2022.10.13 对毒品的需求导致秘鲁的童工人数激增

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对毒品的需求导致秘鲁的童工人数激增
在古柯种植区长大的孩子在成年后异常可能因谋杀罪入狱
2022年10月13日



非法毒品贸易的许多代价是显而易见的。每年因消费者用药过量以及贩运者和交易商之间的暴力而造成的死亡人数不断增加。然而，这个行业所造成的全部损失要广泛得多。普林斯顿大学的Maria Micaela Sviatschi最近发表的一篇论文显示，对古柯叶（可卡因的原料）的需求将秘鲁的一代儿童从学校推到了犯罪的路上。

20世纪90年代末，当时世界上主要的古柯生产国哥伦比亚（今天也是如此），发起了一场打击贩毒团伙的运动。在 "哥伦比亚计划"（美国提供的一揽子军事和财政援助）的支持下，这项工作包括在古柯种植区喷洒作物杀伤剂。结果，该国的古柯产量在一段时间内下降。由于供应减少，需求没有变化，价格上涨。

安第斯山脉与亚马逊盆地交汇处的山谷中，邻国秘鲁的农民注意到了这一点。相对于其他作物，古柯的利润越高，他们就越想种植古柯。然而，与咖啡或可可不同的是，大部分古柯叶被用于非法用途。农民家庭似乎找到了解决办法，那就是将劳动委托给太年轻的儿童，使他们无法被起诉。


为了衡量这一效果，斯维亚茨基女士将农业和生态数据与家庭调查和毒品价格联系起来。她发现，1997-2003年，随着古柯价格的飙升，古柯种植区的童工率上升了30%，准备上中学的儿童中辍学的比例增加了26%。在秘鲁的其他地区，这些比率的上升幅度并不大。

其后果是令人沮丧的持久性。Sviatschi女士发现，在古柯价格翻倍的地区，当时11-14岁的儿童在18-30岁之间因谋杀而入狱的比例增加了30%。在不同地区长大的同龄儿童中，或者在同一地区早生或晚生的儿童中，没有类似的增长。受影响的儿童犯下不同于毒品交易的其他罪行的机会也没有增加，例如盗窃或性侵犯。对这种模式最可能的解释是，种植古柯的儿童获得了宝贵的行业知识，如如何将古柯变成可卡因或在哪里找到买家，这反过来又导致他们继续从事这一行业。

斯维亚茨基女士确实发现了一个有希望的补救措施。从理论上讲，如果父母让他们的孩子种植古柯是因为这是维持生计的唯一途径，那么如果有其他经济选择，他们可能会让他们的孩子留在学校。在相关时期，古柯种植区的一些地区实施了一项现金转移计划，如果他们的孩子达到某些标准，如在学校上85%的课，那么这些家庭每月可获得30美元的收入--平均增加20%。其他地区则没有。

果然，在提供这种激励措施的地区，一旦开始实施，古柯产量下降了34%。鉴于其他禁毒政策的高成本和低影响，这种计划看起来很划算。



The youngest victims
Demand for drugs caused a surge in child labour in Peru
Kids who grew up in coca-growing areas were unusually likely to be imprisoned for murder as adults
Oct 13th 2022

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Many costs of the illegal drug trade are easy to see. Body counts mount every year from overdoses by consumers and violence among traffickers and dealers. The full damage that the business inflicts, however, is far broader. A recent paper by Maria Micaela Sviatschi of Princeton University shows that demand for coca leaves, from which cocaine is produced, pushed a generation of children in Peru out of school and into lives of crime.

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In the late 1990s Colombia, then the world’s leading coca producer (as it is again today), launched a campaign against drug gangs. Bolstered by Plan Colombia, a package of military and financial aid from the United States, the effort included spraying crop-killing chemicals in coca-growing areas. As a result, the country’s coca output fell for a while. With less supply and no change in demand, prices rose.

Farmers in neighbouring Peru, in valleys where the Andes meet the Amazon basin, took notice. The more profitable coca became relative to other crops, the more coca they sought to grow. Unlike coffee or cacao, however, most of the coca leaves were destined for illegal use. The solution farming families appear to have found was to delegate the labour to children too young to be prosecuted.


To measure this effect, Ms Sviatschi linked agricultural and ecological data with household surveys and drug prices. She found that in 1997-2003, as coca prices surged, the child-labour rate in coca-growing areas rose by 30% and the share of children set to begin secondary school who dropped out increased by 26%. These rates did not rise as much in other parts of Peru.

The consequences have been depressingly durable. Ms Sviatschi found that in regions where the price of coca doubled, the share of children then aged 11-14 who went on to be imprisoned for murder between the ages of 18 and 30 rose by 30%. There was no similar increase among children of the same age who grew up in different regions, or among those in the same areas who were born earlier or later. There was also no increase in the affected children’s chances of committing other crimes distinct from the drug trade, such as theft or sexual assault. The most likely explanation for this pattern is that children who grow coca acquire valuable industry-specific knowledge, such as how to turn it into cocaine or where to find buyers, that in turn leads them to stay in the business.


Ms Sviatschi did find one promising remedy. In theory, if parents had their kids grow coca because it was the only way to make ends meet, they might keep their children in school if given economic alternatives. And during the relevant time period, some districts in coca-growing zones ran a cash-transfer scheme that gave families $30 a month—a 20% increase in income, on average—if their children met certain criteria, such as attending 85% of classes in school. Other regions did not.

Sure enough, in areas that offered this incentive, coca production fell by 34% once it was introduced. Given the high cost and low impact of other anti-drug policies, such schemes look like a bargain.■