2022.09.26 中国跌倒，美国吃饱

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China’s Mistakes Can Be America’s Gain
The United States does not need to take Xi Jinping’s attempt to project power at face value.

By Michael Schuman
An illustration of Chinese leader Xi Jinping about to step on a banana peel
Tyler Comrie / The Atlantic; Getty
SEPTEMBER 26, 2022, 7 AM ET
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Xi jinping should be enjoying his final days in charge of China. For decades now, the Chinese Communist Party has regularly replaced its senior leadership—a system crucial to the nation’s success—and after 10 years in power, Xi would be due to step aside and allow a new team to guide the country’s future. But when the country’s top cadres meet in Beijing on October 16 for the 20th Party Congress, Xi is widely expected to break precedent and extend his rule for at least another five years.

Although this departure from custom has been mooted for years, the news might send a renewed chill down the spine of some in Washington, D.C. Xi has transformed China from the U.S.’s potential partner to its chief strategic adversary. The Chinese leader appears determined to capitalize on his country’s recently acquired wealth to challenge America’s economic primacy, technological advantage, and military dominance, and even its assumptions about the global order that forms the foundation of American power. Five more years of Xi almost certainly means five more years of superpower competition, even confrontation.


That is the conventional wisdom. But maybe Washington should be grateful Xi is sticking around. China’s leader definitely intends to roll back American global influence, but he may not be doing a good job of preparing his own country to attain that goal. The actual results of his policies suggest that he is weakening, not strengthening, China as a competitor to the United States. The longer Xi remains at China’s helm, the less competitive the country may become.

Lost amid the hype about China’s ascent is just how poorly the country has performed under Xi’s stewardship in nearly every aspect of policy. The economy has slowed dramatically. The leadership has given up on meeting its once-sacrosanct growth target. Xi’s aggressive foreign policy has alienated most of the world’s major powers and terrified China’s neighbors in Asia. Many of Xi’s high-profile government initiatives are marred by waste and mismanagement. China’s rise, which Xi has called inevitable, is less, not more, certain because of his rule.

That alternative narrative has serious implications for American foreign and domestic policy. In response to Xi’s belligerence, policy makers in Washington feel compelled to contest China on every front: diplomatic, economic, technological, military, and ideological. That was the thinking behind the recently signed CHIPS bill, which is designed to ensure America’s continued mastery of the semiconductor industry against China’s high-tech ambitions. The same strategy guided President Joe Biden’s 2021 Build Back Better World, an infrastructure-building program intended to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and vie for influence in the developing world. These policies were based on the premise that China’s capabilities are keeping pace with Xi’s ambitions. The evidence now suggests that Xi’s aims are outstripping the country’s capacity to sustain them.


Read: No more ‘strategic ambiguity’ on Taiwan

The timing of Xi’s overreach is fortunate for Washington. Amid the partisan rancor and social disorder that has preoccupied the United States in the past five years, American global power has probably been more vulnerable than at any time since World War II. Xi could have taken advantage of that disarray to expand Chinese influence at America’s expense. Instead, his actions have had the effect not only of keeping the U.S. in the game but also, in certain respects, of enhancing its global standing. The worldwide American network of alliances, which had come under severe strain, is arguably stronger now than it has been in years—in part due to Xi’s policies.

Xi’s China remains a threat as the only country with both the intent and the resources to undermine the U.S.-led global order. Yet the failings of Xi’s agenda show that the widely held assumption that China’s rise is as unstoppable as American decline is simplistic. Xi wants to be written into the history books as the man who overturned Pax Americana. Instead, he could end up being the one who preserves it.

When xi jinping claimed power in 2012, most China experts anticipated that he would follow the immensely successful path laid by the “paramount leader” Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s—based on liberalizing economic reforms, integration with the global economy, and a partnership with the United States. Xi had previously served as an official in some of China’s most economically vibrant regions, so he had long experience with Deng’s central principle of “reform and opening up.” Shortly before Xi became the country’s new leader, he had had extensive interactions with then Vice President Joe Biden, which left the impression that Xi valued China’s fruitful relationship with Washington.

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As his rule has unfolded, however, those early assumptions have proved to be wrong. Highly ideological, fiercely nationalist, and obsessed with political control, Xi has deviated sharply from his predecessors’ policies. In so doing, he has altered China’s course in profound and unpredictable ways.

