1959.12 红色中国对亚洲的影响

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Red China's Impact on Asia
A. DOAK BARNETT, who was born and brought up in China, has spent most of his professional life studying Chinese affairs. A former member of the State Department, Mr. Barnett is now program associate at the Ford Foundation. This article is drawn from his new book, COMMUNIST CHINA AND ASIA: CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN POLICY, to be published by Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations early next year.

By A. Doak Barnett
DECEMBER 1959 ISSUE
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BY A. DOAK BARNETT

IN THE decade since the Chinese Communists established the Peking regime, Mao Tse-tung and his followers, while steadily improving their domestic base for national power, have worked persistently to achieve ambitious foreign policy goals. It is important that these goals, and the Chinese Communists’ strategy in pursuing them, be understood. It is essential to ask some fundamental questions. How do the Chinese Communists look at the world? What do they feel China’s role in it should be? What are they attempting to achieve, and how do their day-to-day foreign policy tactics relate to long-range strategic concepts?


There can be disagreement about many of Communist China’s aims, but Peking’s leaders are explicit in stating one thing: they are determined to be accepted as a great power. Premier Chou En-lai stated this bluntly in 1956; Communist China’s views, he said, should be heard “in the settlement of any major international issue.”

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In addition, the Chinese Communists obviously accept a new version of “Asia for the Asians” and seem confident that, if Western influence can be expelled from Asia, Communist China will automatically become the dominant power in the region. One of the clearest statements of this idea was made by Chou at the Geneva Conference in 1954. “We hold,” he declared, “that interference in the internal affairs of Asian nations be stopped, all foreign military bases in Asia be removed, foreign armed forces stationed in Asia be withdrawn, the remilitarization of Japan be prevented, and all economic blockades and restrictions be abolished.” This was a frank and concise way of saying, leave Asia to us.

In the Chinese Communists’ eyes, the United States is their principal enemy. It is the only nation now capable of counterbalancing their power and blocking the achievement of many of their basic aims. All nations allied with the United States are labeled contemptuously as mere “tools of imperialism.”

Peking’s leaders place special importance on the role of Japan as the key nation in terms of regional security. Liu Shao-chi, who succeeded Mao as Chairman of the Republic when Mao retired from this post, has stated this very clearly. “It would be impossible for American imperialism or any other imperialist power to launch largescale aggressive war in the Far East without Japan as a base,” Liu declared in 1953, adding, “It can be said that peace in the Far East is assured as long as it is possible to prevent the resumption of aggression and violation of peace by Japan or any other state that may collaborate with Japan.”

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There are other areas on China’s immediate periphery which Peking also regards as being of particular importance to its national interests. Of prime importance, of course, is Taiwan. The Chinese Communists look on Taiwan as unliberated Chinese territory, and in this sense not a foreign policy issue at all. Although they apparently hope to win Taiwan eventually without risking a major war with the United States, they will certainly continue attempting to probe, threaten, and subvert the Chinese Nationalist and American position, and for this reason the Taiwan Strait area will undoubtedly continue to be dangerous and potentially explosive for a long time to come.

The Chinese Communists are sensitive about all their border areas, and, like most strong Chinese rulers in the past, they have exerted pressure at many points on China’s circumference. Undoubtedly, Peking now regards both North Korea and North Vietnam as buffer areas of great importance, and it would probably go to great lengths to prevent any serious military threat to China arising in or from either area. It has probed the undefined boundary of Burma and created serious doubts about China’s intentions regarding some of its other borders which are as yet not clearly settled. Conceivably, at some time in the future, the Chinese Communists might put forth irredentist claims elsewhere, to Hong Kong and Macao, as they have to Tibet and certain Indian and Burmese territories, and they might someday try to re-establish claims to territory in Outer Mongolia or in the Soviet Far East, where the Chinese once were predominant.

Yet, despite the fact that Peking’s leaders, like the leaders of any modern nation, have a great and real concern about territorial questions, national security problems, and similar issues, these do not provide the sole key to an understanding of their view of the world. The key must also be sought in their ideological convictions. There is no doubt that these men are genuine revolutionaries, with a strong sense of mission to speed up the course of an “inevitable” world revolution. Ideology clearly molds Peking’s strategy and provides the rationale for both the ends and means of its foreign policy. While the Chinese Communists are pragmatic in interpreting their ideology, it would be a great error to believe that ideology is no more than a meaningless cloak for their national interests. It is, in fact, a basic determinant of their strategy.

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THE Chinese Communists see the world as engaged in a prolonged, continuous, and intense revolutionary struggle, and this simple fact has profound implications. They are not fundamentally concerned with freezing the existing status quo, stabilizing situations, or permanently solving problems. Instead, they are interested in promoting constant change, in the hope that each change, however small, will further their longterm aims. They view the world-wide struggle as one in which great social, economic, and political forces—some identified with particular national states and others cutting across national lines — are contending for supremacy.


Consequently, international relations are not only a matter of conventional dealings between governments. Government-to-government relations are regarded as important, it is true; but equally important in Peking’s eyes is the necessity of using every possible means, formal and informal, overt and covert, to influence social trends, political opinions, and economic conditions within foreign countries, in order to exert an indirect influence on the policies of other governments, and, in favorable situations, to promote revolutionary changes.

Viewing the world in this fashion, the Chinese Communist leaders have a very sophisticated philosophy of power, evolved during their own struggle within China. They certainly believe that there is an intimate relationship between military and political power. In an oft-quoted statement, Mao Tse-tung declared bluntly over two decades ago: “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. . . . Anything can grow out of the barrel of a gun.”

