2022.04.29 为何印度不在俄罗斯阵营中

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By Invitation | Russia and Ukraine
Tanvi Madan explains why India is not in Russia’s camp
The historian says that the longer the war continues, the trickier India’s balancing act becomes

Apr 29th 2022 (Updated Apr 29th 2022)

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SINCE RUSSIA’S invasion of Ukraine, India’s position has widely been interpreted as supportive of Moscow. Delhi has not explicitly condemned Russia, and abstained on several related votes at the United Nations. It has refused to rule out the purchase of Russian arms or oil. It hosted Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, and he was granted a meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Furthermore, China and Russia have both suggested that India shares their view of the current crisis and of the international order.

India is not, however, in Russia’s camp. It neither supports nor endorses the Russian invasion. Moreover, Indian interests have been adversely affected by Moscow’s move. The invasion endangered the lives of more than 20,000 Indian citizens in Ukraine, one of whom was killed. It has increased Indian concerns about further Chinese military action at their shared border while the world’s attention is on Europe. It has also jeopardised the Russian and Ukrainian links in the arms supply chain on which Indian forces depend.


In addition, Delhi is facing a more constrained economic environment thanks to Vladimir Putin’s invasion. India is particularly vulnerable to higher commodity prices, especially crude and edible oils and fertiliser, and worried about inflationary pressures. These pose multiple problems for the Modi government relating to energy, food security, India’s fiscal position and its politics.

Strategically, Mr Putin’s war complicates India’s long-standing goal of keeping apart its rival China from Russia. India-Soviet relations deepened in the 1960s and 1970s due to a shared concern about China, and, ideally, Delhi wants to see Moscow serve as a counterweight to Beijing in Eurasia. But the Russian invasion has put paid to Indian hopes of a Western rapprochement with Moscow as a means of luring Russia away from Beijing. Worryingly from Delhi’s perspective, it could even make Russia more dependent on China. There are already questions in India about the implications. For instance, what would a Russia more beholden to China do if Beijing asks Moscow to take actions that go against India interests, such as in international organisations or in an India-China crisis? Or, will Beijing now expect or demand Russia take its side more actively in the Indo-Pacific?

The crisis has also put pressure on India’s ties with several of its other partners, including America, Europe and Japan. These partners are crucial to India’s security and its economic and diplomatic objectives—arguably more so than Russia. But there is also concern that those partners’ attention could be diverted away from India’s priorities—the Indo-Pacific and the challenge posed by China—because of the war.

So, then, why has India not condemned Russia? It hopes to keep Moscow onside yet fears that it won’t stay onside. Delhi frets that Moscow could choose to hold back or slow down the supply of equipment, spare parts or maintenance support for the Russian hardware that the Indian military operates, or move from neutrality to China’s side at a time of heightened tension at the Sino-Indian border. More broadly, Russia could play spoiler vis-à-vis Indian interests concerning both China and Pakistan, and in international institutions. In addition, Russia has remained relevant for India as a partner in defence, trade and technology, as well as in the nuclear and space sectors. And the Indian government generally avoids direct condemnation—especially of its partners. Finally, it has wanted to keep channels of communication to Moscow open, including, in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, to enable the evacuation of Indian nationals.


Delhi’s stance has been hardening, however, in recent weeks. While there is some sympathy for Russian concerns about European security architecture, India has dropped references to “legitimate security interests of all sides” and stopped framing the war as a Russia-NATO problem. Statements at the UN and in the Indian Parliament have taken on a more critical tone, with the foreign minister stating that India is “strongly against the conflict”. It has reiterated its interest in respect for international law, territorial integrity and sovereignty and the UN charter on which the global order is built. It has expressed its disapproval of the use of force to resolve disputes and of unilateral changes of the status quo. And it has criticised the shelling of nuclear facilities and condemned the massacre in Bucha. It has also pushed back against Russian disinformation, such as Mr Putin’s assertion that Ukraine was taking Indians hostage. Furthermore, it has distanced itself from China’s more supportive position vis-à-vis Russia.

A former national security adviser has noted that, in private, Indian policymakers will likely also “have made their displeasure clear” about the invasion. Mr Modi has suggested that Mr Putin talk directly with President Volodymyr Zelensky, with whom the Indian prime minister has spoken twice. India has also provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, and offered to play a diplomatic role if helpful. And, willingly or not, Indian companies will largely comply with sanctions given their exposure to, and interests within, western economies. India’s economic ties with Russia are relatively limited by comparison. For instance, India-Russia trade in goods between April 2021 and the end of February 2022 stood at almost $12bn. Trade between India and America stood at $107bn in the same period. In that same time frame, 2.3% of the crude oil and 0.4% of the liquified natural gas India consumes came from Russia while the US accounted for 8.5% and 16.8% of those imports.