Most dramatically of all, Xi has entirely revised China’s foreign policy. He apparently believes that China’s moment to assume the status of the world’s most powerful country has arrived. Rather than treating Washington as a partner, Xi considers the U.S. to be China’s most dangerous adversary. Instead of immersing China in the American-led global order, Xi is promoting his own vision of a Sinocentric alternative, one that is friendlier to authoritarian regimes. Notably, the Chinese leader has forged a new friendship with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who Xi seems to believe can be an ally in his quest to roll back American power.

Yet the more openly hostile China has become to the current international system, the stronger U.S. alliances have grown. Xi’s agenda has persuaded the world’s democracies to tighten their ties to the United States and to one another in order to counter the threat he presents.

Initially, European leaders were uncomfortable with Washington’s tougher line on China, insisting on their “strategic autonomy.” This divergence sowed some dissension within the Atlantic alliance. However, Xi’s support for Putin amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has gone a long way toward healing that rift. At a virtual summit in April, ostensibly meant to bolster cooperation between China and Europe, the leaders of the European Union criticized Xi’s pro-Russia stance, warning him against aiding Putin’s war effort.

Then, in June, the leaders of Washington’s four main partners in the Pacific—Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—participated in a NATO summit for the first time to discuss the Chinese threat. This was a sign that a more coordinated or fully united alliance that brought together the democratic powers in Europe and Asia might be possible. In addition, India—usually wary of entangling itself in superpower competition—has become more active in the Quad (a security partnership that also includes Australia, Japan, and the U.S.). This suggests that India sees the group as a potential bulwark against Beijing, which has alarmed Indian leaders by pressing territorial claims along the two countries’ disputed border.

Read: Zero COVID has outlived its usefulness. Here’s why China is still enforcing it.

Xi seems not to care about these effects of his actions. In mid-September, on his first international diplomatic trip since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, Xi chose to meet Putin, thumbing his nose at the United States and its European allies. He has also pressed ahead with his undiplomatic diplomacy, which has at times descended into threats and demands delivered by his appointees. In a July meeting with his Australian counterpart, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi blamed the two countries’ strained relations on Canberra’s “irresponsible words and deeds.” He went on to say that they could be improved—if Australia avoided “being controlled by any third party”—that is, the U.S.—according to an official Chinese summary of the conversation.

Shortly after that, China’s foreign ministry directly threatened the U.S. that it would “pay the price” for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, which Beijing perceived as a violation of its sovereignty. (The government in Beijing considers Taiwan part of China.) A few days later, a senior Chinese official warned the Israeli ambassador to Beijing not to allow the U.S. to influence Israel’s approach to China, with a tactless claim that the Jews and the Chinese share a common grievance as victims of the West.

As a consequence of all this, China’s image has deteriorated sharply around the world, according to a recent survey of 19 countries, mostly major democracies, by the Pew Research Center. Xi himself fares poorly, too, with respondents in many countries expressing little or no confidence that the Chinese leader will “do the right thing” in international affairs.

China is perceived somewhat more favorably in parts of the developing world, and Beijing’s foreign policy has become increasingly focused on winning support in what’s called the “Global South.” But even there, Xi blunders. China, for instance, failed to corral the small nations of the South Pacific into a security and economic pact, in part because of Beijing’s arrogance. Henry Puna, the secretary general of the Pacific Islands Forum, a regional policy organization, said in a July briefing that local leaders had rejected the initiative because Chinese officials had presented them with fully drafted documents for the pact without consultation. “If anybody knows what we want and what we need and what our priorities are, it’s not other people—it’s us,” he said.

Xi isn’t doing much better at home, particularly with China’s economy. Growth has slowed significantly on his watch. In 2012, at the start of his tenure, the economy grew 7.8 percent, but this year the International Monetary Fund forecasts a meager 3.3 percent expansion. A reduction in the rate of growth was probably inevitable as the economy developed, but Xi’s policies have likely made matters worse.

The key to China’s decades-long economic boom was the withdrawal of state intervention in the economy and its opening to overseas trade and investment, which allowed private enterprise to thrive. To some extent, Xi has reversed that—enough to undercut some of the most vibrant sectors of the economy and divert capital and talent into wasteful endeavors, such as a slate of state-led industrial programs.

