2022.07.06 让我们用芝加哥规则来击败俄罗斯

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Let’s Use Chicago Rules to Beat Russia
Why the U.S. adversary is a lot like Al Capone

By Eliot A. Cohen
Photo from the film "The Untouchables"
Paramount via Everett
JULY 6, 2022, 9:10 AM ET
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About the author: Eliot A. Cohen is a contributing writer at The Atlantic, a professor at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and the Arleigh Burke chair in strategy at CSIS. From 2007 to 2009, he was the Counselor of the Department of State. He is the author most recently of The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force.

Carl von Clausewitz observed in his classic On War that “the maximum use of force is by no means incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect.” That means, in part, acting thoughtfully but with the utmost effort, understanding that war is more bar fight than chess game. Or, to put it in the simpler words of Jim Malone, Eliot Ness’s counselor in The Untouchables, “You wanna know how to get Capone? They pull a knife, you pull a gun. He sends one of yours to the hospital, you send one of his to the morgue. That’s the Chicago way! And that’s how you get Capone.”

Al Capone is an apt analogy for what the West confronts in Russia: a particularly noxious mix of Mafia mentality, hypernationalist ideology, and totalitarian technique. Elegance is not the Russian way, and it cannot be our way. This is the light in which one should measure the accomplishments of NATO’s recent gathering in Madrid.


The tangible efforts that Western leaders announced were impressive in many respects, particularly the commitments to provide Ukraine with nearly 500 artillery systems, 600 tanks, hundreds of thousands of rounds of ammunition, and more. The question, as always, is whether these will be delivered as swiftly as they can be absorbed, and whether the United States and its allies are “leading the target” by putting in place now the infrastructure to prepare Ukraine for the weapons it will require and hopefully receive one, two, or six months from now, and for training the large forces it must mobilize.

Read: More than 100 days of war in Ukraine

The United States made some incremental additional commitments of forces to Europe, including two destroyers for a naval base in Spain. The policy declarations were important as well: a decision to expand by an order of magnitude NATO’s high-readiness forces; a formal recognition of the challenge (NATO avoided for now the word threat) posed by China; and an agreement to welcome Finnish and Swedish applications to join the alliance.

But these moves, beneficial as they may be, only partly meet the needs of the moment. Time and again Ukraine has demonstrated its ability to absorb high-end military hardware and deploy it quickly and effectively. This seems to be the case with HIMARS, the mobile rocket systems that are extremely accurate, and with which Ukrainian forces seem to be already hitting Russian ammunition dumps and military headquarters. Instead of the promised eight, the Ukrainians need 80, and work should be happening now to scale up transfers of these and like weapons as fast as possible.


What the Biden administration still struggles with is the ultimate purpose of Western assistance to Ukraine. At his press conference, the president said that the United States and its allies would not “allow Ukraine to be defeated.” That is the wrong objective. It should be, rather, to ensure Russia’s defeat—the thwarting of its aims to conquer yet more of Ukrainian territory, the smashing of its armed forces, and the doing of both in a convincing, public, and, yes, therefore humiliating way. Chicago rules, in other words.

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In the same way, the administration is wrong to titrate arms out of a misguided desire to avoid provoking Russian escalation or enabling the Ukrainians to do too much. The West is in a moment of military-industrial crisis; it should be taking concrete measures to ramp up industrial mobilization, with the goal of equipping Ukraine to the maximum while rearming the expanding forces of a newly awakened NATO.

Even as Western allies counter Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they must also meet the broader and longer-term threat that Russia poses to the eastern members of NATO, particularly the Baltic states.

The Western allies will not invade Russia, nor will they overthrow its regime directly—one day, hopefully, Russians will do that. Putin is motivated by imperial fantasies of imitating Peter the Great and other, even less savory Russian leaders. And Putin’s successor, should the Russian leader die or become incapacitated while in office, will likely be no better. For evidence of that, one need only consult the ravings of key advisers such as Nikolai Patrushev. If and when the battles cease in Ukraine, Russia’s intentions to expand and subjugate its neighbors will remain.

The good news here is that if one sets aside misleading memories of World War II and the Cold War, and disregards the ominous mutterings of experts who exaggerated Russian capacity before the war, then it becomes obvious that Russia is a weak state.


Russia’s GDP is less than that of South Korea. Its leadership is afraid to openly mobilize its middle class, so it refuses to declare war and send young men from Moscow and St. Petersburg to the slaughterhouse that is the Donbas. Its generals are, for the most part, incompetent, which is why purges of them continue. It is scraping the bottom of its manpower barrel and so raises to absurd heights the age level of potential service members. Corruption and indiscipline have rotted out its maintenance and low-level leadership. What it has is Cold War–era stockpiles of weapons and munitions (and those are huge, but finite); some pockets of excellence, for example its railroad units; and utter disregard for human life throughout the chain of command.

Even so, a mangy, myopic, and rabid bear is still a dangerous beast. That’s why beating Russian forces in Ukraine is not enough. The West must impose upon Russia sanctions intended not, as the current ones are, to punish, but rather to enfeeble (Chicago rules, again). The plummeting of Russian car production is an example of a basic fact, which is that Russian production depends, more than one might think, on access to Western chips, machine tools, and special materials. However the Ukraine war ends, permanently or temporarily, the West needs to settle into a comprehensive sanctions regime that will weaken Russia’s economy in the long haul and throttle its ability to rearm on a large scale when the shooting stops.