Yet the Chinese Communists also recognize that power in the modern world is the product of many complex factors — political, economic, and psychological, as well as military — a product of people and ideas as well as guns. They attach extraordinary importance, in fact, to men’s minds and appear to believe that by manipulating them they can gain control over basic social forces and thereby offset the power even of enemies with greater military strength. Therefore, despite the great emphasis which they place on the need for military power, their concept of continuing world revolution is not a simple idea of military conquest. It involves a strategy which is far more complex and subtle than overt military expansionism.


In translating strategy to tactics, the Chinese Communists are masters of the zigzag. Although tactical opportunism is characteristic of Communists everywhere, Mao and his followers have elaborated a doctrine of flexibility, growing out of the revolution in China, which has a unique Chinese flavor. Thinking, as they do, in longrange terms, they are prepared to make tactical retreats when necessary, without abandoning their constant striving toward ultimate goals. “To defend in order to attack, to retreat in order to advance, to take a flanking position in order to go straight: these,” Mao once said, “are the inevitable phenomena in the process of development of any event or matter. All of us know that in a boxing contest a wise boxer usually yields a step.”

Most important of all, the Chinese Communists see an unceasing contest between two camps: Moscow, Peking, and the so-called “camp of peace” on the one side, the United States and its allies in the “imperialist camp” on the other. Each situation, each problem, and each issue is evaluated in terms of its relationship to this basic struggle and to the fundamental aim of steadily enlarging the size, strength, and influence of the Communist sphere.

Between these two poles are the colonial and semicolonial countries, the uncommitted nations, and the broad area which Lenin regarded as the “rear bases” of imperialism, without which the capitalist world would crumble. The Chinese Communists look on this area as a political battleground, a primary focus of the struggle between the two camps, and they feel that China, as the Asian partner in the Sino-Soviet alliance, must play a very large role in the Communists’ approaches to this area.

WITHIN the broad framework set by its longrange goals, Peking, in close coordination with Moscow, has made several tactical shifts in its foreign policy in the past decade, and among the most important have been its changes of approach toward the non-Communist Asian nations which, in its view, belong to the colonial and semicolonial world. These shifts have had far-reaching effects on Communist China’s relations with all of Asia. The most striking contrast is between the peaceful-coexistence tactics which Peking, and the entire Communist bloc, evolved during 1952 to 1954 and the militantly revolutionary posture which the Chinese Communists adopted when they first came to power.

In their first flush of victory in 1949, the Party leaders, apparently confident that their own success would give a decisive impetus to Communist insurrections throughout Asia, openly and unabashedly proclaimed their broad revolutionary aims. Calling for armed struggle wherever possible, Liu Shao-chi declared that “The path taken by the Chinese people ... is the path that should be taken by the peoples in the various colonial and semicolonial countries in their fight for national independence and people’s democracy.” All the non-Communist leaders in Asia, including those in the nonaligned nations, were regarded as “running dogs” and “hirelings” of the “imperialists.”

Five years later, Peking and the Communist bloc as a whole had put on a new and very different face. The Chinese Communists embarked on a major diplomatic campaign to woo the nonCommunist governments of Asia, and in particular the governments of the nonaligned nations. In April, 1954, they signed an important agreement with India embodying the now famous “five principles of peaceful coexistence,” in which Peking pledged its noninterference in other countries’ affairs.

Chou En-lai soon converted these principles into a major theme song with which he attempted to attract the nonaligned nations into alignment with the Communist bloc in one broad “zone of peace.” “Revolution is not for export,” Chou blandly assured the Indians, the Burmese, and others. And then, at the Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations in early 1955, he adopted a conciliatory posture which had a wide impact on many Asians. We “come here to seek unity, not to quarrel,” Chou declared at Bandung; all Asian nations should “seek common ground,” and this would be found, he said, in “doing away with the sufferings and calamities of colonialism.”

Since that time, the entire Communist bloc, pursuing this peaceful-coexistence approach, has made vigorous efforts to attract the non-Communist countries of Asia. Despite the recent hardening of its policies, Peking seems likely to continue these tactics for a long time, unless it decides that the balance of world forces has swung drastically in the Communists’ favor. Clearly, Peking, Moscow, and their allies now feel that, with the world balance as it stands, they must concentrate on influencing the existing governments in nonCommunist Asia, while standing ready to exploit revolutionary situations within these countries if and when they occur.

Peking’s policy is never confined exclusively to either blandishments or pressures, however. Attraction is always mixed with intimidation and subversion, even though the recipe constantly changes. This fact is probably clear to a good many more Asians now than it was during 1955 and 1956, when the Bandung spirit was at its height. Since the latter half of 1957, Peking has shown a new militancy in its foreign policy, and this has greatly affected Communist China’s relations with the rest of Asia.

Communist China has applied new pressures or threats in a variety of ways and places: by banning all trade with Japan; hinting at its willingness to send “volunteers” to the Middle East and Indonesia; using its own brand of brinkmanship in bombarding Quemoy; engaging in cutthroat economic competition in Southeast Asia; issuing warnings to South Vietnam about its activities in the Paracel Islands, which Peking claims; and exerting strong pressures on India and Laos. These pressures and threats have greatly tarnished the five principles, even in the eyes of Asians who have been most predisposed to view the Chinese Communist regime sympathetically.

Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude that Peking has abandoned its general tactics of peaceful coexistence. It seems likely that, while its blend of attraction and intimidation may vary from time to time, Peking will continue focusing its efforts on the short-term aim of separating the non-Communist Asian nations from the West and aligning them with the Communist bloc, while steadily working to build up Communist China’s prestige and influence throughout Asia.

IN PURSUING its foreign policy goals, Peking has numerous instruments of policy at its command: its military power, both conventional diplomacy and “people’s diplomacy,” trade and aid, the Overseas Chinese, and the Communist parties throughout Asia.

