2022.10.21 乌克兰的东正教会为何陷入僵局

shiyi18

经济学家》杂志解释说
乌克兰的东正教会为何陷入僵局
其两个分支因政治而非信仰而分裂
TOPSHOT - 这张拍摄于2022年9月30日的照片显示，在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰期间，顿涅茨克州斯维亚托希尔斯克镇附近的上帝之母东正教教堂的院子里，乌克兰军人走在一辆被摧毁的俄军装甲车旁边。(Photo by ANATOLII STEPANOV / AFP) (Photo by ANATOLII STEPANOV/AFP via Getty Images)
2022年10月21日



7月底，在乌克兰中部文尼察市附近，阿纳托利-杜德科正在为一名阵亡士兵做布道，一名身穿黑色连衣裙的老人冲向他。该男子试图扯下杜德科先生佩戴的十字架，然后用自己的十字架砸向他。两人都是东正教的牧师，但来自不同的教会。杜德科先生追随乌克兰东正教会（ocu）；攻击他的人追随乌克兰东正教会（uoc）。这两个教会共享大多数仪式和信仰--更不用说近乎相同的名字--但却因相互憎恶而分裂。俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵使他们进一步分裂。为什么？

几十年来，乌克教是乌克兰唯一被正式承认的东正教分支。在苏联时期，它是俄罗斯教会的一个分支，并且在1991年乌克兰独立后仍受其管辖。还出现了两个未被承认的教会：一个在苏联时期曾是一个流亡教会；另一个成立于1992年，宣布自己是独立的乌克兰教会。它们在2018年合并为OCU，并在次年被东正教的最高领导人君士坦丁堡的巴塞洛缪一世授予正式的自传--承认其独立。俄罗斯东正教会立即宣布东正教会为分裂教派。


这使得该国有两个官方承认的教会，一个与俄罗斯相连，另一个与独立的乌克兰相连。这种区别在教会政治之外也很重要。俄罗斯正统教会的领袖基里尔牧首是总统弗拉基米尔-普京的长期盟友。两人都援引了一个虚假的想法，即俄罗斯和乌克兰共同的宗教遗产创造了一个天然的俄罗斯影响范围--这是俄罗斯多年来侵略的虚假理由。2014年，在克里米亚被吞并后，与俄罗斯有联系的乌克兰uoc的信徒开始成群结队地离开教会。2月的入侵后，出走潮进入了高潮。数以百计的教区已经转移到了欧共体。

5月下旬，欧共体为了与牧首基里尔和克里姆林宫保持距离，宣布从俄罗斯东正教会独立。大主教尼古拉-达尼列维奇（Nikolai Danilevich）说，一旦战争结束，该教会可能会申请正式的自封。但由于它是从莫斯科牧首辖区发展起来的，只有俄罗斯教会有权批准这样的请求。"宗教专家柳德米拉-菲利波维奇（Lyudmila Filipovich）说："他们的教规地位是可疑的。"他们既不属于莫斯科，也不属于大公教区"。

许多乌克兰人认为Uoc的转变只是表面现象。7月的一项调查显示，只有4%的人觉得与它关系密切，低于俄罗斯入侵前的18%。菲利波维奇女士说，乌克兰的大多数神职人员都毕业于莫斯科和圣彼得堡的神学院。她认为与俄罗斯的联系持续存在。欧共体领导人甚至更进一步，指责他们的对手教会是俄罗斯的第五纵队。俄克拉荷马大学强烈否认这些说法。达尼列维奇先生指出，他自己的家人都为乌克兰而战死。实际上，大公会的神职人员中既有乌克兰的爱国者，也有与莫斯科关系的不那么强烈的支持者。绝大多数人处于中间位置。


7月初，来自两个教会的一小群牧师在基辅的圣索菲亚大教堂举行会议，谴责俄罗斯的侵略，并宣称需要 "乌克兰东正教的团结"。但不信任感很深。他们的领导人对彼此的蔑视可以说是令人震惊。达尼列维奇先生说："我们看待[奥库]的方式与乌克兰看待德涅斯特河和伊尔河的方式相同。"他指的是战前由俄罗斯代理人控制、现在被俄罗斯非法吞并的 "人民共和国"。"他们必须回来"。奥古斯丁大主教耶夫斯特拉蒂-佐利亚（Yevstratiy Zorya）声称，奥古斯丁大主教（Metropolitan Onufriy）和他的同伙 "如果普京征服了基辅，他们会满心欢喜"。和解，更不用说合并，是一个遥远的前景。■




