2022.07.27南希-佩洛西的台湾之行对中国的启示

shiyi18

What Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan Trip Says About China
The rancor over the House speaker’s potential visit reveals how badly Xi Jinping needs a new strategy.

By Michael Schuman
Xi Jinping delivers a speech
Bloomberg / Getty
JULY 27, 2022
SHARE
About the author: Michael Schuman is a contributing writer at The Atlantic, and the author of Superpower Interrupted: The Chinese History of the World and The Miracle: The Epic Story of Asia’s Quest for Wealth.

Imagine, for a moment, that Nancy Pelosi, en route to Taiwan, is confronted by Chinese fighter jets in the skies near the island. Taiwan scrambles its own planes to her defense. A game of chicken ensues. Who blinks first?

This scenario would be a Cuban-missile-crisis moment, with the United States and China staring at a potential conflagration. And based on Beijing’s strident reaction to the House speaker’s possible visit to Taiwan, it’s not all that far-fetched. “China will act strongly to resolutely respond to [Pelosi’s visit] and take countermeasures,” a foreign ministry spokesperson warned. “We mean what we say.” Hu Xijin, a former editor of a Communist Party news outlet, appeared to threaten violence. “If the US can’t restrain her, let China restrain her & punish her,” he tweeted. “PLA Air Force will surely make her visit a disgrace to herself and to the US.”


The controversy—China regards Taiwan as a renegade province; were she to visit, Pelosi would be the most senior American lawmaker to set foot on the island in a quarter century, an implicit threat to Beijing’s claim—is a sign of just how tense relations between the U.S. and China have become, and of how the chances of war, which seemed remote only a short time ago, have become very real.

But most of all, the rancor reveals how badly Beijing needs a new strategy for Taiwan—and an entirely new foreign policy. Beijing’s hostile approach to the world may be meant to protect and promote the country’s national interests and global ambitions, but in many respects, it seems to be achieving exactly the opposite.

China’s leaders would probably not agree, and certainly not when it comes to Taiwan. They’ve considered unification with Taiwan a top national-policy priority ever since their mortal enemies, the Kuomintang, fled to the island in 1949 after losing the civil war for control of China and established a rival government. To them, Taiwan is an integral part of China. Though Beijing professes to favor “peaceful reunification,” as the Communists call it, the threat that war could break out has persistently loomed over East Asia.

Beijing, too, has always rankled at continued U.S. support for Taiwan. Though Washington upholds the “one-China policy” and does not formally recognize the Taipei government, it has maintained a friendship with Taiwan anyway, even shipping it arms, to the great chagrin of Beijing, which has accused the U.S. of meddling in China’s internal affairs and violating its sovereignty.


Those protests have become even louder under President Xi Jinping. A champion of nationalist causes, Xi has turned up the pressure on Taiwan. Over the past two years, Beijing has routinely sent squadrons of jets buzzing near Taiwan and held other military exercises close to the island, apparently aimed at intimidating the democratic government there. Other countries that show support for Taiwan are met with rabid hostility: After Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open a representative office in its capital in 2021, Beijing blocked imports from the Baltic country.

RECOMMENDED READING

When Conservationists Kill Lots (and Lots) of Animals
EMMA MARRIS
An illustration of a stack of pancakes with a fork sticking out of it
The 12 Most Unforgettable Descriptions of Food in Literature
ADRIENNE LAFRANCE

SPONSOR CONTENT
The future of banking for the hustle generation
ALLY BANK
Thus the extreme reaction to the potential Pelosi visit.

It’s hard to tell which side is escalating matters. Members of Congress have journeyed to Taiwan before—as recently as April—without sparking fears of war. Beijing may be pushing back against what it sees as Washington’s attempts to salami-slice the status quo. But Pelosi is no ordinary representative, either. In Beijing’s eyes, her plan reinforces its fear that the U.S. is pulling Taiwan inexorably into the American orbit. Officially, Washington’s policy toward Taiwan has not changed. But inadvertently or otherwise, Washington has been dropping hints that it sees Taiwan as a core national interest. President Joe Biden included Taiwan in his Summit for Democracy last year, as if it were just another country. In May, when asked at a press conference if the U.S. would defend Taiwan from Chinese attack, Biden blurted out “yes,” apparently deviating from Washington’s standard policy of keeping America’s military commitment ambiguous. (His national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, recently told The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg that the comment was in line with the U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity.”)