Communist China’s military forces, reorganized and modernized since 1949, are now probably stronger than the military establishments of all the non-Communist nations of the Far East, Southeast Asia, and South Asia combined. Peking has two and a half million men in its People’s Liberation Army, backed by millions more in its reserves and its militia; 2500 planes in its air force, 1800 or more of them jets; and a navy which, although small, is nevertheless the largest indigenous naval force in the Far East. All of these forces are supported by continuing Soviet assistance and advice.

For the past several years, there has been a rough sort of balance between American atomic weapons and Chinese manpower, and Peking, in the name of peaceful coexistence, has refrained from bringing the full weight of its military power to bear on its Asian neighbors. Nevertheless, Communist China’s growing strength has steadily enhanced its international prestige and its ability to make its political weight felt in Asian affairs. No country on China’s periphery can today overlook the fact that Peking, even when speaking softly, carries a big stick.

But until recently, in pursuing tactics of competitive coexistence, the Chinese Communists have de-emphasized military pressure on their neighbors and have made vigorous efforts to expand their influence throughout the Asian-African world by more conventional and respectable political and economic means.

Diplomatically ostracized by the United States and excluded from most international bodies, Peking has nevertheless steadily expanded its contacts abroad. Its successes have been most notable in South and Southeast Asia and in the Middle East and North Africa, where it has been able to establish diplomatic relations with Burma, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, the U.A.R., Yemen, Ceylon, Cambodia, Iraq, Morocco, and Sudan. At the height of Chou En-lai’s freewheeling drive to broaden and develop Communist China’s diplomatic influence, during 1954 to 1956, the Chinese Communists signed numerous joint statements and communiqués with the leaders of nonaligned nations in Asia, and they concluded several important intergovernmental agreements with India, Indonesia, and others.

In all of its diplomatic dealings, Peking has persistently worked toward certain limited aims: to arouse and exploit anticolonial resentments, to reinforce neutralism, to highlight existing areas of agreement between the Communist bloc and the newly independent nations, to mobilize support for the Communists’ views on issues such as the control of atomic weapons, and in subtle ways to align the nonaligned nations with the Communist orbit. The impact of its efforts on the AsianAfrican world should not be underestimated. It is true that, since the hardening of the Communists’ policies in 1957, and particularly since Peking’s suppression of revolt in Tibet, many Asians have taken a more critical look at Communist China. But it would be wishful thinking to assume that Peking has lost all of its power of attraction.


ONE of the most remarkable aspects of Communist foreign policy in recent years is the fact that, despite China’s immense domestic economic problems, it has become a major participant in the Communist bloc’s economic offensive, focusing on the underdeveloped areas.

Peking’s total foreign trade has more than doubled in the past decade, rising from $1.8 billion in 1950 to perhaps $4.9 billion in 1958. In contrast to the years before 1949, the bulk of this trade has been with Russia and Eastern Europe, and it has consisted essentially of an exchange of Chinese agricultural products for needed capital goods. Since 1952, however, the Chinese Communists have steadily increased their trade with the non-Communist nations, and they have vigorously promoted trade with the Asian-African area. Peking’s political motives undoubtedly go beyond the simple aim of purchasing good will; since 1958, its strong economic sanctions against Japan and its drastic price cutting, bordering on dumping, in Southeast Asia provide a warning that Peking may be able to use trade as an instrument of direct political pressure.

At present, Communist China is trading with more than eighty non-Communist countries or areas. By early this year, it had signed formal, intergovernmental trade pacts with a wide range of countries in the Asian-African area: India, Afghanistan, Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, the U.A.R., Lebanon, Nepal, Yemen, Tunis, Morocco, Iraq, and Sudan. Of Peking’s total trade with the non-Communist world, roughly two thirds is now with the Asian-African area, and in the Far East and South and Southeast Asia, Communist China accounts for over two thirds of the entire Communist bloc’s trade. In this trade, the Chinese Communists maintain a large export surplus, and they are steadily expanding their exports of manufactured goods — textiles, other consumer goods, and even some capital goods. They are beginning to compete seriously with Japan and other industrial nations. Between 1954 and 1957, Communist China’s trade with the underdeveloped countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia rose by more than three quarters, at a rate over three times as fast as the increase of Japanese trade with the area.


Peking has also entered into the business of foreign aid. Since 1953, if one includes its aid to other Communist regimes, the Chinese Communists have given more than $750 million in grants and $150 million in loans (this loan figure is incomplete, since the amounts of a few loans have not been announced) to North Korea, North Vietnam, and Outer Mongolia, and have also provided more than $30 million in grants and loans to Hungary.

Communist China’s aid to countries outside the Communist orbit started only in 1956, and to date it has been relatively modest. But the fact that Peking is giving any aid at all to countries in South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East is significant. All of its programs of aid to these countries fall into a definite pattern. They have been given to nonaligned nations, with the clear aim of reinforcing neutralism and building up Communist China’s political prestige as well as its economic influence. Peking’s promises to these countries include grants totaling more than $60 million to Cambodia, Nepal, Egypt, and Ceylon, and loans totaling over $40 million to Yemen, Indonesia, Burma, and Ceylon.

This year, Communist China plans, according to its budget, to deliver over $250 million of foreign aid to both Communist and non-Communist countries. This is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that, as far as is known, Peking itself is not now receiving any financial aid from the Soviet Union in the form of either grants or long-term loans. It is also worth noting that the total foreign aid which Peking plans to deliver this year, if expressed as a percentage of China’s small national income, takes a slice out of economic output which is comparable to that which the United States is allocating to its foreign economic aid programs.


DIPLOMACY, trade, and aid are useful to Peking in its current dealings with existing governments in Asia, but Peking’s ultimate objective is to encourage successful revolutions throughout Asia. In the long run, what it hopes most to export is revolution, and even though its general tactics of peaceful coexistence have forced it to play down this aim for the present and to be discreet and covert about encouraging subversion, the objective remains unchanged.

