2011.05.05 巴基斯坦的两张面孔

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The Two Faces of Pakistan
By Michael Hirsh
MAY 5, 2011
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Understanding an ally that hides terrorists even as it kills many of them

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Pakistani police stand guard at the hideout of slain al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, about 30 miles from Islamabad. Pakistan has handed over some terrorists, while keeping others hidden for its own purposes. AFP Photo
Osama Bin Laden
"We are with you unstintingly." Those were the words that then-Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said to the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan,  Wendy Chamberlin, just after 9/11. Musharraf's promise proved to be largely a lie--but not entirely untrue. Ever since then, whether the Pakistani regime was autocratic or democratic, Islamabad has played a well-thought-out double game with the United States that's involved handing over  some jihadis and protecting others for Pakistan's own purposes.

And what of the biggest quarry of all--Osama bin Laden? Is there some way of explaining how the al-Qaida leader could spend the last six years ensconced in a large and obtrusive villa in Abbottabad, surrounded by the Pakistani military, without anyone in Pakistani officialdom knowing about it?

No, there probably isn't--and in many ways it's unsurprising that if the Pakistani  authorities knew bin Laden was there, his whereabouts might have been, shall we say, closely held. CIA officials have known for years that when it came to the really big game, such as bin Laden, Pakistani authorities were unlikely to be cooperative: They feared that backlash from the Muslim world and their own society would be too great if they were seen as playing stooges to the Americans and violating Pashtun tribal loyalties."My bet is they knew he was there," Chamberlin told National Journal. "The fear of backlash is part of it. And Pashtun culture is you don't give up people who've helped you, and he goes back to 1980s," when the mujahideen movement bin Laden was a part of served both U.S. and Pakistani interests against the Soviets.


Pakistan occupies a unique position in American foreign policy. "Any other country, we'd be calling them a state sponsor of terrorism," said a former senior U.S. diplomat. "It's inconceivable that we give $3 billion a year to a country that would harbor Osama bin Laden."

Why does Washington do this--and why is Washington virtually certain to continue providing aid to Pakistan despite the hue and cry in Congress over the bin Laden news? Because Pakistan is a nuclear-armed country that is still mainly secular. Washington has little choice but to support those secular strains and tamp down the Islamist ones, and it can't do this without the help of the Pakistani government, military, and intelligence apparatus, though it is shot through with Islamist sympathizers.

Critics such as Gary Schroen, the former CIA station chief in neighboring Afghanistan, have noted the Pakistani pattern of giving up second-rate Taliban or al-Qaida leaders only to ameliorate American mistrust, then retreating.

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To maintain his power, Musharraf cut deals with the religious parties that gave extremists succor, in particular the coalition called the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA, or United Action Committee). In the last decade it was Pakistan's rogue chief nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan (who is still under government protection)--not Saddam Hussein, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or Kim Jong Il--who was the most dangerous liaison to would-be nuclear terrorists.

At the same time the Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus has grown more cooperative in certain areas as they have become convinced the jihadists they once nurtured as an Islamist counterweight to their fearsome rival, India, have also turned against them. Pakistan helped capture Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational kingpin of 9/11, in 2003, and in the years since it has turned over other leading al-Qaida figures. This was partly the result of foolish overreaching by the extremists. As Taliban forces moved into Swat Valley they sought to impose harsh Islamic law and sowed indiscriminate violence that left a bitter taste, prompting support when Pakistani Army Chief of Staff Ashfaq Kayani directed a successful offensive there. Ironically, Pakistani authorities grew so consumed by their own homegrown threats that they may have paid less attention to al-Qaida figures such as bin Laden in their midst, says Seth Jones of the RAND Corporation.


All of which helps to explain why President Obama's counterterrorism coordinator, John Brennan, declared on Monday: "Pakistan has been responsible for capturing and killing more terrorists inside of Pakistan than any country, and it's by a wide margin. And there have been many, many brave Pakistani soldiers, security officials, as well as citizens, who have given their lives because of the terrorism scourge in that country."