The most obvious sign of that shift is the extensive new regulatory burden imposed on private companies. Some of it is well intentioned—ensuring that food-delivery workers get better treatment, for instance—but all of it has been introduced haphazardly and has curtailed the expansion of some of the country’s most important companies. The once-flourishing private-education industry, which offered after-school classes for college-hungry kids, has suffered layoffs and heavy financial losses after an edict forbidding these businesses from making money out of teaching core-curriculum subjects to most students. One prominent technology firm, the ride-hailing app Didi Chuxing, has suffered so much harassment from a cybersecurity investigation and restrictions on its operations that its share price has plunged by more than 80 percent since its initial public offering a year ago.

Read: When Biden went to China

Instead of propelling fresh economic growth, the tech sector as a whole has been downsizing and laying off employees. That has made jobs harder to find for recent college graduates: In July, youth unemployment reached an all-time high of nearly 20 percent (though it improved slightly in August).

Xi’s motivations appear part ideological, part purely political. He seems to fear that Big Business, and especially the tech sector, could amass sufficient influence and wealth to pose a challenge to Communist rule. Party officials have said plainly that they want greater control over the management of private enterprises, and Xi himself has spoken of the “need to prevent the disorderly expansion and unchecked growth of capital.” Xi prefers instead state-led endeavors that he can more easily superintend. The government has provided lavish investments, subsidies, and tax breaks to support industries that Xi’s bureaucrats favor in sectors they want China to dominate, including electric vehicles, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence.

Although these industrial programs are in too early a phase to pass final judgment on, and there are a few signs of progress, the results so far are generally not encouraging. One observer, Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted in a recent essay that in spite of huge government support, “there is almost no sector where China is the dominant technology leader.”

One of the most high profile of these state-driven missions—to develop a semiconductor industry advanced enough to make the country self-reliant—has been plagued by corruption. To date, it has made only glacial progress in catching up to industry leaders in the U.S., and has not come close to reducing the Chinese economy’s dependence on foreign-made chips.

Xi’s apparent distrust of free-market reforms has also exacerbated the economy’s most dangerous weakness: its broken growth model. Chinese policy makers and economists worldwide have long warned that China’s growth is too dependent on investment, which is often debt driven and excessive—squandering resources on unnecessary apartments, factories, and infrastructure. Xi continued the practice of pumping credit into the economy whenever it slowed below the party’s preferred target, and he’s suffering for it today. Debt has risen steeply during Xi’s tenure, from less than double national output in 2012 to almost triple today.

The consequences are emerging in the bloated but vital property sector. A government attempt to rein in highly indebted developers led to a crisis last year at one of the industry’s giants, Evergrande, and the sector’s troubles have deepened. With developers defaulting, property sales falling, real-estate prices sinking, and new construction slumping, the instability of the sector represents a risk to the nation’s banks, which are deep in property-related lending, as well as to the wealth of the country’s middle class. In a remarkable indication of diminished public confidence, families across the country recently engaged in a “mortgage strike”—suspending payments on unfinished apartments out of concern that cash-strapped builders will never complete them.

Xi is adding to these woes with his strict pandemic controls. Undoubtedly, the biggest achievement of Xi’s tenure was limiting COVID-19’s hold in China and averting the scale of public-health crisis that so many other countries have suffered. But Xi’s mandate that COVID cases must be kept at or near zero has become an intolerable burden on the nation. Recurring closures of major cities and industrial zones have stifled travel, output, and commerce. Hardest hit have been the smallest businesses, those neighborhood restaurants, salons, and corner shops that provide crucial urban employment.

Amid the strain of quarantines and joblessness, domestic discontent has reached an unusually high level. The government faced widespread resistance in imposing its two-month COVID shutdown of Shanghai earlier this year. Residents confined to their homes banged pots and pans and screamed out of their windows to protest the harsh restrictions. In Beijing, where residents must still present a recent negative COVID test in order to ride the subway or eat in a restaurant, testing stations have become targets for vandalism, in some cases defaced with graffiti reading “Give me liberty or give me death.”

