政治自由换来了安全感和繁荣。在2000年代，由于高油价，许多俄罗斯人比以前更富裕。但从那时起，情况发生了变化。俄罗斯人现在愿意放弃一部分繁荣来换取民族自豪感，只要克里米亚是俄罗斯的一部分，就愿意承受制裁或经济危机的刺痛。自1991年苏联解体以来，大多数俄罗斯人都没有为自己的国家感到自豪。由于随后发生的经济动荡，他们中的许多人感到羞辱。


现在，对许多人来说，普京已经恢复了一种自豪感。这就像你最喜欢的足球队获胜时的感觉一样。实际上没有什么变化。你并没有变得更聪明、更健康或更富有；你的个人生活也没有改善。你只是非理性地感到更快乐，为你没有参与的成就感到自豪。对数百万俄罗斯人来说，普京就是那个足球队。而他所做的一切都是为了胜利。

俄罗斯昔日的辉煌远比一些新的、史无前例的胜利重要，为俄罗斯的宣传机器提供燃料。随着油价跌至历史低点，俄罗斯的历史已经取代了繁荣时期的丰收，成为普京受欢迎程度的永恒之泉。

通过这个镜头来看，1917年是俄罗斯宣传最不舒服的一年。在俄罗斯帝国灭亡的故事中，没有任何人物可以让普京将自己与之等同。不是斯大林，那个带领他的同胞取得战争胜利的人（他从未将自己与斯大林本人相比），也不是尼古拉二世，那个交出帝国的失败者。他也不能把自己等同于弗拉基米尔-列宁，那个破坏了一个帝国的革命者。(普京毫不掩饰他对列宁的反感，称他是在俄罗斯下面放了一颗定时原子弹的人。)

普京当然也不能把自己与1917年2月和10月起治理国家的民主革命者相比。由于他们的努力，俄罗斯在短时间内成为世界上最进步的国家，是欧洲第一个废除死刑的国家，也是最早实行普选权的国家之一，包括妇女。


在那几个月里，俄罗斯强大而自由的公民社会试图将国家的命运掌握在自己手中，在瓦西里-康定斯基、作曲家伊戈尔-斯特拉文斯基、导演康斯坦丁-斯坦尼斯拉夫斯基、俄罗斯芭蕾舞团创始人谢尔盖-迪亚吉列夫等艺术家以及米哈伊尔-布尔加科夫和安娜-阿赫玛托娃等作家和诗人的激励下。事实上，俄罗斯第一位民主总理格奥尔基-利沃夫是列夫-托尔斯泰的朋友和追随者，并试图实施乌托邦式的理想，建立一个非暴力的国家。1917年7月，在布尔什维克第一次试图发动暴力政变后，他辞职了，说他不能让自己使用武器来镇压起义。他的继任者亚历山大-克伦斯基（Alexander Kerensky）是一位富有魅力的二月革命领导人，也许有能力成为一位软性独裁者或俄罗斯的阿塔图尔克。但他也想走一条西方的民主道路。最后他被列宁赶走了，他是一个更残酷的独裁者。

但对于俄罗斯的当代意识形态来说，伟大的文化和强大的公民社会都不重要。相反，重要的是一个胜利的俄罗斯帝国。任何不符合这一形象的东西都可以被丢弃。

顺便说一句，100年前的俄罗斯也充斥着这些类似的阴谋论。
然而，当代俄罗斯宣传的一个方面让人想起1917年的革命。根据俄罗斯国家电视台的说法，俄罗斯反对派是由西方非政府组织和安全部门的代理人组成的。任何革命都是阴谋或外国干涉的结果，似乎是这样。俄罗斯官方的阴谋论--俄罗斯电视台每天都在鼓吹，普京也相信--告诉我们，2014年的乌克兰革命与阿拉伯之春的革命一样，都是由美国人组织和资助的。


现在，我们看到同样的理论出现在国家媒体对1917年革命的描述中。据说推翻尼古拉二世的二月革命是由英国赞助的（通过非常活跃的英国驻俄罗斯大使乔治-布坎南的努力）。使布尔什维克上台的十月革命据说是由德国人资助的，德国人帮助列宁进入俄国，并且确实需要他的帮助来结束第一次世界大战。

顺便说一下，100年前的俄罗斯也充斥着类似的阴谋论。1917年，俄国沙皇国家认为反对派中的每个人都是出卖灵魂给英国人的叛徒，而自由派反对派则认为政府中爬满了德国间谍。今天，人们公认的智慧是，没有任何阴谋，无论是英国还是德国，都在左右着1917年的事件。列宁不是间谍，尽管柏林当局确实允许他和他的布尔什维克在战争期间在返回俄国的路上经过德国，他们希望在那里完成革命（并希望将俄国从战争中拉出来）。大量的精力被用来对付想象中的威胁，而不是来自西方的真正威胁。而当真正的革命混乱降临时，一切都崩溃了。没有人再为尼古拉二世辩护：所有在他退位前忠于他的人都消失了。


今天的俄罗斯政府并不害怕革命。即使是最近在俄罗斯几个城市发生的反腐抗议活动，仍然没有给克里姆林宫留下印象。那些抗议者都是年轻的时髦人士，他们确信，绝大多数俄罗斯人将保持绝对忠诚。克里姆林宫确信，一切都很稳定，人民为他们的总统感到骄傲，没有理由担心。而且他们是对的。但在它的时代，俄罗斯帝国似乎更加稳定。每个人都知道尼古拉二世的帝国会发生什么：它将由他的儿子阿列克谢统治。今天，俄罗斯的稳定远没有那么容易预测。

本文由朱莉娅-约菲从俄语翻译而来。