One big clue into understanding Pakistan's double game can be found in the scholarly work of the country's current ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani. In 2005, when he was still considered a dissident to Musharraf's regime, Haqqani published a book, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, which said radical Islamists would always have a safe haven inside the country as long as military strongmen ran Islamabad. Haqqani argued that Pakistani leaders going back to the nation's founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, and Pakistani generals have constantly used the unifying principle of Islam and the perceived threat from Hindu India to build a national identity. This helps explain everything from the military's decades-old effort to build up an Islamist insurgency in disputed Kashmir to Islamabad's successful strategy of aiding and building up the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan during the 1990s.

But it has proved to be something of a Faustian bargain. Many jihadists the Pakistanis once considered "theirs" have since aligned themselves with the Taliban or al-Qaida, and even launched plots against Kayani and other Pakistani officials. Because the Pakistani military's main strategic imperative continues to be building counterweights to India--including Islamist insurgents--only democracy "can gradually wean the country from Islamic extremism," Haqqani wrote.

Haqqani's thesis is still untested, to a degree. While Musharraf has been ousted and Pakistan is nominally democratic under President Asif Ali Zardari--the husband of assassinated Pakistan Peoples Party leader Benazir Bhutto--the country is still effectively ruled by the military. And the Pakistani military's interests haven't changed.

Michael Hirsh is chief correspondent for National Journal.



巴基斯坦的两张面孔
作者：Michael Hirsh
2011年5月5日
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了解一个在杀死许多恐怖分子的同时还隐藏着恐怖分子的盟友

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巴基斯坦警察在距离伊斯兰堡约30英里的阿伯塔巴德被杀害的基地组织领导人奥萨马-本-拉登的藏身处站岗。巴基斯坦已经移交了一些恐怖分子，同时出于自己的目的将其他恐怖分子隐藏起来。法新社照片
奥萨马-本-拉登
"我们毫不吝啬地与你们同在。" 这是当时的巴基斯坦总统佩尔韦兹-穆沙拉夫在9/11事件后对美国驻巴基斯坦大使温迪-张伯伦所说的话。事实证明，穆沙拉夫的承诺在很大程度上是一个谎言--但并非完全不真实。从那时起，无论巴基斯坦政权是专制还是民主，伊斯兰堡都与美国进行了一场深思熟虑的双重游戏，包括为巴基斯坦自己的目的交出一些圣战分子并保护其他人。

那么，最大的猎物--奥萨马-本-拉登呢？是否有办法解释基地组织领导人如何在过去六年里，在巴基斯坦军方的包围下，在阿伯塔巴德的一个大型和令人讨厌的别墅里度过，而巴基斯坦官方没有任何人知道这件事？

不，可能没有--而且在许多方面，如果巴基斯坦当局知道本-拉登在那里，他的行踪可能会被--我们可以说--严密封锁，这并不令人惊讶。中情局官员多年来一直知道，当涉及到真正的大游戏，如本-拉登，巴基斯坦当局不太可能合作。他们担心，如果他们被视为美国人的走狗，违反了普什图人的部落忠诚，那么来自穆斯林世界和他们自己社会的反弹就会太大。"我敢打赌，他们知道他在那里，"张伯伦告诉《国家期刊》。"对反击的恐惧是其中的一部分。普什图文化是你不会放弃帮助过你的人，他可以追溯到20世纪80年代，"当时本-拉登参与的圣战者运动为美国和巴基斯坦对抗苏联的利益服务。


巴基斯坦在美国的外交政策中占据了一个独特的位置。"任何其他国家，我们都会称他们为支持恐怖主义的国家，"一位前美国高级外交官说。"我们每年给一个窝藏奥萨马-本-拉登的国家提供30亿美元，这是不可想象的。"

为什么华盛顿会这样做--以及为什么华盛顿几乎肯定会继续向巴基斯坦提供援助，尽管国会对本-拉登的消息吵得沸沸扬扬？因为巴基斯坦是一个拥有核武器的国家，它仍然以世俗化为主。华盛顿别无选择，只能支持那些世俗主义势力，压制伊斯兰主义势力，而如果没有巴基斯坦政府、军队和情报机构的帮助，它是无法做到这一点的，尽管它被伊斯兰主义的同情者射穿。