Among Peking’s various instruments for promoting subversion, the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia have attracted wide attention in recent years. They are certainly important, and in a few key areas they will probably be decisive in determining the shape of the future. But their importance should not be exaggerated; in Peking’s strategy toward Asia as a whole, their role is clearly a subordinate one.

There are about ten million Overseas Chinese living in Southeast Asia. With impressive commercial skills, they have acquired great economic power, and the large majority of them are unassimilated. Almost every Southeast Asian government regards them as a major problem and would like both to reduce their economic influence and to integrate them more fully into the local societies. A large percentage of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia have retained ties of many sorts with their homeland, and both the Communists and the Nationalists have competed actively to obtain their loyalty. Ever since 1949, Peking has devoted major attention to the Overseas Chinese, and with the advantage of its growing power it has manipulated them in various ways to serve its purposes. They provide valuable sources of intelligence as well as channels for financial or other aid to local Communist and proCommunist groups.


Where the Overseas Chinese make up a large proportion of the population, as in Singapore, Malaya, and Thailand, they are potentially an extremely important instrument of Peking’s influence. In all three of these areas, the local Communist movements are essentially Chinese in membership, and without any doubt Peking regards the Overseas Chinese as the key to the future of the entire Malayan peninsula. In Singapore, specifically, the political dangers which they pose are immediate. Communist-manipulated and pro-Peking Chinese laborers and students provide much of the political backing for the People’s Action Party, which won a landslide victory in last summer’s Singapore elections. If these elements were to gain complete control of the PAP, they would undoubtedly try gradually to convert the new state of Singapore, at the crossroads of Southeast Asia, into a political satellite of Peking.

Peking’s strategy elsewhere in Asia depends far more on the indigenous Communist parties than on the Overseas Chinese. Confident that these parties will eventually gain power, the Chinese Communists constantly strive to support them.

Although Communist China’s people’s diplomacy emphasizes so-called cultural relations, it has a strongly subversive purpose. It might, in fact, be called overt subversion. Peking distributes an enormous amount of Communist propaganda in Asia through the conventional media of communication. It has become a mecca for visitors from all over Asia and has arranged exchanges of persons on a wide scale. Even more important, it has supported the establishment within other Asian countries of numerous front organizations which mobilize the support of thousands of nonCommunists behind Communist-sponsored causes. Its aim in all of these activities is to foster favorable, or at least benevolently tolerant, attitudes among key groups in other Asian countries toward Communist China, toward the Communist bloc as a whole, and toward local Communist movements. People’s diplomacy aims at the cultivation of fellow travelers and potential converts to serve both as lobbyists within their own countries for the ideas and policies of the Communist bloc and as backers of local Communist causes.


The spread of Communism in Asia will not be accomplished by fellow travelers, however, and Peking’s main hopes obviously rest upon the hardcore Communist parties in each non - Communist country. Since the early 1920s, the Chinese Communists have maintained links with many of these parties, and, since 1949, Peking has become, along with Moscow, a major center of guidance and support to them. During the past decade it has channeled financial support to the parties in several countries, but its major support, particularly since the world-wide shift in Communist tactics from violent insurrection to political maneuver, has been intangible. Peking has given constant encouragement and advice, and possibly training, to other Asian Communists. The stamp of the Chinese model for revolution has had a wide impact throughout Asia, even though the path of armed insurrection which Peking proclaimed a decade ago as China’s strategic prescription for Asia has been subordinated, at least temporarily.

In the past few years, the growth of Communist strength has been disturbing in many areas. In Indonesia, the Communist Party’s membership is claimed to have jumped from 8000 in 1952 to more than a million in 1957; and in the 1957 local elections, when it received 8 million votes, it emerged as the strongest single party on Java, the center of political power in Indonesia. In Laos, the pro-Communist Pathet Lao, converted into a legal party called the Neo Lao Haksat, won most of the seats which it contested in the 1958 elections. In India, the Communist Party, having doubled its membership between 1952 and 1957, emerged as the second strongest national party in the 1957 elections, and in mid-1959 reverted to insurrectionary tactics.


In the past year or more, the growth of Communism seems to have been checked, for the moment, in some places. Since late 1958, nonCommunist military leaders have taken control or political leaders with military backing have assumed special powers in a number of Asian countries, including Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, and Laos. Wherever this has taken place, there has been a clampdown on Communist activities, but, as events in Laos indicate, one cannot conclude that the basic Communist threat has been substantially reduced. Anti-Communist military leaders have assumed new political importance in these countries because of a breakdown of democratic institutions and processes, and it remains to be seen whether the new regimes will be able to strike successfully at the root causes of Communist growth.

In an Asia characterized by continuing revolution, instability, and an uneasy balance of power, the growing power and influence of Communist China pose a major challenge to the United States and all other nations concerned with the future of the region. The United States must recognize that it cannot avoid engaging in a longterm contest with Communist China throughout Asia, a contest which is now, and will continue to be, ideological, political, and economic, as well as military. The tasks which face the United States in this contest are formidable. In direct dealings with Communist China, it must attempt to deter aggression, avoid war, and — to the extent possible — reduce the present acute military tensions on China’s immediate periphery. In meeting the broad challenge which Communist China poses throughout Asia, it must help to build strong nonCommunist states which can maintain their national integrity in the face of both external pressures and internal subversion. These tasks will demand a high level of statesmanship and a far larger commitment of American resources — intellectual, moral, and material — than the United States has been willing to make so far.


