2022.03.04 全球经济史上的分水岭时刻

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By Invitation | Russia and Ukraine
Nicholas Mulder, who studies sanctions, declares a watershed moment in global economic history
Russia’s economic isolation will have dramatic repercussions for the world economy

Mar 4th 2022 (Updated Mar 5th 2022)


The barrage of Western sanctions against Russia has moved political and economic systems around the world into uncharted territory. In December, it was already clear that Russian aggression against Ukraine would meet a wave of American and European economic pressure. But although Vladimir Putin’s sudden and brutal invasion shocked us all, the Western economic response has been just as astonishing.

An initial round of sanctions on February 24th targeted Russian banks and technology exports; a second round on February 26th severed access to the swift financial messaging network, seized the foreign wealth of Russian oligarchs and, most significant of all, froze most Russian overseas central-bank reserves. Before this, no g20 economy had ever faced such drastic economic sanctions, nor experienced so many of them in such a short span of time.


European leaders are remarkably forthright about the force of their sanctions. The French finance minister, Bruno Le Maire, has declared that the West will wage ‘economic and financial total war against Russia’. But the significance of this sanctions campaign goes beyond its geopolitical meaning. Already it has galvanised nato, tightened the transatlantic alliance and unified the European Union. Yet it is also a watershed moment in global economic history.

We can look for comparable historical episodes by considering the severity of the sanctions, the size of the target, or the goal: stopping war. In the past two decades, only Iran, Venezuela and Afghanistan have had their external central-bank assets frozen. What sets Russia decisively apart from these cases is its size. As the world’s 11th-largest economy, Russia is a giant compared with the small Afghan economy and the middling ones of the Islamic and Bolivarian Republics.

It is not just the target of the sanctions, but also the ambitions of those using them that are much larger. If the goal of the West’s economic war is to end Mr Putin’s war of aggression in Ukraine, then historical experience suggests different measures will be needed. Sanctions alone have a poor record of halting military adventures. During the 20th century, only three out of 19 attempts to use sanctions as a policy to impede war have been successful: two of these were the work of the League of Nations. It nipped in the bud incipient border wars in the Balkans, between Yugoslavia and Albania in 1921 and between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925. The other successful use of sanctions was American financial pressure on sterling, which forced an end to Britain’s Egyptian military expedition in the Suez war of 1956.


Significantly, the first two of these cases were threats rather than actual applications, while the third was a case of one cold-war ally squeezing another. There is only one instance in which a state of similar heft to Russia has been embargoed in order to rein in its aggression. In 1935 the League of Nations imposed sanctions on Mussolini’s Italy, which was the world’s seventh-largest economy for invading Ethiopia in 1935. But these measures failed to hobble the invader and save the defenders.

What will the effect be of the sanctions on Russia? The initial financial shock will surely be severe, leading to serious inflation and popular misery. Yet there is reason to expect that, if Russia weathers this immediate crisis, it will thereafter lumber on at low or negative growth rates for some time. Iran suffered acute currency crises in 2012 and 2018 as a result of Western sanctions, but after initial contractions it adjusted and stabilised. Russia has been more tightly integrated into the world economy, but it also possesses a much broader economic base, larger fiscal revenues and a more diversified export sector than Iran.

Russia’s economic isolation will have dramatic repercussions for the world economy. This is a function of its role as a leading supplier of several key commodities. Comprehensive sanctions against Iran and Venezuela affected the world economy mainly in specific segments of the oil market. But the Western sanctions will certainly force painful adjustment and affect Russia’s ability to furnish its variegated share of the world’s commodity basket: 6% of aluminium output, 7% of nickel supply, 12% of crude-oil production, 18-19% of wheat and natural-gas exports and a quarter of copper supply. Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq and Lebanon are already experiencing rising prices due to the closure of Ukrainian ports; sanctions make their continued food supply precariously dependent on the decisions of Western policymakers. Global financial markets will require further support from central banks to offset the removal of Russia’s large foreign-exchange surpluses from currency swap markets.