The longer the war continues, the trickier India’s balancing act could become. While it has been diversifying, its current overdependence on Russian defence supplies will be a liability for its strategic autonomy and its security—its army chief even alluded to the latter. In addition, the war could further weaken Russia’s ability to serve as an arms and technology supplier to India, a counterbalance to China and an effective player in the multipolar world Delhi desires. Moreover, while it wants to keep the European and Indo-Pacific theatres separate, the Russia-Ukraine war will have spillover ramifications for Asia. And Delhi will have to reconcile its willingness to align with like-minded partners to counter China—including via the quad of Australia, Japan, America and India, which Moscow opposes—with its desire to avoid isolating Russia, given the increasing alignment between Russia and China.

Europe and America, for their part, should recognise that India will continue to engage Moscow, but will remain outside the Russia-China camp. India understands how severely Russian actions have harmed its interests. For instance, Mr Modi has outlined how the war has caused difficulties and anxieties in every country in the world, particularly mentioning commodity-price rises as a direct impact. If America and Europe frame the situation as Russia versus the West, or declare the objective as weakening Russia, however, it will divert attention from Russian responsibility for these consequences. It will only widen the gap with India and others that have taken a similar stance—and play into Moscow and Beijing’s hands. Instead, it would be better to keep the focus on Russia’s violation of a country’s territorial integrity. And when engaging India on the crisis, it would be more effective to focus on cooperation on energy, food security and humanitarian assistance—as the Biden administration and most European governments have been doing—and on India using its influence to urge Mr Putin to cease hostilities. Over time, it is broader security and economic engagement with India that will do more to limit Russia’s lure as a partner than a “with us or against us” approach.

Tanvi Madan is a historian, author and director of The India Project at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC.



应邀参加｜俄罗斯和乌克兰
坦维-马丹解释为何印度不在俄罗斯阵营中
这位历史学家说，战争持续的时间越长，印度的平衡行为就越棘手

2022年4月29日 (2022年4月29日更新)


自俄罗斯入侵乌克兰以来，印度的立场被广泛理解为支持莫斯科。德里没有明确谴责俄罗斯，并在联合国的几次相关投票中投了弃权票。它拒绝排除购买俄罗斯武器或石油的可能性。它接待了俄罗斯外交部长谢尔盖-拉夫罗夫，并允许他与总理纳伦德拉-莫迪会面。此外，中国和俄罗斯都表示，印度与他们对当前的危机和国际秩序的看法一致。

然而，印度并不在俄罗斯的阵营中。它既不支持也不赞同俄罗斯的入侵行为。此外，印度的利益已经受到莫斯科此举的不利影响。入侵危及了乌克兰境内20,000多名印度公民的生命，其中一人被杀。它增加了印度对中国在其共同边界的进一步军事行动的担忧，而世界的注意力都在欧洲。它还危及了印度军队所依赖的武器供应链中的俄罗斯和乌克兰环节。


此外，由于弗拉基米尔-普京的入侵，德里正面临着一个更加紧张的经济环境。印度特别容易受到商品价格上涨的影响，尤其是原油、食用油和化肥，并担心通货膨胀的压力。这给莫迪政府带来了与能源、食品安全、印度财政状况和政治有关的多重问题。

在战略上，普京先生的战争使印度长期以来将其竞争对手中国与俄罗斯分开的目标变得复杂。由于对中国的共同关注，印度与苏联的关系在20世纪60年代和70年代得到了深化，而且在理想情况下，德里希望看到莫斯科在欧亚大陆成为北京的制衡力量。但俄罗斯的入侵使印度希望通过西方与莫斯科的和解来吸引俄罗斯远离北京的希望破灭了。从德里的角度来看，令人担忧的是，这甚至可能使俄罗斯更加依赖中国。在印度，人们已经对这种影响产生了疑问。例如，如果北京要求莫斯科采取违背印度利益的行动，例如在国际组织中或在印中危机中，一个更加依赖中国的俄罗斯会怎么做？或者，北京现在会不会期望或要求俄罗斯在印太地区更积极地站在自己一边？

这场危机也给印度与其他几个伙伴，包括美国、欧洲和日本的关系带来了压力。这些伙伴对印度的安全及其经济和外交目标至关重要--可以说比俄罗斯更重要。但也有人担心，这些伙伴的注意力可能会因为战争而偏离印度的优先事项--印度洋-太平洋和中国带来的挑战。

