2013.07.26 60年前与朝鲜人谈判的情景

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What It Was Like to Negotiate With North Koreans 60 Years Ago
The agonizing, years-long talks that still didn't fully resolve the tragic conflict.

By Brandon K. Gauthier
JULY 26, 2013
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nkarmistice.jpg
A communist prisoner of war who lost both legs fighting United Nations Forces in Korea,uses crutches as he leaves Pusan, South Korea, on April 15, 1953. (AP)
For two hours and 11 minutes, North Korea's lead negotiator, General Nam Il, stared at U.S. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, chain-smoking and sitting silently.


In August 1951, a little over a month into cease-fire negotiations to end the Korean War, talks inched forward at an agonizing pace. Hatred hung in the air like the general's cigarette smoke.

Since June 25, 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea, unimaginable devastation had decimated the "Land of Morning Calm." Before it was over, three million Koreans, mostly innocent civilians, perished in the flames, U.S. aerial bombardments razed every town in North Korea, and South Korea was left a wasteland of refugees and unmitigated misery.

Over a million Chinese "volunteers"--and more than 40,000, largely American, soldiers of the United Nations--joined their Korean brethren in death.

This immense suffering set the backdrop to cease-fire talks starting on July 10, 1951.

On that day, Vice Admiral Joy and a UN delegation met Chinese and North Korean negotiators for the first time in Kaesŏng, just south of the 38th parallel. Both sides bowed--slightly--and Joy took note of his adversaries.

North Korean General Nam Il was "short in stature...and gave the impression of considerable nervous energy."


General Hsieh Fang, the ranking Chinese delegate, gave "the impression of Shakespeare's 'Yond Cassius...a lean and hungry look'...a bitterly sharp mind."

North Korean General Lee Sang Cho, described by Joy in less glowing terms, "was an accomplished liar...short and chunky, often dirty and slovenly."

The UN team marveled at the degree to which the North Koreans attempted to appear stern. While Hsieh Fang dressed like a trench soldier, the North Koreans wore fanciful uniforms. They never smiled.

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General Lee, eager to demonstrate "iron self-control," let flies crawl around his face before the amused Americans. When a lower-ranking South Korean colonel fell out of his chair, the North Koreans didn't crack a smile as the Chinese burst out laughing.

Admiral Joy noticed other peculiarities; the North Koreans had shortened the legs of his chair, making Nam Il appear taller. When a United Nations flag was placed on the conference table, a bigger North Korean flag appeared alongside it after a recess.

Every comment in the talks was translated to Chinese, Korean, and English. In the interim, Nam Il smoked constantly and broke pencils--"like a cat on a hot tin roof," as Joy explained. Hsieh Fang, who the admiral described in overtly racial terms, "watched proceedings broodingly...His saturnine yellow face was a set mask, revealing nothing, expressing nothing."

The first step towards ending active fighting was to decide an agenda for the talks. That effort--producing disagreement over the definition of "agenda"--took 10 meetings. Agreed steps for a cease-fire came out as follows:

-- Establish a demarcation line and demilitarized zone

-- Create specific conditions for an armistice and name neutral countries to oversee it


-- Reach an agreement on exchanging prisoners of war

-- Offer post-armistice "recommendations" to both sides

The first issue, establishing a cease-fire line, was messy from the beginning. North Korean and Chinese delegates insisted on the 38th parallel--a stipulation that would have forced UN troops to withdraw from fortified lines near today's demilitarized zone and return hundreds of square miles to North Korea.

On the orders of General Matthew B. Ridgway--then the ranking U.S. commander in the Pacific--Joy's delegation refused to accept any demarcation zone south of the actual line of battle. The 38th parallel, they contended, was militarily indefensible for stopping future attacks. Nam Il ridiculed these arguments--"do you not feel ridiculous?"--noting that America's air and naval power more than compensated for such disadvantages.

Increasingly vitriolic debates ensued over the hot days of August. On the 14th of that month, Nam Il called the UN position "arrogant and absurd" 19 times in a little over an hour and then--as Joy recorded in his journal--"actually sneered at us."


On August 22, the Communist delegation accused the UN of launching a mysterious napalm raid in the neutral Kaesŏng area. When American commanders dismissed the claim as propaganda, North Korean and Chinese officials broke off negotiations. An actual UN violation two months later--acknowledged immediately by General Ridgway--didn't help matters.

By October, however, new talks had started at Panmunjom, a neutral site between the lines, and a breakthrough emerged on a cease-fire zone. Nam Il arrived in a shiny Imperial Chrysler (!) on November 27 and accepted the current battle line as an immediate demarcation line. This shrewd move effectively barred further hostilities on the ground while the remainder of the agenda was negotiated. UN officials, acting on the orders of the White House, agreed to this de-facto cease-fire for 30 days.