Although sanctions have thus far steered clear of Russia’s most essential commodity exports, fear of them will scare off bulk buyers, intermediaries and final consumers. Private-sector decisions to divest from Russia are accelerating. Maersk and msc, two cargo giants which control a third of the global container market, have already suspended shipping orders to and from Russia. bp and Shell are withdrawing from the country’s oil industry. Air travel, tourism and other links between Russia and the West are all being scaled back rapidly.

Following the 2015 nuclear deal, the paltry interest of Western business in Iran showed that overreactions to sanctions may outlast the measures themselves. They become entrenched in business behaviour. There are also unforeseen spillover effects. Russia’s currency devaluation is negatively affecting the five Central Asian republics, whose currencies shadow the rouble. Without assistance, a year that began with protests at the rising cost of living in Kazakhstan will bring further hardship for this region. But the shocks are already emanating much further. Wartime disruption, supply shortages and sanctions fears are driving a global commodity price shock. This may inaugurate a worldwide recession and undermine the political stability of societies in North Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and beyond.


Sanctions are no longer scalpel-like instruments that exploit globalisation. At their current scale, they are a tempest that will change the nature of globalisation itself in major ways. Given the criminality of Mr Putin’s invasion, punishing Russian aggression with economic, financial and diplomatic measures is necessary. But Western policymakers should be very careful in designing these interventions. Sanctions have a chilling effect that will persist in private-sector decision-making. Once the perception that the measures are permanent sticks, any chance of using them to steer towards peace in Eastern Europe will be lost.

In an already fragile world economy, the unintended political and economic effects of sanctions can quickly spiral out of control. Instead of rushing forward with further sanctions, Western policymakers must focus on directly helping the Ukrainians defend their independence. They must also promptly outline clear conditions for the removal of sanctions to encourage de-escalation and an end to this catastrophic war.

Nicholas Mulder is an assistant professor in the history department of Cornell University in New York. He is the author of “The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War” (2022).




应邀参加｜俄罗斯和乌克兰
研究制裁的尼古拉斯-穆尔德宣布全球经济史上的分水岭时刻
俄罗斯的经济孤立将对世界经济产生戏剧性的影响

2022年3月4日 (2022年3月5日更新)


西方对俄罗斯的一连串制裁使全世界的政治和经济体系进入了未知的领域。12月，已经很清楚，俄罗斯对乌克兰的侵略将遭遇美国和欧洲经济压力的浪潮。但是，尽管弗拉基米尔-普京的突然和野蛮的入侵让我们所有人感到震惊，西方的经济反应也同样令人吃惊。

2月24日的第一轮制裁针对的是俄罗斯银行和技术出口；2月26日的第二轮制裁切断了对迅捷金融信息网络的访问，没收了俄罗斯寡头的外国财富，最重要的是，冻结了大多数俄罗斯海外中央银行的储备。在此之前，没有任何一个20国集团经济体曾面临过如此激烈的经济制裁，也没有在如此短的时间内经历过如此多的制裁。


欧洲领导人对其制裁的力度非常坦率。法国财政部长布鲁诺-勒梅尔宣布，西方将对俄罗斯发动 "经济和金融的全面战争"。但这场制裁运动的意义超出了其地缘政治的意义。它已经激励了北约，收紧了跨大西洋联盟，统一了欧盟。然而，这也是全球经济史上的一个分水岭。

我们可以通过考虑制裁的严重程度、目标的大小或目标：停止战争来寻找可比较的历史事件。在过去20年里，只有伊朗、委内瑞拉和阿富汗的中央银行外部资产被冻结。使俄罗斯与这些案例截然不同的是它的规模。作为世界第11大经济体，俄罗斯与阿富汗的小经济体以及伊斯兰和玻利瓦尔共和国的中等经济体相比是一个巨人。

不仅仅是制裁的对象，还有那些使用制裁的人的野心也要大得多。如果西方的经济战争的目标是结束普京先生在乌克兰的侵略战争，那么历史经验表明需要采取不同的措施。单纯的制裁在阻止军事冒险方面有着糟糕的记录。在20世纪，在19次利用制裁作为阻碍战争的政策的尝试中，只有三次是成功的：其中两次是国际联盟的工作。国际联盟将巴尔干地区刚开始的边界战争消灭在萌芽状态，1921年在南斯拉夫和阿尔巴尼亚之间，1925年在希腊和保加利亚之间。制裁的另一个成功应用是美国对英镑的金融压力，这迫使英国在1956年的苏伊士战争中结束了对埃及的军事远征。