NATO expansion should assist in this process. The alliance will soon in all likelihood have Sweden and Finland as full members. They have real and potential capacity (Finland more the former, Sweden more the latter) and serious political leadership. But a NATO of 32 members will be even more unwieldy than what we now have.

Read: The accidental Trumpification of NATO

The solution—which cannot be publicly declared—is a NATO-within-NATO. Germany, France, and Italy have the largest economies in the European Union and in theory should carry the most weight in European-security decision making as well. But they cannot. Germany, the proverbial Hamlet of nations, is fatally compromised by its unwillingness and inability to make good on military commitments, and its recent sordid past in enabling Russia’s growth and stranglehold on European energy supplies. France is domestically torn, while the overweening vanity of its presidents makes it difficult for them to get a receptive hearing from lesser mortals. Italy, as ever, produces statesmen on occasion, but not statesmanship.

A nascent coalition of powers is, however, willing to take Russia seriously and has the muscle to thwart her while bringing less resolute European states along. The Eastern European and Baltic states, with Poland in the lead, know Russian tyranny firsthand, and are ready to stand up to it; the Scandinavian states, in particular Finland and Norway, are almost as intent; the English-speaking external powers, including the United Kingdom and Canada, are similarly alive and determined. It is to this core group that American statecraft must look.


The British chief of the General Staff recently described the Ukraine crisis as a 1937 moment for the West. It was an acute historical comparison. In that year the Sino-Japanese war began, setting the stage for World War II. In that year the West had before it choices that could have avoided the horrors of a far worse conflict, but it ducked.

To their credit, in the current moment, Western leaders are performing far better than did their counterparts 85 years ago—but not yet well enough. We’re dealing with Capone, and while, like Eliot Ness, we need to stay within the constraints of law and basic decency, we also need to apply Chicago rules.

Eliot A. Cohen is a contributing writer at The Atlantic, a professor at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and the Arleigh Burke chair in strategy at CSIS. From 2007 to 2009, he was the Counselor of the Department of State. He is the author most recently of The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force.



让我们用芝加哥规则来击败俄罗斯
为什么美国的对手很像阿尔-卡彭？

作者：艾略特-A-科恩
图片来自电影 "无法触及的人"。
派拉蒙公司通过埃弗雷特
2022年7月6日，美国东部时间上午9:10
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关于作者。艾略特-A-科恩是《大西洋》杂志的特约撰稿人，约翰-霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的教授，以及CSIS的阿利-伯克战略讲座。2007年至2009年，他曾担任美国国务院参赞。他最近的著作是《大棒》。软实力的局限性和军事力量的必要性。

卡尔-冯-克劳塞维茨在其经典的《战争论》中指出，"最大限度地使用武力与同时使用智力决不是不相容的"。这在某种程度上意味着，要深思熟虑地采取行动，但要尽最大努力，要明白战争与其说是象棋游戏，不如说是酒吧战斗。或者，用吉姆-马龙（The Untouchables中艾略特-尼斯的顾问）更简单的话来说，"你想知道如何抓住卡彭？他们拿刀，你拿枪。他把你的人送进医院，你把他的人送进停尸房。这就是芝加哥的方式! 这就是你如何抓住卡彭的方法"。

卡彭是西方在俄罗斯所面临的一个恰当的比喻：黑手党心态、超民族主义意识形态和极权主义技术的特别有害的组合。优雅不是俄罗斯的方式，也不可能是我们的方式。这就是人们应该衡量北约最近在马德里举行的会议所取得的成就的角度。


西方领导人宣布的实际努力在许多方面都令人印象深刻，特别是承诺向乌克兰提供近500套火炮系统、600辆坦克、数十万发弹药，以及更多。像往常一样，问题是这些东西是否会像可以吸收的那样迅速交付，以及美国及其盟国是否 "引领目标"，现在就建立基础设施，为乌克兰需要并希望在一、二或六个月后收到的武器做好准备，并训练它必须动员的大量部队。

阅读。乌克兰战争的100多天

美国对欧洲作出了一些渐进式的额外部队承诺，包括为西班牙的一个海军基地提供两艘驱逐舰。政策声明也很重要：决定将北约的高度戒备部队扩大一个数量级；正式承认中国带来的挑战（北约暂时避免使用威胁一词）；以及同意欢迎芬兰和瑞典申请加入联盟。

但这些举动，尽管可能是有益的，但只能部分地满足当前的需要。乌克兰一次又一次地证明了它有能力吸收高端军事硬件，并快速有效地部署它们。HIMARS似乎就是这种情况，这种移动火箭系统非常精确，乌克兰军队似乎已经在用它打击俄罗斯的弹药库和军事总部。乌克兰人需要的不是承诺的8套，而是80套，现在应该开展工作，尽快扩大这些武器和类似武器的转让。