前中央情报局驻阿富汗站站长加里-施罗恩（Gary Schroen）等批评家指出，巴基斯坦的模式是放弃二流的塔利班或基地组织领导人，只是为了缓解美国的不信任，然后就撤退。

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更多来自国家期刊的信息。
奥巴马宣布，经过历史性的追捕，本-拉登已经死亡。
图片。世界对乌萨马-本-拉丹之死的反应
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为了维持他的权力，穆沙拉夫与给极端分子提供帮助的宗教党派达成了交易，尤其是名为Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal（MMA，即联合行动委员会）的联盟。在过去的十年里，是巴基斯坦的流氓首席核科学家A.Q.Khan（他仍然受到政府的保护）--而不是萨达姆-侯赛因、马哈茂德-艾哈迈迪-内贾德或金正日--成为可能的核恐怖分子的最危险联络人。

同时，巴基斯坦的军事和情报机构在某些领域变得更加合作，因为他们已经确信，他们曾经作为可怕的对手印度的伊斯兰教抗衡力量而培养的圣战分子也已经转向反对他们。2003年，巴基斯坦帮助抓获了9-11事件的头目哈立德-谢赫-穆罕默德（Khalid Sheikh Mohammed），此后几年，它又交出了其他基地组织的头目。这在一定程度上是极端主义分子愚蠢的过度行为的结果。当塔利班部队进入斯瓦特山谷时，他们试图强加严厉的伊斯兰法律，并播种了不分青红皂白的暴力，留下了苦涩的味道，当巴基斯坦陆军参谋长阿什法克-卡亚尼在那里指挥了一次成功的进攻时，引起了支持。兰德公司的塞思-琼斯（Seth Jones）说，具有讽刺意味的是，巴基斯坦当局被他们自己的本土威胁所困扰，以至于他们可能不太注意他们中间的基地组织人物，如本-拉登。


所有这些都有助于解释为什么欧巴马总统的反恐协调员约翰-布伦南在周一宣布。"巴基斯坦负责抓捕和杀害的恐怖分子比任何国家都多，而且差距很大。而且有很多很多勇敢的巴基斯坦士兵、安全官员以及公民，因为该国的恐怖主义祸害而献出了他们的生命。"

了解巴基斯坦的双重游戏的一个重要线索可以在该国现任驻美国大使侯赛因-哈卡尼的学术工作中找到。2005年，当他仍然被认为是穆沙拉夫政权的持不同政见者时，哈卡尼出版了一本书《巴基斯坦。该书称，只要军事强人掌管伊斯兰堡，激进的伊斯兰教徒就会在该国拥有一个安全避难所。哈卡尼认为，巴基斯坦的领导人可以追溯到国家的创始人穆罕默德-阿里-真纳，而巴基斯坦的将军们则不断利用伊斯兰教的统一原则和来自印度教的威胁来建立国家认同。这有助于解释从军方几十年来在有争议的克什米尔建立伊斯兰叛乱的努力到伊斯兰堡在20世纪90年代在邻国阿富汗援助和建立塔利班的成功战略。

但事实证明，这是个浮士德式的交易。许多曾被巴基斯坦人视为 "自己人 "的圣战分子后来与塔利班或基地组织结盟，甚至发起了针对卡亚尼和其他巴基斯坦官员的阴谋。哈卡尼写道："由于巴基斯坦军方的主要战略任务仍然是建立对抗印度的力量--包括伊斯兰叛乱分子--只有民主 "才能使该国逐渐摆脱伊斯兰极端主义"。

哈卡尼的论点在某种程度上仍未得到验证。虽然穆沙拉夫已经被赶下台，巴基斯坦在总统阿西夫-阿里-扎尔达里（Asif Ali Zardari）--被暗杀的巴基斯坦人民党领导人贝娜齐尔-布托的丈夫--的领导下名义上实现了民主，但该国仍然由军方有效统治。而巴基斯坦军方的利益并没有改变。

Michael Hirsh是《国家期刊》的首席记者