The sources of public dissatisfaction are not limited to the lockdowns. In July, hundreds of protesters from all over the country massed in the central city of Zhengzhou after their bank deposits were frozen thanks to a local financial scandal.


Jeffrey Goldberg: A Russian defeat in Ukraine could save Taiwan

The angry mood seems to have overwhelmed efforts to censor criticism on Chinese social media. “People are not happy!” proclaimed one recent post on Weibo, China’s version of Twitter. “Your government positions are secure but people at the bottom are having a hard time surviving.”

The evidence of rising discontent with Xi’s government is anecdotal, of course. In an environment without free speech and a free press, what the Chinese public really thinks about Xi Jinping is impossible to gauge. But the willingness of ordinary citizens to risk reprisals for their displays of defiance—in Zhengzhou unidentified thugs assaulted protesters with the apparent complicity of local authorities—is a measure of how frustrated people are with the current state of China.

None of these diplomatic, economic, or social problems appear likely to derail Xi’s quest for a third term. They may, however, make his rule unpredictable. The more China’s fortunes fade, the more of a threat Xi may become—not unlike his friend Putin. Xi has shifted toward nationalism to legitimize his hold on power. Hence Beijing’s heightened rhetoric on issues such as Taiwan, and the relentless anti-American propaganda from its foreign ministry and state media. Xi needs enemies abroad to deflect public disaffection with his failures at home.


For Washington, Xi’s continued rule presents both dangers and opportunities. The correct strategy will be to ensure that tensions do not escalate into conflict, while capitalizing on Xi’s missteps to bolster American power. This approach involves a delicate balance, one fraught with the possibility of war. But if Washington manages the situation well, the U.S. could reap the benefits of Xi’s rule and make China bear the costs.

Michael Schuman is a contributing writer at The Atlantic, and the author of Superpower Interrupted: The Chinese History of the World and The Miracle: The Epic Story of Asia’s Quest for Wealth.



中国的错误可能是美国的收获
美国不需要把习近平投射力量的企图看得太重。

作者：迈克尔-舒曼
中国领导人习近平即将踩到香蕉皮的插图
Tyler Comrie / The Atlantic; Getty
2022年9月26日，美国东部时间上午7点
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习近平应该正在享受他掌管中国的最后时光。几十年来，中国共产党定期更换高级领导层--这对国家的成功至关重要--在执政10年后，习近平应该靠边站，让一个新的团队来指导国家的未来。但是，当10月16日该国最高层干部在北京召开党的第二十次代表大会时，人们普遍预计习近平将打破先例，将其统治至少再延长五年。

虽然这种背离惯例的做法已经酝酿多年，但这一消息可能会让华盛顿特区的一些人再次感到寒心。这位中国领导人似乎决心利用他的国家最近获得的财富来挑战美国的经济优势、技术优势和军事主导地位，甚至挑战它对构成美国权力基础的全球秩序的假设。习近平再过五年几乎肯定意味着再过五年的超级大国竞争，甚至对抗。


这就是传统的智慧。但也许华盛顿应该感谢习近平的坚持。中国的领导人肯定打算削弱美国的全球影响力，但他可能没有很好地为自己的国家实现这一目标做准备。他的政策的实际结果表明，他正在削弱而不是加强中国作为美国竞争对手的地位。习近平掌舵中国的时间越长，中国的竞争力就会越弱。

在对中国崛起的炒作中，人们忽略了中国在习近平的领导下在几乎所有政策方面的表现有多么糟糕。经济已经急剧放缓。领导层已经放弃了实现其曾经神圣的增长目标。习近平咄咄逼人的外交政策疏远了世界上大多数大国，并使中国的亚洲邻国感到恐惧。习近平的许多高调的政府举措都被浪费和管理不善所玷污。习近平称中国的崛起是不可避免的，但由于他的统治，中国的崛起不是更加确定，而是更少。

这种另类说法对美国的外交和国内政策有严重影响。为了应对习近平的好战，华盛顿的政策制定者感到不得不在每一个方面与中国较量：外交、经济、技术、军事和意识形态。这就是最近签署的CHIPS法案背后的想法，该法案旨在确保美国继续掌握半导体行业，对抗中国的高科技野心。同样的战略指导了乔-拜登总统的2021年建设更美好的世界，这是一项基础设施建设计划，旨在与中国的 "一带一路 "倡议竞争，争夺在发展中国家的影响力。这些政策的前提是，中国的能力与习近平的野心同步。现在的证据表明，习近平的目标已经超过了中国维持这些目标的能力。