拜登政府仍然纠结的是西方援助乌克兰的最终目的是什么。总统在其新闻发布会上说，美国及其盟友不会 "允许乌克兰被打败"。这是个错误的目标。相反，它应该是确保俄罗斯的失败--挫败其征服更多乌克兰领土的目标，粉碎其武装力量，并以令人信服的、公开的、是的，因此是羞辱性的方式完成这两项工作。换句话说，芝加哥规则。

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同样，政府出于避免激起俄罗斯升级或使乌克兰人做得太多的错误愿望而缩减武器是错误的。西方正处于军事工业危机的时刻；它应该采取具体措施加强工业动员，目的是最大限度地装备乌克兰，同时重新武装新近觉醒的北约的扩张力量。

即使在西方盟国反击俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵时，他们也必须应对俄罗斯对北约东部成员，特别是波罗的海国家构成的更广泛和更长期的威胁。

西方盟国不会入侵俄罗斯，也不会直接推翻其政权--希望有一天，俄罗斯人会这样做。普京的动机是模仿彼得大帝和其他更不讨好的俄罗斯领导人的帝国幻想。而普京的继任者，如果这位俄罗斯领导人在任期内死亡或丧失能力，可能也不会更好。为了证明这一点，我们只需参考尼古拉-帕特鲁舍夫等主要顾问的呓语。如果乌克兰的战斗停止了，俄罗斯扩张和征服其邻国的意图将继续存在。

这里的好消息是，如果抛开对二战和冷战的误导性记忆，无视战前夸大俄罗斯能力的专家们的不祥嘀咕，那么很明显，俄罗斯是一个弱国。


俄罗斯的国内生产总值不到韩国的水平。它的领导层不敢公开动员其中产阶级，所以它拒绝宣战，拒绝将莫斯科和圣彼得堡的年轻人送到顿巴斯这个屠宰场。它的将军们大部分都是无能的，这就是为什么对他们的清洗仍在继续。它正在搜刮人力，因此将潜在服役人员的年龄水平提高到了荒谬的高度。腐败和违纪已经使其维护和低级领导层腐烂。它所拥有的是冷战时期的武器和弹药储备（这些武器和弹药是巨大的，但也是有限的）；一些优秀的单位，例如它的铁路单位；以及整个指挥系统对人命的完全漠视。

即便如此，一只癞皮、近视和狂暴的熊仍然是一头危险的野兽。这就是为什么在乌克兰击败俄罗斯军队是不够的。西方必须对俄罗斯实施制裁，其目的不是为了惩罚，而是为了削弱（芝加哥规则，再次）。俄罗斯汽车产量的急剧下降是一个基本事实的例子，即俄罗斯的生产比人们想象的更依赖于获得西方的芯片、机床和特殊材料。无论乌克兰战争是永久还是暂时结束，西方都需要建立一个全面的制裁制度，在长期内削弱俄罗斯的经济，并在枪声停止时扼杀其大规模重新武装的能力。


北约的扩张应该有助于这一进程。该联盟很可能很快就会有瑞典和芬兰成为正式成员。它们拥有真正的和潜在的能力（芬兰更多是前者，瑞典更多是后者）和严肃的政治领导。但是，一个由32个成员组成的北约将比我们现在的情况更加臃肿。

阅读。北约的意外特朗普化

解决方案--不能公开宣布--是一个北约内的北约。德国、法国和意大利拥有欧盟最大的经济体，理论上也应该在欧洲安全决策中拥有最大的权重。但它们不能。德国是众所周知的国家中的哈姆雷特，由于它不愿意也没有能力履行军事承诺，以及它最近为俄罗斯的增长和对欧洲能源供应的扼制提供了肮脏的过去，因而受到致命的损害。法国在国内饱受煎熬，而其总统们过度的虚荣心使他们很难得到小人物们的认可。意大利和以往一样，偶尔会产生政治家，但不是政治家。

然而，一个新生的大国联盟愿意认真对待俄罗斯，并且有能力挫败她，同时将不那么坚决的欧洲国家拉拢过来。以波兰为首的东欧和波罗的海国家对俄罗斯的暴政有切身体会，并已准备好挺身而出；斯堪的纳维亚国家，特别是芬兰和挪威，几乎同样有此打算；包括英国和加拿大在内的外部英语国家也同样有活力和决心。美国的国家政策必须着眼于这个核心群体。


英国总参谋长最近将乌克兰危机描述为西方的一个1937年的时刻。这是一个尖锐的历史比较。在那一年，中日战争开始，为第二次世界大战创造了条件。在那一年，西方国家面前有一些选择，可以避免一场更严重的冲突的恐怖，但它回避了。

值得称赞的是，在当前的时刻，西方领导人的表现比85年前的同行要好得多，但还不够好。我们正在与卡彭打交道，虽然像艾略特-尼斯一样，我们需要在法律和基本礼节的约束下行事，但我们也需要适用芝加哥规则。

艾略特-A-科恩是《大西洋月刊》的特约撰稿人，约翰-霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的教授，以及CSIS的阿利-伯克战略主席。2007年至2009年，他曾担任美国国务院参赞。他最近的著作是《大棒》。软实力的局限性和军事力量的必要性。