The next month came and went, and the Communist delegation, as Admiral Joy contended, "dragged their feet at every opportunity and used the 30 days of grace to dig in and stabilize their battle line."

Still, by early 1952, only three primary questions prevented agreement at Panmunjom: Could North Korea build new airfields after an armistice? Which neutral nations would supervise the cease-fire? And how would both sides exchange prisoners of war?


The UN eventually gave in on the first question, but Communist negotiators astonished Joy's team on the second by picking--"believe it or not"--the Soviet Union as a neutral party to supervise the cease-fire. The Chinese and North Koreans, Joy believed, only made the demand with the intention of withdrawing it at a later date for UN concessions (which they did) --a negotiating style derided as "quid pro quid."

Questions over prisoners of war proved far more exasperating at Panmunjom. On December 18, 1951, the UN delegation was appalled to receive a list of just 11,559, mostly South Korean, prisoners in Communist hands. The UN had counted over 100,000 of its soldiers as missing--including 11,500 Americans.

Nam Il and Hsieh Fang themselves were incensed to learn that only 70,000 of 132,000 of their men--based on UN screenings--would return home without the use of force. The subsequent refusal of the United Nations to hand over some 62,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners at gunpoint proved the last remaining obstacle to an armistice in May 1952.

By that time, though, a weary Vice Admiral Joy had already presented the North Koreans and Chinese with a final negotiating position: the UN would accept North Korea's right to rebuild its airfields if it would, in turn, accept a supervisory commission of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia and the voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. Nam Il et al. rejected the deal outright, deadlocking talks for another 15 months.


On May 22, 1952, Joy was relieved as lead negotiator at Panmunjom by his own request and delivered a blistering adieu to the opposition:

"... you impute to the UNC the same suspicion, greed and deviousness which are your stock in trade...you are people of intelligence...you do these things with purpose and design...If you harbor the slightest desire to restore peace and to end the misery and suffering of millions of innocent people, you must bring to the solution of this issue...good faith..."

After the North Koreans and Chinese finally accepted the principle of voluntary repatriation, a cease-fire was signed on July 27, 1953. During those 159 meetings, lasting two years and 17 days, the agony of the Korean peninsula continued unabated in a conflict that is in many ways unresolved to this day.

is a doctoral candidate in American history at Fordham University and a contributor to NKnews.org




60年前与朝鲜人谈判的情景
痛苦的、长达数年的会谈仍然没有完全解决悲惨的冲突。

作者：布兰登-K-高迪尔
2013年7月26日

NKarmistice.jpg
1953年4月15日，一名在朝鲜与联合国部队作战时失去双腿的共产党战俘，在离开南朝鲜的釜山时使用拐杖。(美联社)
在2小时11分钟内，朝鲜的主要谈判代表南日将军盯着美国海军副司令特纳-乔伊（C. Turner Joy），抽着烟，静静地坐着。


1951年8月，结束朝鲜战争的停火谈判进行了一个多月，谈判以令人痛苦的速度向前推进。仇恨像将军的香烟一样在空气中弥漫。

自1950年6月25日北朝鲜入侵南朝鲜以来，难以想象的破坏已经摧毁了 "晨曦之国"。在战争结束之前，300万朝鲜人，大部分是无辜的平民，在火焰中丧生，美国的空中轰炸夷平了北朝鲜的每一个城镇，而南朝鲜则成为难民和无尽苦难的荒地。

超过一百万的中国 "志愿者"--以及超过四万名主要是美国人的联合国士兵--与他们的朝鲜兄弟们一起死亡。

这种巨大的痛苦为1951年7月10日开始的停火谈判提供了背景。

当天，乔伊海军中将和一个联合国代表团在三八线以南的开城首次会见了中国和朝鲜的谈判代表。双方都微微地鞠了一躬，乔伊注意到了他的对手们。

朝鲜将军南日 "身材矮小......给人以相当紧张的印象"。


谢方将军，中国的高级代表，给人的印象是 "莎士比亚笔下的'Yond Cassius......一副瘦弱而饥饿的样子'......有一颗苦涩的心。"

乔伊用不太光彩的语言描述了朝鲜将军李相周，"他是一个成功的骗子......矮胖，经常脏兮兮的，邋里邋遢。"

联合国小组对朝鲜人试图表现出严厉的程度表示惊叹。谢芳穿得像个战壕里的士兵，而朝鲜人则穿上了奇特的军装。他们从来没有笑过。

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李将军急于展示 "铁的自制力"，在有趣的美国人面前让苍蝇在他脸上爬来爬去。当一位级别较低的韩国上校从椅子上摔下来时，朝鲜人没有破涕为笑，因为中国人爆发出了笑声。