阅读。在台湾问题上不再有 "战略模糊性"。

习近平过度扩张的时机对华盛顿来说是幸运的。在过去五年里，美国一直处于党派争斗和社会混乱之中，美国的全球力量可能比二战以来的任何时候都更加脆弱。习近平本可以利用这种混乱来扩大中国的影响力，以美国为代价。相反，他的行动不仅使美国保持在游戏中，而且在某些方面还提高了美国的全球地位。美国的全球联盟网络曾受到严重的压力，现在可以说比多年前更强大--部分原因是习近平的政策。

习近平的中国仍然是一个威胁，因为它是唯一一个既有意图又有资源来破坏美国主导的全球秩序的国家。然而，习近平议程的失败表明，人们普遍认为中国的崛起与美国的衰落一样不可阻挡，这种假设是简单化的。习近平希望被写进历史书，成为颠覆美国和平的人。相反，他最终可能会成为维护它的人。

当习近平在2012年掌权时，大多数中国专家预计，他将遵循 "最高领导人 "邓小平在20世纪80年代奠定的极为成功的道路，即自由化经济改革、与全球经济一体化以及与美国的伙伴关系。习近平曾在中国一些经济最活跃的地区担任过官员，因此他对邓小平的 "改革开放 "核心原则有长期的经验。在习近平成为国家新领导人前不久，他曾与当时的副总统乔-拜登进行了广泛的交流，这给人们留下了习近平重视中国与华盛顿的丰硕关系的印象。

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然而，随着他的统治的展开，这些早期的假设被证明是错误的。高度的意识形态、激烈的民族主义和对政治控制的痴迷，习近平大大地偏离了他的前任的政策。在此过程中，他以深刻和不可预测的方式改变了中国的路线。

最引人注目的是，习近平完全修改了中国的外交政策。他显然认为，中国承担世界上最强大国家地位的时刻已经到来。习近平没有把华盛顿当作伙伴，而是认为美国是中国最危险的对手。习近平没有让中国沉浸在美国领导的全球秩序中，而是在推动他自己对以中国为中心的替代方案的看法，这个方案对独裁政权更加友好。值得注意的是，这位中国领导人已经与俄罗斯总统普京建立了新的友谊，习近平似乎认为普京可以成为他追求美国力量倒退的盟友。

然而，中国越是公开敌视当前的国际体系，美国的联盟就越是强大。习近平的议程已经说服了世界上的民主国家收紧与美国的关系，以及相互之间的关系，以对抗他带来的威胁。

起初，欧洲领导人对华盛顿在中国问题上的强硬路线感到不舒服，坚持他们的 "战略自主权"。这种分歧在大西洋联盟内部埋下了一些分歧。然而，习近平在俄罗斯入侵乌克兰时对普京的支持在很大程度上弥合了这种裂痕。在4月的一次虚拟峰会上，表面上是为了加强中国和欧洲之间的合作，欧盟领导人批评了习近平的亲俄立场，警告他不要帮助普京的战争努力。

然后，在6月，华盛顿在太平洋地区的四个主要合作伙伴--日本、韩国、澳大利亚和新西兰--的领导人首次参加了北约峰会，讨论中国的威胁问题。这是一个迹象，表明一个将欧洲和亚洲的民主大国聚集在一起的更加协调或完全统一的联盟是可能的。此外，印度--通常对纠缠于超级大国的竞争持谨慎态度--在四国集团（一个还包括澳大利亚、日本和美国的安全伙伴关系）中变得更加活跃。这表明，印度将该集团视为对抗北京的潜在堡垒，而北京在两国有争议的边境地区强行提出领土要求，这令印度领导人感到震惊。

阅读。Zero COVID已经失去了它的作用。这就是为什么中国仍然在执行它。

习近平似乎并不关心他的行动的这些影响。9月中旬，在冠状病毒大流行开始后的首次国际外交访问中，习近平选择会见普京，对美国及其欧洲盟友竖起大拇指。他还推进了他的非外交外交，这有时会演变成由他任命的人提出的威胁和要求。在7月与澳大利亚外交部长的会晤中，中国外交部长王毅将两国关系的紧张归咎于堪培拉的 "不负责任的言行"。他接着说，根据中国官方的谈话摘要，如果澳大利亚避免 "被任何第三方（即美国）控制"，两国关系可以得到改善。