重要的是，前两个案例是威胁而不是实际应用，而第三个案例是一个冷战盟友对另一个盟友的挤压。只有一个例子表明，一个与俄罗斯相似的国家被禁运以控制其侵略行为。1935年，国际联盟对墨索里尼的意大利实施制裁，该国是世界第七大经济体，因为它在1935年入侵埃塞俄比亚。但这些措施未能使入侵者步履蹒跚，也未能拯救保卫者。

对俄罗斯的制裁将产生什么影响？最初的金融冲击肯定会很严重，导致严重的通货膨胀和民众的痛苦。然而，我们有理由期待，如果俄罗斯能渡过眼前的危机，它将在此后的一段时间内以低增长或负增长的速度继续前进。由于西方的制裁，伊朗在2012年和2018年遭受了严重的货币危机，但在最初的收缩之后，它调整并稳定下来。俄罗斯已经更紧密地融入了世界经济，但它也拥有比伊朗更广泛的经济基础、更大的财政收入和更多样化的出口部门。

俄罗斯的经济孤立将对世界经济产生巨大的影响。这是它作为几种关键商品的主要供应国的作用。对伊朗和委内瑞拉的全面制裁主要在石油市场的特定部分影响世界经济。但是，西方的制裁肯定会迫使俄罗斯进行痛苦的调整，并影响其在世界商品篮子中的各种份额的能力。6%的铝产量，7%的镍供应，12%的原油产量，18-19%的小麦和天然气出口以及四分之一的铜供应。由于乌克兰港口的关闭，埃及、突尼斯、伊拉克和黎巴嫩已经在经历价格上涨；制裁使他们的粮食供应持续不稳定地依赖于西方政策制定者的决定。全球金融市场将需要中央银行的进一步支持，以抵消俄罗斯在货币互换市场上的大量外汇盈余。

尽管到目前为止，制裁已经避开了俄罗斯最基本的商品出口，但对制裁的恐惧将吓跑大宗买家、中间商和最终消费者。私营部门从俄罗斯撤资的决定正在加速进行。马士基和马斯克这两家控制着全球集装箱市场三分之一的货运巨头，已经暂停了与俄罗斯的航运订单。俄罗斯和西方之间的航空旅行、旅游和其他联系都在迅速缩减。

在2015年的核协议之后，西方企业对伊朗的兴趣微乎其微，这表明对制裁的过度反应可能比制裁措施本身更持久。它们在商业行为中变得根深蒂固。还有一些不可预见的溢出效应。俄罗斯的货币贬值对中亚的五个共和国产生了负面影响，这些国家的货币都是卢布的影子。如果没有援助，以抗议哈萨克斯坦生活成本上升为开端的这一年将给这个地区带来进一步的困难。但是，这些冲击已经在更远的地方产生了。战时中断、供应短缺和对制裁的担忧正在推动全球商品价格冲击。这可能会引发全球经济衰退，破坏北非、中东、亚洲和其他地区社会的政治稳定。


制裁不再是利用全球化的手术刀式的工具。以其目前的规模，它们是一场风暴，将以重大方式改变全球化本身的性质。鉴于普京先生的入侵行为是犯罪行为，用经济、金融和外交措施来惩罚俄罗斯的侵略是必要的。但西方政策制定者在设计这些干预措施时应该非常谨慎。制裁有一种寒蝉效应，会在私营部门的决策中持续存在。一旦认为这些措施是永久性的，任何利用它们来引导东欧和平的机会都将丧失。

在一个已经很脆弱的世界经济中，制裁的意外政治和经济影响会很快失去控制。西方政策制定者必须把重点放在直接帮助乌克兰人捍卫他们的独立上，而不是急于推进进一步的制裁。他们还必须迅速列出取消制裁的明确条件，以鼓励缓和局势，结束这场灾难性的战争。

Nicholas Mulder是纽约康奈尔大学历史系的助理教授。他是《经济武器：作为现代战争工具的制裁的崛起》（2022）的作者。