红色中国对亚洲的影响
A. 多克-巴尼特（DOAK BARNETT）在中国出生和长大，他的大部分职业生涯都在研究中国事务。巴尼特先生曾是国务院的成员，现在是福特基金会的项目助理。本文摘自他的新书《共产主义中国和亚洲：对美国政策的挑战》，将于明年初由哈珀为外交关系委员会出版。

作者：A. Doak Barnett
1959年12月号

作者：A. Doak Barnett

在中国共产党人建立北京政权后的十年里，毛泽东和他的追随者在稳步改善其国内政权基础的同时，一直坚持不懈地努力实现雄心勃勃的外交政策目标。重要的是，要理解这些目标以及中国共产党人追求这些目标的策略。有必要提出一些基本问题。中国共产党人是如何看待世界的？他们认为中国在其中的作用应该是什么？他们试图实现什么，他们日常的外交政策策略与长期的战略概念有什么关系？


对中国共产党的许多目标可能存在分歧，但北京的领导人明确指出了一件事：他们决心被接受为一个大国。周恩来总理在1956年直言不讳地指出了这一点；他说，"在解决任何重大国际问题时 "都应该听取中国共产党的意见。

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此外，中国共产党人显然接受了一个新版本的 "亚洲人的亚洲"，并且似乎相信，如果能够将西方的影响从亚洲驱逐出去，共产党中国将自动成为该地区的主导力量。周恩来在1954年的日内瓦会议上对这一想法做了最清晰的表述。"我们认为，"他宣称，"应停止对亚洲国家内部事务的干涉，拆除亚洲的所有外国军事基地，撤出驻扎在亚洲的外国武装部队，防止日本的再军事化，并废除所有经济封锁和限制。" 这是一种坦率而简明的说法，把亚洲留给我们。

在中国共产党人的眼中，美国是他们的主要敌人。它是目前唯一能够制衡他们的力量并阻挠他们实现许多基本目标的国家。所有与美国结盟的国家都被轻蔑地称为仅仅是 "帝国主义的工具"。

北京的领导人特别重视日本作为区域安全方面的关键国家的作用。当毛泽东从这个职位上退休时，接替毛泽东担任共和国主席的刘少奇曾非常明确地指出这一点。"如果没有日本作为基地，美帝国主义或任何其他帝国主义势力不可能在远东发动大规模的侵略战争，"刘少奇在1953年宣布，"可以说，只要能够防止日本或任何其他可能与日本合作的国家恢复侵略和侵犯和平，远东的和平就有保障。"

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在中国的周边地区，还有一些被北京视为对其国家利益特别重要的地区。当然，最重要的是台湾。中国共产党人把台湾视为未解放的中国领土，从这个意义上说，它根本不是一个外交政策问题。虽然他们显然希望在不冒与美国发生重大战争的风险的情况下最终赢得台湾，但他们肯定会继续试图探测、威胁和颠覆中国国民党和美国的立场，由于这个原因，台湾海峡地区在未来很长一段时间内无疑将继续处于危险和潜在的爆炸性状态。

中国共产党人对其所有的边境地区都很敏感，像过去大多数强大的中国统治者一样，他们在中国周遭的许多地方都施加了压力。毫无疑问，北京现在把朝鲜和北越都视为非常重要的缓冲区，它可能会不遗余力地防止在这两个地区或从这两个地区产生对中国的任何严重军事威胁。它已经探测了缅甸未确定的边界，并对中国在其他一些尚未明确解决的边界上的意图产生了严重怀疑。可以想象，在未来的某个时候，中国共产党人可能会在其他地方，对香港和澳门，就像他们对西藏和某些印度和缅甸领土一样，提出不可剥夺的要求，而且他们有一天可能会试图在外蒙古或苏联远东重新建立领土要求，因为中国人曾经在那里占主导地位。

然而，尽管北京的领导人和任何现代国家的领导人一样，对领土问题、国家安全问题和类似问题有着巨大而真实的关注，但这些并不能成为理解他们世界观的唯一关键。还必须在他们的意识形态信念中寻找关键。毫无疑问，这些人是真正的革命者，有着强烈的使命感，要加快 "不可避免的 "世界革命的进程。意识形态显然塑造了北京的战略，并为其外交政策的目的和手段提供了依据。虽然中国共产党人在解释他们的意识形态时是务实的，但如果认为意识形态不过是他们国家利益的一个毫无意义的外衣，那将是一个大错误。事实上，它是他们战略的一个基本决定因素。

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中国共产党人认为世界正在进行一场长期的、持续的、激烈的革命斗争，这个简单的事实具有深刻的意义。他们不是从根本上关心冻结现有的现状，稳定局势，或永久地解决问题。相反，他们感兴趣的是促进不断的变化，希望每一个变化，无论多么微小，都能促进他们的长期目标。他们认为世界范围内的斗争是巨大的社会、经济和政治力量--有些与特定的民族国家有关，有些则跨越国界--正在争夺最高地位。


因此，国际关系不仅是政府之间的常规交易问题。政府与政府之间的关系被认为是重要的，这是事实；但在北京的眼中，同样重要的是，必须利用一切可能的手段，正式的和非正式的，公开的和隐蔽的，来影响外国的社会趋势、政治观点和经济状况，以便对其他政府的政策施加间接影响，并在有利的情况下，促进革命的变化。

以这种方式看待世界，中国共产党领导人有一套非常复杂的权力哲学，这是在他们自己在中国的斗争中演变出来的。他们当然相信军事和政治力量之间存在着密切的关系。20多年前，毛泽东在一个经常被引用的声明中直言不讳地宣布 "政治权力是从枪杆子里生出来的。. . 任何东西都可以从枪杆子里长出来。"