此后不久，中国外交部直接威胁美国将为众议院议长南希-佩洛西对台湾的访问 "付出代价"，北京认为这是对其主权的侵犯。(北京政府认为台湾是中国的一部分。)几天后，一位中国高级官员警告以色列驻北京大使，不要让美国影响以色列对中国的态度，并不客气地声称犹太人和中国人作为西方的受害者有共同的怨恨。

根据皮尤研究中心最近对19个国家（大部分是主要民主国家）的调查，所有这些的结果是，中国的形象在全世界急剧恶化。习近平本人的表现也很差，许多国家的受访者对中国领导人在国际事务中 "做正确的事 "表示信心不足或没有信心。

中国在发展中世界的部分地区被认为更有利，北京的外交政策越来越注重在所谓的 "全球南部 "赢得支持。但即使在那里，习近平也有失误。例如，中国未能拉拢南太平洋的小国达成安全和经济协议，部分原因是北京的傲慢。太平洋岛屿论坛（一个区域政策组织）秘书长亨利-普纳在7月的一次简报中说，当地领导人拒绝了这一倡议，因为中国官员未经协商就向他们提交了条约的全部草案文件。"他说："如果有人知道我们想要什么，我们需要什么，我们的优先事项是什么，那就不是别人，而是我们。

习近平在国内的情况也没有好到哪里去，尤其是中国的经济。在他的领导下，经济增长已经明显放缓。2012年，在他的任期开始时，经济增长了7.8%，但今年，国际货币基金组织预测，经济增长仅有3.3%。随着经济的发展，增长率的降低可能是不可避免的，但习近平的政策可能使情况变得更糟。

中国几十年来经济繁荣的关键是国家对经济的干预的退出，以及对海外贸易和投资的开放，这使得私营企业得以蓬勃发展。在某种程度上，习近平已经扭转了这一局面--足以削弱一些最具活力的经济部门，并将资本和人才转移到浪费的工作中，例如一系列国家主导的工业项目。

这一转变最明显的标志是强加给私营公司的广泛的新监管负担。其中有些是善意的--例如，确保送餐员得到更好的待遇--但所有这些都是草率出台的，限制了该国一些最重要的公司的扩张。曾经蓬勃发展的私营教育行业为渴望上大学的孩子提供课后班，在禁止这些企业通过向大多数学生教授核心课程赚钱的法令出台后，该行业遭受了裁员和严重的财政损失。一家著名的技术公司，叫车应用滴滴出行，遭受了网络安全调查和运营限制的巨大骚扰，自一年前首次公开发行以来，其股价已暴跌超过80%。

阅读。当拜登去了中国

整个科技行业非但没有推动新的经济增长，反而一直在缩减规模和裁员。这使得最近的大学毕业生更难找到工作。7月，青年失业率达到了近20%的历史新高（尽管8月略有改善）。

习近平的动机似乎部分是意识形态，部分是纯粹的政治。他似乎担心大企业，尤其是科技行业，可能会积累足够的影响力和财富，对共产党的统治构成挑战。党的官员已经明确表示，他们希望对私营企业的管理有更大的控制权，而习近平本人也谈到了 "需要防止资本的无序扩张和无节制增长"。习近平更喜欢国家主导的事业，他可以更容易地进行监督。政府提供了奢侈的投资、补贴和税收减免，以支持习近平的官僚们在他们希望中国占主导地位的行业，包括电动汽车、半导体和人工智能。

尽管这些工业项目还处于早期阶段，无法做出最终判断，而且有一些进展的迹象，但迄今为止的结果普遍不令人鼓舞。一位观察家，战略与国际研究中心的高级顾问斯科特-肯尼迪，在最近的一篇文章中指出，尽管有巨大的政府支持，"几乎没有一个部门，中国是占主导地位的技术领导者。"