乔伊上将还注意到其他一些特殊情况；朝鲜人缩短了他的椅子腿，使南日看起来更高了。当一面联合国旗帜放在会议桌上时，休会后，一面更大的朝鲜国旗出现在旁边。

会谈中的每一句话都被翻译成中文、韩文和英文。在这期间，南日不断吸烟，并折断铅笔--正如乔伊解释的那样，"就像一只热铁皮屋顶上的猫"。谢方，海军上将用明显的种族术语描述了他，"忧心忡忡地看着谈判过程......他那张阴沉的黄脸是一个固定的面具，什么也不透露，什么也不表达。"

结束战斗的第一步是为会谈决定一个议程。这一努力--在 "议程 "的定义上产生了分歧--花了10次会议。商定的停火步骤如下。

-- 建立一条分界线和非军事区

-- 为停战创造具体条件，并指定中立国家监督停战。


-- 达成一项交换战俘的协议

--向双方提出停战后的 "建议"

第一个问题，建立停火线，从一开始就很混乱。朝鲜和中国代表坚持以38度线为界--这一规定将迫使联合国军队从今天的非军事区附近的防御线撤出，并将数百平方英里的土地归还给朝鲜。

根据马修-B-里奇韦将军的命令--当时美国在太平洋地区的最高指挥官--乔伊的代表团拒绝接受实际战线以南的任何分界线。他们争辩说，三八线在军事上是无法阻止未来的攻击的。南一嘲笑这些论点--"你不觉得可笑吗？"--指出美国的空军和海军力量足以弥补这些不利因素。

在8月的炎热日子里，越来越激烈的辩论接踵而至。当月14日，南日在一个多小时内19次称联合国的立场是 "傲慢和荒谬的"，然后--正如乔伊在他的日记中所记录的--"实际上是在讥笑我们。"


8月22日，共产党代表团指控联合国在中立的开城地区发动了一次神秘的凝固汽油弹袭击。当美国指挥官将这一说法视为宣传时，朝鲜和中国官员中断了谈判。两个月后，联合国的一次实际侵犯行为--雷德韦将军立即承认了这一点--并没有帮助解决问题。

然而，到了10月，新的谈判在两线之间的中立地点板门店开始，并在停火区方面取得了突破性进展。11月27日，南日乘坐一辆闪亮的帝国克莱斯勒汽车（！）抵达，并接受目前的战线为即时分界线。这一精明之举有效地阻止了当地的进一步敌对行动，同时对议程的其余部分进行了谈判。联合国官员根据白宫的命令行事，同意这一事实上的停火，为期30天。

接下来的一个月过去了，正如乔伊上将所说，共产党代表团 "一有机会就拖后腿，并利用这30天的宽限期来挖掘和稳定他们的战线"。

尽管如此，到1952年初，只有三个主要问题妨碍了在板门店达成协议。北朝鲜在停战后能否建造新的机场？哪些中立国家将监督停火？以及双方将如何交换战俘？


联合国最终在第一个问题上做出了让步，但共产党谈判代表在第二个问题上让乔伊的团队大吃一惊，他们选择了--"信不信由你"--苏联作为监督停火的中立方。乔伊认为，中国和北朝鲜提出这一要求，只是为了在以后的日子里撤回这一要求，以换取联合国的让步（他们确实这样做了）--这种谈判方式被嘲笑为 "交换条件"。

在板门店，关于战俘的问题被证明是更令人恼火的。1951年12月18日，联合国代表团收到了一份仅有11,559人的名单，其中大部分是南朝鲜的战俘，他们在共产党手中。联合国曾统计有超过10万名士兵失踪，其中包括11,500名美国人。

南日和谢方得知他们13.2万名士兵中只有7万人--根据联合国的筛查--将在不使用武力的情况下返回家园，他们自己也感到非常愤怒。随后，联合国拒绝在枪口下交出大约62,000名朝鲜和中国囚犯，这证明了1952年5月停战的最后一个障碍。

不过，到那时，疲惫不堪的乔伊海军中将已经向朝鲜和中国提出了最后的谈判立场：如果朝鲜接受由瑞典、瑞士、波兰和捷克斯洛伐克组成的监督委员会以及自愿遣返战俘，联合国将接受朝鲜重建机场的权利。南日等人断然拒绝了这项交易，使谈判又僵持了15个月。


1952年5月22日，乔伊应自己的要求在板门店被解除了首席谈判代表的职务，并向反对派发表了一份尖锐的告别书。

"......你们把你们的交易中的怀疑、贪婪和狡诈也归咎于联合国军司令部......你们是有智慧的人......你们做这些事情是有目的和有计划的......如果你们怀有恢复和平和结束数百万无辜人民的不幸和痛苦的丝毫愿望，你们必须为解决这一问题带来......诚意"。

在朝鲜人和中国人最终接受自愿遣返的原则后，1953年7月27日签署了停火协议。在这159次会议期间，持续了两年零17天，朝鲜半岛的痛苦有增无减，这场冲突在许多方面至今仍未得到解决。

是福特汉姆大学美国历史专业的博士生，也是NKnews.org的撰稿人。