那么，为什么印度没有谴责俄罗斯？它希望能让莫斯科站在一边，但又担心它不会一直站在一边。德里担心莫斯科会选择搁置或减缓对印度军队使用的俄罗斯硬件的设备、备件或维护支持的供应，或者在中印边境紧张局势加剧的时候从中立走向中国一边。更广泛地说，相对于印度在中国和巴基斯坦的利益，俄罗斯可以在国际机构中扮演破坏者的角色。此外，俄罗斯作为印度在国防、贸易和技术以及核和太空领域的合作伙伴，一直与印度保持着联系。印度政府通常会避免直接谴责，特别是对其合作伙伴的谴责。最后，它希望保持与莫斯科的沟通渠道畅通，包括在入侵发生后立即让印度国民撤离。


然而，近几周来，德里的立场一直在变得强硬。虽然对俄罗斯对欧洲安全架构的担忧有些同情，但印度已经放弃了 "各方合法安全利益 "的提法，并不再将战争归结为俄罗斯和北约的问题。在联合国和印度议会的发言中，印度外交部长表示，印度 "强烈反对这场冲突"，并采取了更为严厉的语气。印度重申了其对尊重国际法、领土完整和主权以及作为全球秩序基础的联合国宪章的关注。它表示不赞成使用武力解决争端，不赞成单方面改变现状。它还批评了对核设施的炮击，并谴责了在布查发生的屠杀。它还回击了俄罗斯的虚假信息，例如普京先生声称乌克兰将印第安人扣为人质的说法。此外，它还与中国对俄罗斯的支持性立场保持距离。

一位前国家安全顾问指出，在私下里，印度的政策制定者可能也会对入侵事件 "明确表达他们的不满"。莫迪先生建议普京直接与沃洛季米尔-泽伦斯基总统会谈，印度总理已经与他谈过两次。印度还向乌克兰提供了人道主义援助，并提出如果有帮助，将发挥外交作用。而且，无论是否愿意，鉴于印度公司与西方经济体的接触和在其中的利益，它们在很大程度上会遵守制裁规定。相比之下，印度与俄罗斯的经济联系相对有限。例如，2021年4月至2022年2月底，印度与俄罗斯的货物贸易额几乎为120亿美元。同一时期，印度和美国之间的贸易额为1070亿美元。在同一时间段内，印度消费的2.3%的原油和0.4%的液化天然气来自俄罗斯，而美国占这些进口的8.5%和16.8%。

战争持续的时间越长，印度的平衡行为就会变得更加棘手。虽然它一直在进行多元化发展，但目前对俄罗斯国防供应的过度依赖将成为其战略自主权和安全的负担--其陆军首长甚至暗示了后者。此外，战争会进一步削弱俄罗斯作为印度的武器和技术供应商、中国的制衡力量以及德里所期望的多极世界中的有效参与者的能力。此外，虽然它想把欧洲和印度-太平洋战场分开，但俄乌战争将对亚洲产生溢出效应。德里将不得不协调其与志同道合的伙伴结盟以对抗中国的意愿--包括通过澳大利亚、日本、美国和印度的四方（莫斯科反对）--与避免孤立俄罗斯的愿望，因为俄罗斯和中国之间的关系日益密切。

欧洲和美国方面应该认识到，印度将继续与莫斯科接触，但仍将处于俄中阵营之外。印度了解俄罗斯的行动对其利益造成了多大的损害。例如，莫迪先生已经概述了战争是如何给世界上每个国家带来困难和焦虑的，特别是提到了商品价格上涨的直接影响。然而，如果美国和欧洲将局势设定为俄罗斯与西方的对抗，或者宣布目标是削弱俄罗斯，这将转移人们对俄罗斯对这些后果的责任的关注。这只会拉大与印度和其他采取类似立场的国家的差距--并落入莫斯科和北京的手中。相反，最好是将重点放在俄罗斯侵犯一个国家的领土完整上。而在与印度就危机进行接触时，更有效的做法是将重点放在能源、食品安全和人道主义援助方面的合作上--正如拜登政府和大多数欧洲政府一直在做的那样，以及印度利用其影响力敦促普京先生停止敌对行动。随着时间的推移，与印度更广泛的安全和经济接触将比 "与我们合作或反对我们 "的做法更能限制俄罗斯作为合作伙伴的诱惑力。

Tanvi Madan是历史学家、作家和华盛顿布鲁金斯学会的印度项目主任。