这些国家驱动的任务中最引人注目的一项是发展一个足以使国家自力更生的先进的半导体产业，但却受到腐败的困扰。到目前为止，它在追赶美国的行业领导者方面只取得了冰冷的进展，并没有接近减少中国经济对外国制造的芯片的依赖。

习近平对自由市场改革的明显不信任，也加剧了中国经济最危险的弱点：其破碎的增长模式。中国的政策制定者和世界各地的经济学家早就警告说，中国的经济增长过于依赖投资，而投资往往是由债务驱动的，并且过度地将资源用于不必要的公寓、工厂和基础设施。习近平继续采取这种做法，每当经济增长速度低于党的首选目标时，就向经济中注入信贷，而他今天正为此而痛苦。在习近平的任期内，债务急剧上升，从2012年的不到两倍的国家产出到今天的几乎三倍。

其后果在臃肿但重要的房地产行业出现。政府试图控制负债累累的开发商，导致该行业的巨头之一恒大去年出现危机，该行业的问题也随之加深。随着开发商违约，房地产销售下降，房地产价格下跌，新建筑下滑，该行业的不稳定对国家的银行构成了风险，这些银行在与房地产相关的贷款方面非常深入，也对国家中产阶级的财富构成了风险。公众信心下降的一个显著表现是，全国各地的家庭最近进行了一次 "抵押贷款罢工"--由于担心资金紧张的建筑商将永远不会完工，所以暂停支付未完工的公寓。

习近平正在用他严格的大流行病控制来增加这些困境。毫无疑问，习近平任期内最大的成就是限制了COVID-19在中国的影响力，避免了许多其他国家遭受的大规模公共卫生危机。但是，习近平要求COVID病例必须保持在或接近零的水平，已经成为国家不可容忍的负担。主要城市和工业区一再关闭，扼杀了旅行、产出和商业。受影响最大的是最小的企业，那些提供关键的城市就业的邻里餐馆、沙龙和角落商店。

在隔离和失业的压力下，国内的不满情绪达到了一个异常高的水平。今年早些时候，政府在对上海实施为期两个月的COVID封锁时遇到了广泛的阻力。被关在家里的居民敲打着锅碗瓢盆，从窗户里发出尖叫，以抗议严厉的限制。在北京，居民仍然必须出示最近的COVID阴性测试才能乘坐地铁或在餐馆用餐，测试站已经成为破坏的目标，在某些情况下，涂鸦着 "不给我自由就给我死亡"。

公众不满的来源并不限于禁闭。7月，来自全国各地的数百名抗议者在中部城市郑州聚集，因为他们的银行存款因当地的金融丑闻而被冻结。


杰弗里-戈德堡。俄罗斯在乌克兰的失败可以拯救台湾

愤怒的情绪似乎已经压倒了中国社交媒体上审查批评的努力。"人们不高兴了！"最近在中国版Twitter的微博上，有一个帖子宣称。"你们的政府职位是安全的，但底层人民却很难生存。"

当然，对习近平政府的不满情绪上升的证据是传闻。在一个没有言论自由和新闻自由的环境中，中国公众对习近平的真实想法是无法衡量的。但是，普通公民愿意冒着被报复的危险进行反抗--在郑州，不明身份的暴徒袭击了抗议者，而当地政府显然是共谋--这说明人们对中国的现状有多么失望。

这些外交、经济或社会问题似乎都不可能破坏习近平对第三个任期的追求。然而，这些问题可能会使他的统治变得不可预测。中国的命运越是衰败，习近平就越是一个威胁--与他的朋友普京不一样。习近平已经转向民族主义，以使他对权力的掌控合法化。因此，北京在台湾等问题上的言辞更加激烈，外交部和国家媒体的反美宣传也毫不留情。习近平需要国外的敌人来转移公众对他在国内失败的不满。


对华盛顿来说，习近平的持续统治既带来了危险也带来了机会。正确的策略是确保紧张局势不会升级为冲突，同时利用习近平的失误来增强美国的实力。这种做法涉及一种微妙的平衡，充满了战争的可能性。但如果华盛顿能很好地管理局势，美国可以从习近平的统治中获得好处，并让中国承担代价。

迈克尔-舒曼是《大西洋月刊》的特约撰稿人，也是《超级大国中断》和《中国的世界史》的作者。中国的世界史》和《奇迹：亚洲追求财富的史诗故事》。