然而，中国共产党人也认识到，现代世界的权力是许多复杂因素的产物--政治、经济、心理以及军事--是人民和思想以及枪支的产物。事实上，他们特别重视人的思想，似乎认为通过操纵人的思想，他们可以获得对基本社会力量的控制，从而抵消甚至拥有更强军事力量的敌人的力量。因此，尽管他们非常强调军事力量的必要性，但他们的持续世界革命的概念并不是一个简单的军事征服的想法。它所涉及的战略比公开的军事扩张主义要复杂和微妙得多。


在将战略转化为战术方面，中国共产党人是 "之 "字形的高手。虽然战术上的机会主义是各地共产党人的特点，但毛泽东和他的追随者们在中国的革命中阐述了一种灵活的学说，这种学说具有独特的中国色彩。正如他们所做的那样，从长远角度考虑，他们准备在必要时进行战术性撤退，而不放弃对最终目标的不断努力。"毛泽东曾说："以守为攻，以退为进，以退为进：这些都是任何事件或事物发展过程中不可避免的现象。我们都知道，在拳击比赛中，明智的拳击手通常会让步"。

最重要的是，中国共产党人看到了两个阵营之间不间断的竞争。一方是莫斯科、北京和所谓的 "和平阵营"，另一方是美国及其在 "帝国主义阵营 "的盟友。每一种情况、每一个问题、每一个议题都要根据其与这一基本斗争的关系以及与稳步扩大共产主义领域的规模、实力和影响这一基本目标的关系进行评估。

在这两极之间是殖民地和半殖民地国家，未承诺的国家，以及被列宁视为帝国主义 "后方基地 "的广大地区，没有这些基地，资本主义世界将崩溃。中国共产党人将这一地区视为政治战场，是两大阵营斗争的主要焦点，他们认为，中国作为中苏联盟的亚洲伙伴，必须在共产党人对这一地区的态度上发挥非常大的作用。

在其长期目标设定的大框架内，北京在与莫斯科的密切协调下，在过去十年中对其外交政策进行了一些策略上的转变，其中最重要的是对非共产主义亚洲国家的态度转变，在它看来，这些国家属于殖民和半殖民世界。这些转变对共产党中国与整个亚洲的关系产生了深远的影响。最突出的对比是北京和整个共产主义集团在1952年至1954年期间发展起来的和平共处策略，以及中国共产党人在第一次掌权时采取的好战的革命姿态。

在1949年的第一次胜利中，党的领导人显然相信他们自己的成功会给整个亚洲的共产主义叛乱带来决定性的推动力，他们公开地、毫不掩饰地宣布了他们广泛的革命目标。刘少奇呼吁在任何可能的地方进行武装斗争，他宣布："中国人民所走的道路......也是各个殖民地和半殖民地国家的人民在争取民族独立和人民民主的斗争中应该走的道路。" 亚洲的所有非共产主义领导人，包括不结盟国家的领导人，都被视为 "帝国主义 "的 "走狗 "和 "雇佣者"。

五年后，北京和整个共产主义集团以一种新的、非常不同的面貌出现。中国共产党人开始了一场重要的外交活动，向亚洲的非共产党政府，特别是不结盟国家的政府示好。1954年4月，他们与印度签署了一项重要协议，体现了现在著名的 "和平共处五项原则"，其中北京承诺不干涉其他国家的事务。

周恩来很快就把这些原则变成了一首重要的主题曲，他试图以此吸引不结盟国家与共产主义集团在一个广泛的 "和平区 "中保持一致。"革命不是为了出口，"周恩来平淡地向印度人、缅甸人和其他国家保证。然后，在1955年初的亚非国家万隆会议上，他采取了一种和解的姿态，对许多亚洲人产生了广泛影响。周恩来在万隆会议上宣布，我们 "来这里是为了寻求团结，而不是为了争吵"；所有亚洲国家都应该 "寻求共同点"，他说，这将在 "消除殖民主义的痛苦和灾难 "中找到。

从那时起，整个共产主义集团在奉行这种和平共处的方针时，一直在大力吸引亚洲的非共产主义国家。尽管最近其政策趋于强硬，北京似乎有可能在很长一段时间内继续采取这些策略，除非它认定世界力量的平衡已经急剧地转向对共产党有利。显然，北京、莫斯科和他们的盟友现在觉得，在目前的世界平衡下，他们必须集中精力影响非共产主义亚洲的现有政府，同时随时准备在这些国家的革命局势发生时加以利用。

然而，北京的政策从来没有完全局限于诱惑或施压。吸引总是与恐吓和颠覆混合在一起，尽管配方不断变化。与1955年和1956年万隆精神最鼎盛的时候相比，现在可能有更多的亚洲人清楚这个事实。自1957年下半年以来，北京在其外交政策中表现出一种新的好战性，这大大影响了共产党中国与亚洲其他国家的关系。

共产党中国以各种方式和地点施加新的压力或威胁：禁止与日本的所有贸易；暗示愿意向中东和印度尼西亚派遣 "志愿者"；在轰炸金门时使用自己的边缘政策；在东南亚进行残酷的经济竞争；对南越在北京声称拥有的西沙群岛的活动发出警告；对印度和老挝施加强大压力。这些压力和威胁极大地玷污了五项原则，甚至在那些最倾向于同情中共政权的亚洲人眼中也是如此。

然而，如果得出结论说北京已经放弃了其和平共处的一般策略，那将是一个错误。尽管其吸引和恐吓的方式可能会时有变化，但北京可能会继续集中精力实现短期目标，将非共产主义的亚洲国家从西方分离出来，使其与共产主义集团结盟，同时稳步地在整个亚洲建立起共产主义中国的威望和影响力。