The Economist explains
Why Ukraine’s Orthodox churches are at loggerheads
Its two branches are divided by politics, not faith
TOPSHOT - This photograph taken on September 30, 2022, shows Ukrainian servicemen walking next to a destroyed Russian Army APC in a yard of Burial Shroud of the Mother of God Orthodox Church on the bank of the Seversky Donets River near the town of Sviatohirsk, Donetsk region, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Photo by ANATOLII STEPANOV / AFP) (Photo by ANATOLII STEPANOV/AFP via Getty Images)
Oct 21st 2022

Save

Share

Give
In late july Anatoliy Dudko was delivering a sermon for a fallen soldier near the city of Vinnytsia, in central Ukraine, when an elderly man in a black frock charged at him. The man attempted to rip off the cross Mr Dudko was wearing before hitting him with his own crucifix. Both men were Orthodox priests, but from different churches: Mr Dudko follows the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (ocu); his attacker the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (uoc). The churches share most rites and beliefs—not to mention near-identical names—but are divided by mutual rancour. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has driven them further apart. Why?

For decades, the uoc was the only formally recognised branch of Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine. In Soviet times it was a branch of the Russian church, and remained under its jurisdiction after Ukraine’s independence in 1991. Two unrecognised churches also emerged: one had been a church in exile during Soviet times; the other, established in 1992, declared itself an independent Ukrainian church. They merged in 2018 to form the ocu, which was granted formal autocephaly—recognition of independence—by Orthodox Christianity’s highest leader, Bartholomew I of Constantinople, the following year. The Russian Orthodox church immediately declared the ocu schismatic.


That left the country with two officially recognised churches, one linked to Russia and the other to an independent Ukraine. The distinction mattered beyond church politics. Patriarch Kirill, the head of Russia’s orthodox church, is a long-time ally of Vladimir Putin, the president. Both men have invoked the bogus idea that the shared religious heritage of Russia and Ukraine creates a natural sphere of Russian influence—a phoney justification for Russia’s aggression over the years. In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian followers of the Russian-affiliated uoc began leaving the church in droves. The exodus went into overdrive after the invasion in February. Hundreds of parishes have transferred to the ocu.

In late May the uoc, seeking to distance itself from Patriarch Kirill and the Kremlin, proclaimed independence from the Russian Orthodox Church. Archpriest Nikolai Danilevich, a spokesman for the uoc, says the church may apply for formal autocephaly once the war ends. But because it grew out of the Moscow Patriarchate, only the Russian church has the authority to grant such a request. “Their canonical status is dubious,” says Lyudmila Filipovich, a religion expert. “They’re neither with Moscow or with the ecumenical patriarchate.”

Many Ukrainians believe the uoc’s conversion is merely cosmetic. A survey in July revealed that only 4% felt close to it, down from 18% before Russia’s invasion. Most of its clergy are graduates of seminaries in Moscow and St Petersburg, says Ms Filipovich. She believes the bond with Russia endures. ocu leaders go even further, accusing their rival church of being a fifth column for Russia. The uoc strongly denies those claims. Mr Danilevich points out that members of his own family have died fighting for Ukraine. In reality the uoc’s clergy contains both Ukrainian patriots and much less vocal supporters of the relationship with Moscow. The overwhelming majority are somewhere in the middle.


In early July a small group of priests from both churches met at the St Sophia cathedral in Kyiv to condemn Russia’s aggression and assert the need for “unity of Ukrainian Orthodoxy”. But distrust runs deep. The contempt their leaders have for each other can be startling. “We view [the ocu] the same way Ukraine views the dnr and the lnr,” says Mr Danilevich, referring to the “people’s republics” controlled by Russian proxies before the war, and now illegally annexed by Russia. “They have to come back.” Archbishop Yevstratiy Zorya of the ocu claims Metropolitan Onufriy, the head of the uoc, and his associates “would have been full of joy if Putin conquered Kyiv”. Reconciliation, let alone a merger, is a remote prospect. ■