Beijing’s intimidation of the Taipei government has, however, heightened alarm in Washington and around the region that Xi is preparing to use force to claim the island. In response, the U.S. and its allies continue to risk Beijing’s ire to show support for Taiwan. Japan, for instance, allowed Taiwan’s vice president to attend the funeral of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe earlier this month (officially as a private citizen).

The fact is, Xi has been frosty toward Taiwan for some time. In the past, Beijing and Taipei have been able to hold a dialogue, sometimes with fruitful results: In 2010, the two sides inked an economic-cooperation pact. But no serious talks have taken place since Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen took office six years ago. Xi appears to perceive the Tsai administration as especially threatening. She represents the Democratic Progressive Party, a political movement that is cold to Beijing’s notions on unification. Tsai has personally deemed Xi’s calls for unification “impossible” and has launched programs to reduce Taiwan’s economic reliance on China while seeking closer ties to America. In a sense, she is just following the will of her citizens. The thought of unification with China holds little appeal in Taiwan, while its people grow more sympathetic to the idea of declaring formal independence—a step Beijing would find intolerable. In one recent survey in Taiwan, a mere 8 percent of respondents had a positive view of the mainland government.

Beijing’s fiery rhetoric and military harassment are not likely to woo them back into the fold. That’s typical of Xi’s entire foreign policy. China’s leaders, for instance, are worried about becoming ring-fenced by American allies, but their aggressive stance on territorial disputes, extensive military buildup, and warming friendship with Russia are making that outcome inevitable. Much attention has been paid to Finland and Sweden joining NATO in the months since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but what was widely noticed in Asia was that the leaders of Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand attended a NATO summit last month. China has “become more assertive and more willing to challenge international rules and norms,” New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern warned, adding that “we must respond to the actions we see.” India, long wary of allying with Washington, is becoming more engaged in the Quad, a security partnership with Australia, Japan, and the United States that is developing into an anti-China coalition.

No change in Xi’s approach is on the horizon, however. Beijing apparently has come to believe it can compel neighbors and adversaries to submit to its wishes and align their policies with China’s interests. At the moment, that’s contributing to a standoff over Pelosi’s proposed visit. Though it’s unlikely China’s leaders actually want war, their stern warnings almost force them into some especially belligerent response, leaving open the threat of unintended consequences. In the mid-1990s, after Washington infuriated Beijing by allowing Taiwan’s then-president to travel to the U.S., the Chinese staged military exercises and shot missiles into the seas near Taiwan as a sign of what might come next time. A Pelosi visit might demand a similar response, or something even more threatening.

Her proposed visit and China’s reaction are painting all parties in uncomfortable corners. If Beijing allows Pelosi to visit Taiwan without a response, China’s leadership will look helpless and humiliated. If Pelosi cancels or postpones, the Biden administration will look as if it was bullied by Chinese threats. Even Taiwan, usually eager for international support, will have to calculate if hosting Pelosi is worth the risks.

All of this melodrama could be avoided if Beijing aimed to win hearts and minds instead of scaring them. If the country took a more practical approach to Taiwan that realistically accounted for the island’s growing political and economic importance, it could ease fears both in Taiwan and around the region. Even if Xi believes his tough line is responding to U.S. provocations, his saber-rattling is a choice. He has others—such as constructive dialogue—that may better serve his ultimate goals and long-term interests. Until then, Xi will find that he is creating crises instead of resolving them.

Michael Schuman is a contributing writer at The Atlantic, and the author of Superpower Interrupted: The Chinese History of the World and The Miracle: The Epic Story of Asia’s Quest for Wealth.