为了实现其外交政策目标，北京拥有众多政策工具：军事力量、常规外交和 "人民外交"、贸易和援助、海外华人以及亚洲各地的共产党。

自1949年以来，中国共产党的军队经过重组和现代化，现在可能比远东、东南亚和南亚所有非共产主义国家的军事机构加起来还要强大。北京的人民解放军有250万人，还有几百万人的后备军和民兵支持；空军有2500架飞机，其中1800架以上是喷气式飞机；海军虽然规模不大，但却是远东地区最大的本土海军力量。所有这些部队都得到了苏联的持续援助和建议。

在过去的几年里，美国的原子武器和中国的人力之间存在着一种粗略的平衡，北京以和平共处的名义，避免将其军事力量的全部力量用于其亚洲邻国。然而，中国共产党的实力不断增强，稳步提高了其国际威望和在亚洲事务中发挥政治影响力的能力。今天，中国周边的任何国家都不能忽视这样一个事实，即北京即使说得很轻，也会有大棒。

但直到最近，在推行竞争性共存的策略时，中国共产党人不再强调对邻国的军事压力，而是通过更常规、更令人尊敬的政治和经济手段，大力拓展其在整个亚非世界的影响力。

北京在外交上受到美国的排斥，并被排除在大多数国际机构之外，但它还是稳步扩大了它在国外的联系。它的成功在南亚和东南亚以及中东和北非最为明显，在那里它能够与缅甸、印度、印度尼西亚、巴基斯坦、阿富汗、尼泊尔、阿拉伯联合酋长国、也门、锡兰、柬埔寨、伊拉克、摩洛哥和苏丹建立外交关系。在周恩来为扩大和发展中国共产党的外交影响而进行的自由活动的高峰期，在1954年至1956年期间，中国共产党人与亚洲不结盟国家的领导人签署了许多联合声明和公报，他们与印度、印度尼西亚和其他国家缔结了一些重要的政府间协议。

在其所有的外交活动中，北京一直在努力实现某些有限的目标：激起和利用反殖民主义的怨恨，加强中立主义，强调共产主义集团和新独立国家之间现有的协议领域，动员人们支持共产党在控制原子武器等问题上的观点，并以微妙的方式使不结盟国家与共产党的轨道保持一致。它的努力对亚非世界的影响不应该被低估。诚然，自从1957年共产党的政策变得强硬以来，特别是北京镇压西藏的叛乱以来，许多亚洲人对共产党中国采取了更严厉的态度。但是，如果认为北京已经完全失去了它的吸引力，那将是一厢情愿的想法。


近年来，共产主义外交政策最引人注目的一个方面是，尽管中国有巨大的国内经济问题，但它已成为共产主义集团经济攻势的主要参与者，重点是不发达地区。

北京的对外贸易总额在过去十年中增加了一倍多，从1950年的18亿美元上升到1958年的49亿美元。与1949年以前的情况不同，这种贸易的大部分是与俄罗斯和东欧的贸易，而且基本上是用中国的农产品换取所需的资本货物。然而，自1952年以来，中国共产党人稳步增加了与非共产主义国家的贸易，并大力促进与亚非地区的贸易。北京的政治动机无疑超出了购买善意的简单目的；自1958年以来，它对日本的强力经济制裁和在东南亚的大幅降价，近乎于倾销，提供了一个警告，北京可能会利用贸易作为直接政治压力的工具。

目前，共产党中国正在与八十多个非共产党国家或地区进行贸易。到今年年初，它已经与亚非地区的许多国家签订了正式的政府间贸易协定。印度、阿富汗、锡兰、缅甸、印度尼西亚、柬埔寨、阿拉伯联合酋长国、黎巴嫩、尼泊尔、也门、突尼斯、摩洛哥、伊拉克和苏丹。在北京与非共产主义世界的贸易总额中，现在大约有三分之二是与亚非地区的贸易，而在远东、南亚和东南亚，共产主义中国占整个共产主义集团贸易的三分之二以上。在这种贸易中，中国共产党人保持着大量的出口盈余，他们正在稳步扩大其制成品的出口--纺织品、其他消费品，甚至一些资本货物。他们开始与日本和其他工业国家认真竞争。在1954年和1957年之间，共产党中国与远东和东南亚不发达国家的贸易增长了四分之三以上，其速度是日本与该地区贸易增长速度的三倍以上。


北京也进入了对外援助的领域。自1953年以来，如果包括对其他共产党政权的援助，中国共产党已经向朝鲜、北越和外蒙古提供了超过7.5亿美元的赠款和1.5亿美元的贷款（这个贷款数字并不完整，因为有几笔贷款的金额还没有公布），还向匈牙利提供了超过3000万美元的赠款和贷款。

共产党中国对共产党轨道以外的国家的援助从1956年才开始，到目前为止，援助额度相对不大。但北京向南亚、东南亚和中东国家提供任何援助的事实是很重要的。它对这些国家的所有援助项目都有一个明确的模式。它们都是提供给不结盟国家的，目的很明确，就是为了加强中立主义，建立共产主义中国的政治威望和经济影响力。北京对这些国家的承诺包括向柬埔寨、尼泊尔、埃及和锡兰提供总额超过6000万美元的赠款，以及向也门、印度尼西亚、缅甸和锡兰提供总额超过4000万美元的贷款。

根据其预算，今年，共产党中国计划向共产党和非共产党国家提供超过2.5亿美元的对外援助。这一点特别引人注目，因为就目前所知，北京本身并没有从苏联获得任何赠款或长期贷款形式的财政援助。还值得注意的是，北京今年计划提供的对外援助总额，如果以中国少量国民收入的百分比来表示，就是从经济产出中抽出一块，与美国分配给其对外经济援助项目的数额相当。


在目前与亚洲现有政府的交往中，民主、贸易和援助对北京有用，但北京的最终目标是鼓励整个亚洲的成功革命。从长远来看，它最希望输出的是革命，尽管其和平共处的一般策略迫使它在目前淡化这一目标，并在鼓励颠覆方面保持谨慎和隐蔽，但目标仍然没有改变。

在北京推动颠覆的各种工具中，东南亚的华侨华人近年来引起了广泛的关注。他们当然很重要，而且在一些关键领域，他们可能会对决定未来的形式起到决定性作用。但是他们的重要性不应该被夸大；在北京对整个亚洲的战略中，他们的作用显然是次要的。

大约有1000万海外华人生活在东南亚。他们拥有令人印象深刻的商业技能，获得了巨大的经济力量，而他们中的绝大多数人都没有被同化。几乎每个东南亚国家的政府都把他们视为一个大问题，并希望减少他们的经济影响，使他们更充分地融入当地社会。東南亞的華僑中有很大一部分人與他們的祖國保持著各種聯繫，共產黨和國民黨都在積極爭奪他們的忠誠。自1949年以来，北京对华侨华人给予了极大的关注，并利用其日益强大的实力，以各种方式操纵他们为自己服务。他们为当地的共产党和亲共团体提供了宝贵的情报来源，以及财政或其他援助渠道。


在新加坡、马来亚和泰国，当海外华人在人口中占很大比例时，他们就有可能成为北京影响力的重要工具。在所有这三个地区，当地的共产主义运动基本上都是由华人组成的，毫无疑问，北京将海外华人视为整个马来亚半岛未来的关键。特别是在新加坡，他们所带来的政治危险是直接的。被共产党操纵的亲北京的劳工和学生为人民行动党提供了大量的政治支持，该党在去年夏天的新加坡选举中获得了压倒性的胜利。如果这些人获得了对人民行动党的完全控制，他们无疑会试图逐步将这个位于东南亚十字路口的新新加坡国变成北京的政治卫星。

北京在亚洲其他地区的战略更多的是取决于本地的共产党，而不是海外华人。中国共产党人确信这些政党最终会获得权力，因此不断努力支持它们。

尽管中国共产党的人民外交强调所谓的文化关系，但它有强烈的颠覆性目的。事实上，它可能被称为公开的颠覆。北京通过常规的传播媒介在亚洲分发大量的共产主义宣传品。它已成为亚洲各地游客的圣地，并安排了大规模的人员交流。更重要的是，它支持在其他亚洲国家建立许多前沿组织，动员成千上万的非共产党员支持共产党赞助的事业。在所有这些活动中，它的目的是在亚洲其他国家的关键群体中培养对共产主义中国、对整个共产主义集团以及对当地共产主义运动的有利态度，或者至少是善意的宽容态度。人民外交的目的是培养同路人和潜在的皈依者，让他们在自己的国家里为共产主义集团的思想和政策做说客，并成为当地共产主义事业的支持者。


然而，共产主义在亚洲的传播不会由同路人完成，北京的主要希望显然寄托在每个非共产主义国家的核心共产党身上。自20世纪20年代初以来，中国共产党人一直与其中的许多政党保持着联系，而且自1949年以来，北京与莫斯科一起，成为指导和支持这些政党的主要中心。在过去的十年中，北京向一些国家的政党提供了财政支持，但它的主要支持，特别是在全世界范围内共产党的策略从暴力叛乱转向政治操纵以来，一直是无形的。北京对其他亚洲共产党人给予了不断的鼓励和建议，可能还有培训。中国革命模式的印记已经在整个亚洲产生了广泛的影响，尽管北京在十年前宣布的作为中国在亚洲的战略处方的武装暴动的道路已经从属，至少是暂时的。

在过去的几年里，共产党力量的增长在许多地区都令人不安。在印度尼西亚，据称共产党员从1952年的8000人跃升至1957年的100多万人；在1957年的地方选举中，它获得了800万张选票，成为印度尼西亚政治权力中心爪哇岛上最强大的单一政党。在老挝，亲共产主义的老挝爱国者党（Pathet Lao）已经转变为一个合法的政党，称为新老挝党（Neo Lao Haksat），在1958年的选举中赢得了大部分的竞选席位。在印度，共产党在1952年至1957年期间将其党员人数增加了一倍，在1957年的选举中成为第二强大的全国性政党，并在1959年中期恢复了叛乱策略。


在过去一年多的时间里，共产主义的发展似乎在一些地方暂时得到了遏制。自1958年底以来，在一些亚洲国家，包括巴基斯坦、缅甸、印度尼西亚、泰国和老挝，非共产党的军事领导人已经控制了政权，或者有军事支持的政治领导人获得了特殊权力。无论在哪里发生这种情况，都对共产主义活动进行了镇压，但是，正如老挝的事件所表明的那样，我们不能断定共产主义的基本威胁已经大大减少。由于民主体制和程序的瓦解，反共军事领导人在这些国家具有了新的政治重要性，而新政权是否能够成功地打击共产主义增长的根源还有待观察。

在一个以持续的革命、不稳定和不稳定的权力平衡为特征的亚洲，共产主义中国日益增长的力量和影响对美国和所有其他关心该地区未来的国家构成了重大挑战。美国必须认识到，它不能避免在整个亚洲与共产主义中国进行长期的较量，这种较量现在是，并将继续是，意识形态、政治、经济以及军事方面的较量。在这场较量中，美国所面临的任务是艰巨的。在与中国共产党的直接交往中，它必须试图阻止侵略，避免战争，并且--尽可能--减少目前在中国周边的严重军事紧张局势。在应对共产主义中国在整个亚洲构成的广泛挑战时，它必须帮助建立强大的非共产主义国家，这些国家在面对外部压力和内部颠覆时能够保持其国家完整。这些任务将需要高水平的政治家和美国的资源承诺--智力、道德和物质--远远超过美国迄今为止愿意作出的承诺。