南希-佩洛西的台湾之行对中国的启示
对众议院议长的潜在访问的不满揭示了习近平多么需要一个新的战略。

迈克尔-舒曼报道
习近平发表讲话
彭博社/盖蒂
2022年7月27日
分享
关于作者。迈克尔-舒曼是《大西洋》杂志的特约撰稿人，也是《超级大国中断》和《奇迹：亚洲追求财富的史诗故事》的作者。中国的世界史》和《奇迹：亚洲追求财富的史诗故事》。

想象一下，南希-佩洛西在前往台湾的途中，在该岛附近的天空中遇到了中国的战机。台湾方面启动了自己的飞机来保卫她。一场 "鸡 "的游戏随之展开。谁先眨眼？

这种情况将是一个古巴导弹危机的时刻，美国和中国正盯着一场潜在的大火。而根据北京对众议院议长可能访问台湾的强烈反应，这并不那么牵强。"中国将采取强有力的行动，坚决回应[佩洛西的访问]并采取反措施，"外交部发言人警告说。"我们言出必行。" 一个共产党新闻机构的前编辑胡锡进似乎在威胁要使用暴力。"他在推特上说："如果美国不能约束她，就让中国约束她并惩罚她。"解放军空军一定会让她的访问成为自己和美国的耻辱。"


这场争论表明，中国将台湾视为一个叛逆的省份；如果她访问，佩洛西将成为四分之一世纪以来踏足该岛的最高级美国立法者，这对北京的主张是一个隐性的威胁--这表明美国和中国之间的关系变得多么紧张，也表明战争的可能性，在不久前似乎还很渺茫，现在已经变得非常真实。

但最重要的是，这种敌意揭示了北京多么需要一个新的台湾战略，以及一个全新的外交政策。北京对世界的敌对态度可能是为了保护和促进该国的国家利益和全球野心，但在许多方面，它似乎正在实现完全相反的目标。

中国的领导人可能不会同意，当然在涉及台湾的时候也不会同意。自从他们的死敌国民党在1949年争夺中国控制权的内战中失败后逃到台湾并建立了一个敌对政府后，他们就把与台湾的统一视为国家政策的首要任务。对他们来说，台湾是中国的一个组成部分。虽然北京宣称赞成共产党人所说的 "和平统一"，但战争可能爆发的威胁一直笼罩着东亚。

北京也一直对美国对台湾的持续支持感到不满。尽管华盛顿坚持 "一个中国政策"，没有正式承认台北政府，但它还是与台湾保持着友谊，甚至向台湾运送武器，这让北京非常恼火，它指责美国干涉中国的内政，侵犯中国的主权。


在习近平主席的领导下，这些抗议声变得更加响亮。作为民族主义事业的倡导者，习近平加大了对台湾的压力。在过去的两年里，北京经常派战机中队在台湾附近徘徊，并在该岛附近举行其他军事演习，显然是为了恐吓那里的民主政府。其他国家如果对台湾表示支持，就会遭到狂热的敌视。在立陶宛允许台湾于2021年在其首都开设代表处后，北京阻止了来自这个波罗的海国家的进口。

推荐阅读

当保护主义者杀死大量（和大量）的动物时
EMMA MARRIS
一叠煎饼的插图，上面插着一把叉子
文学作品中最令人难忘的12种食物描述
阿德里安娜-拉芳斯

赞助内容
喧嚣一代的银行业的未来
爱丽银行
因此，对佩洛西可能来访的极端反应。

很难说哪一方在使事情升级。国会议员以前也曾前往台湾--最近一次是在4月--但没有引发对战争的担忧。北京可能正在回击它所认为的华盛顿试图破坏现状的行为。但佩洛西也不是普通的代表。在北京的眼中，她的计划加强了它的恐惧，即美国正在把台湾不可避免地拉入美国的轨道。从官方来说，华盛顿的对台政策并没有改变。但无论是否有意，华盛顿一直在暗示，它将台湾视为国家核心利益。乔-拜登总统去年将台湾纳入他的民主峰会，仿佛它只是另一个国家。5月，在一次新闻发布会上，当被问及美国是否会保卫台湾不受中国的攻击时，拜登脱口而出 "是的"，这显然偏离了华盛顿保持美国军事承诺模糊性的标准政策。(他的国家安全顾问杰克-沙利文最近告诉《大西洋》杂志的杰弗里-戈德堡，这一评论符合美国的 "战略模糊 "政策）。

然而，北京对台北政府的恐吓加剧了华盛顿和该地区对习近平准备使用武力夺取该岛的担忧。作为回应，美国及其盟友继续冒着北京的怒火来表示对台湾的支持。例如，日本允许台湾副总统在本月早些时候参加前首相安倍晋三的葬礼（正式身份为私人公民）。

事实上，习近平对台湾冷淡已经有一段时间了。过去，北京和台北一直能够进行对话，有时还能取得丰硕成果。2010年，双方签署了一项经济合作协议。但自从台湾总统蔡英文六年前上任以来，就没有进行过认真的会谈。习近平似乎认为蔡英文政府特别具有威胁性。她所代表的民进党是一个对北京的统一观念很冷淡的政治运动。蔡英文个人认为习近平的统一要求是 "不可能的"，并推出了减少台湾对中国经济依赖的计划，同时寻求与美国建立更紧密的联系。从某种意义上说，她只是在遵循其公民的意愿。与中国统一的想法在台湾没有什么吸引力，而台湾人民越来越同情宣布正式独立的想法--北京会认为这是不可容忍的一步。在台湾最近的一项调查中，仅有8%的受访者对大陆政府持正面看法。

北京的激烈言辞和军事骚扰不可能吸引他们回心转意。这也是习近平整个外交政策的典型。例如，中国领导人担心成为美国盟友的包围圈，但他们在领土争端上的激进立场、广泛的军事集结以及与俄罗斯不断升温的友谊使这一结果不可避免。在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰后的几个月里，人们对芬兰和瑞典加入北约给予了很大关注，但在亚洲受到广泛关注的是，日本、韩国、澳大利亚和新西兰的领导人上个月参加了北约峰会。中国已经 "变得更加自信，更愿意挑战国际规则和规范"，新西兰总理杰辛达-阿德恩警告说，"我们必须对我们看到的行动作出回应"。长期以来对与华盛顿结盟持谨慎态度的印度，正在更多地参与四国集团，这是一个与澳大利亚、日本和美国的安全伙伴关系，正在发展成为一个反华联盟。

然而，习近平的做法并没有改变。北京显然已经相信它可以迫使邻国和对手服从其意愿，并使其政策符合中国的利益。目前，这导致了对佩洛西提议的访问的僵持。尽管中国领导人不太可能真的想要战争，但他们的严厉警告几乎迫使他们做出一些特别好战的反应，留下了意外后果的威胁。1990年代中期，在华盛顿允许台湾当时的总统访问美国而激怒了北京之后，中国举行了军事演习，并向台湾附近的海域发射了导弹，以示下一次可能发生的事情。佩洛西的访问可能需要类似的反应，或者更有威胁性的反应。

她提议的访问和中国的反应使各方都处在不舒服的角落里。如果北京允许佩洛西访问台湾而不作任何回应，中国的领导层将显得无助和羞辱。如果佩洛西取消或推迟访问，拜登政府将看起来像是被中国的威胁所欺负。即使是通常热衷于国际支持的台湾，也将不得不计算接待佩洛西是否值得冒险。

如果中国政府的目标是赢得人心，而不是吓唬他们，那么所有这些闹剧都可以避免。如果中国对台湾采取更实际的做法，现实地考虑到该岛日益增长的政治和经济重要性，就可以缓解台湾和整个地区的恐惧。即使习近平认为他的强硬路线是对美国挑衅的回应，他的剑拔弩张也是一种选择。他还有其他选择--比如建设性的对话--可能更符合他的最终目标和长期利益。在此之前，习近平会发现他在制造危机而不是解决危机。

迈克尔-舒曼是《大西洋》杂志的特约撰稿人，也是《超级大国中断》和《中国的世界史》的作者。中国的世界史》和《奇迹：亚洲追求财富的史诗故事》。